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Preface
Academic literature on financial modeling typically assumes that the probability law governing future
realizations of key economic quantities is known to decision makers; this implies that the relevant
source of uncertainty in the model is risk, that is, uncertainty deriving from the randomness of future
contingencies with known odds. Knight first and Keynes successively emphasized the importance of
the distinction between risk and ambiguity, the latter being defined as the situation in which agents
do not rely on a single probability law for assessing future events. Ambiguity aversion means that
investors penalize this unprecise probabilistic description in their preference orderings.
As will be discussed later in more details, the academic community has realized that ambiguity
aversion is a plausible explanations for many financial phenomena. The interest in such a modeling
device was indeed enhanced by the strong support found in experimental data: the famous Ellsberg’s
paradox (Ellsberg (1961)), in particular, confirmed the relevance of the distinction between risk and
ambiguity for the economic behavior of decision makers. Four bets based on a draw from two urns
are to be ranked: the urns contain either red or black balls, but the number of red balls in known only
for the fist urn (half of the balls). The first (second) bet is won if the ball drawn from the first urn is
red (black), the third (fourth) bet is won if the ball drawn from the second urn is red (black). The
prize won is constant across bets. Ellsberg noticed that decision maker are significantly indifferent
between the first and the second bet and between the third and the fourth bet, but strictly prefer
either the first or the second to either the third or the fourth. No probability distribution of balls in
the second urn can give rise to a Savage expected utility representation of this preference orderings,
therefore this paradigm is violated.
Gilboa and Schmeidler’ s (1989) seminal contribution relaxes the independence axioms to introduce
in a static setting an axiomatic theory of choice coherent with ambiguity aversion, where preference
are represented by a Max-Min expected utility over a set probability measures. Inspired by this con-
tribution, several authors have attempted to embed ambiguity aversion in an intertemporal context:
Epstein and Wang’ s (1994) make use in a discrete-time framework of a max-min recursive expected
utility criterion over a set of distributions, called Recursive Multiple Prior Utility, later axiomatized
by Epstein and Schneider (2003), who show the dynamic consistency of this approach. Indepen-
dently of this approach, a second attempt to an ambiguity averse theory of dynamic decision making
was made by Hansen, Sargent and coauthors (Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999) and Anderson,
Hansen and Sargent (2003) among other contributions) who built on Robust Control techniques to
come up with an alternative form of Max-Min expected utility.
Several recent papers focused on asset pricing have relied on ambiguity aversion to successfully
address stylized facts considered as ‘puzzles’ according to the standard Savage expected utility
modelling approach. Among these contributions we recall Uppal and Wang (2003), Epstein and
Miao (2003), for the home-bias ‘puzzle’ and underdiversification, Anderson, Hansen and Sargent
(2000), Chen and Epstein (2002), Maenhout (2001) and Sbuelz and Trojani (2002) for the equity
premium ‘puzzle’ and Leippold, Trojani and Vanini (2004) for the equity premium and interest rate
‘puzzles’. Dow and Werlang (1992) and Trojani and Vanini (2004) generate endogenous limited
stock market participation as a consequence of agents’ optimizing behavior in the absence of market
2
frictions, whereas Liu, Pan and Wang (2003) are able to mimic the typical ‘smirk’ shape of options’
implied volatilities.
The axiomatic framework of Knox (2004), Leippold, Trojani and Vanini (2004), Epstein and Schnei-
der (2002) and Hansen, Sargent and Wang (2002) tackle the issue of learning under ambiguity
aversion, and, in addition to generating economic predictions consistent with the empirical evidence,
emphasize that learning about an unknown parameter fails to resolve ambiguity asymptotically.
This Thesis is structured in two Chapters, each aimed at contributing to the existing literature
by exploring the effects of ambiguity aversion on two classical equilibrium asset pricing problems:
the term structure of interest rates and two-agents equilibrium. In both cases, ambiguity aversion
is modeled by means of a Max-Min expected utility representation that falls within the Recursive
Multiple Priors class - therefore delivering dynamic consistency of the optimal policies of the agents
- but was originally adopted by the Robust Control school of Hansen, Sargent et al. The set of
likelihood used in the preference orderings representation is identified by means of a bound on the
maximum ‘distance’ between admissible probability measures and a reference one, interpreted as
approximate description of the true data generating model.
To the end of analyzing the impact of aversion for ambiguity on agents’ consumption investment
choices and on assets pricing in a rational expectation equilibrium context, the first Chapter of the
Thesis, A General Treatment of Equilibrium under Ambiguity (joint with Fabio Trojani) considers a
continuous-time pure exchange economy populated by two agents, whose decisions rely on a whole
set of possible contaminations of a reference probabilistic model. As already pointed out implicitly,
given that they adopt a form of max-min expected utility representation, they select the worst-
case model among those considered as relevant. The methodology applied in order to characterize
equilibrium equity premia and stock returns volatility is based on a weak notion of aggregation
of the single agents into a representative agent, whose preferences depend on an additional state
variable acting as a proxy for the stochastic shifts of the cross-sectional wealth distribution due to
the different beliefs selected in equilibrium by agents. This methodology first appeared in Cuoco
and He (1994). Closed form solutions for key equilibrium quantities are detailed for markovian
specifications of the stochastic opportunity set. In accordance with the literature on ambiguity
aversion (Epstein and Wang (1994), Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2000), Trojani and Vanini, 2004;
Trojani and Sbuelz, 2002) we find that this modelling framework suggests a possible explanation of
the equity premium puzzle; what is more, endogenous cycles of restricted stock market participation
are obtained, without imposing exogenous policy restrictions on agents: the agents who refrain
from investing in risky assets select a consumption plan characterized by negligible correlation with
aggregate consumption, and since the entire variability of the latter then falls on those whose risky
position is not null, then the equilibrium risk premium is proportional to the the risk aversion of
these agents rather than to the risk aversion of the representative agent. Therefore, cycles of limited
stock market participation do indeed help overcome the inability of Lucas-type models to generate
realistic equity premia for reasonable values of risk aversion. This result has been achieved in the
literature by means of models in which the constraint of limited participation is assumed ex-ante
(Cuoco and Basak (1998) for instance), and not derived as a consequence of agent’s optimizing
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behavior.
The second Chapter of the Thesis, Ambiguity aversion, bond pricing, and the non robustness of
some affine term structures, (joint work with Patrick Gagliardini and Fabio Trojani) is inspired by
a simple consideration emphasized in the first chapter as well as in previous contributions (Trojani
and Sbuelz, 2002): the impact of ambiguity aversion is more prominent on equity premia than price
levels, therefore equilibrium models of the term structure taking into account ambiguity aversion
should allow for a wide variety of implications. In light of this, we develop a continuous time general
equilibrium model of the term structure of interest rates where economic agents are averse to model
uncertainty and consider the possibility of a misspecified dynamic model for the latent random factors
driving interest rates. Aversion to ambiguity is parameterized through the same form of Knightian
uncertainty used in the first chapter, and this form may induce first order risk aversion effects
in equilibrium if a suitable specification is selected. We find that a small concern for ambiguity
significantly affects the implied term structures in equilibrium and drives the prices of common
derivative securities toward the patterns observed in fixed income markets. Indeed, equilibrium
risk premia and interest rates have a different functional form than in the standard model, due
to an ambiguity aversion premium. Moreover, otherwise unpriced factors in the standard model
receive a premium for model uncertainty which is of a particularly rich structure in the multiple
factors setting. All these features induce in equilibrium term structure levels and shapes that are
very different from those generated by the standard model. Examples of the impact of ambiguity
aversion on popular factor models of the term structure are derived, both in cases for which the ‘level
of concern’ ambiguity is time-varying and in cases for which it is time invariant. Furthermore, we
analyze a form of ‘robustness’ property of some classes, that is, the functional differences between
equilibrium quantities and their counterparts arising in an economy with standard Savage-type
preferences.
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Chapter 1
A General Treatment of
Equilibrium Under Ambiguity
In a continuous-time, pure exchange economy on a finite horizon financial agents display ambiguity
aversion for a neighborhood of indistinguishable model specifications that are constrained in their
relative entropy from a given reference model. We characterize equilibrium optimal consumption-
portfolio choices under a general (possibly non Markovian) stochastic opportunity set by means of
martingale methods and, once we restrict to the case of most common Markovian stochastic volatility
models, we identify closed-form solutions. In an environment populated by multiple heterogeneous
agents who derive utility from intertemporal consumption and terminal wealth, we investigate the
impact of ambiguity aversion on asset prices from a rational expectations equilibrium perspective,
using a notion of state-dependent representative agent introduced in Cuoco and He (1994). Both
equilibrium interest rate and equity premium point towards a possible rationalization of the equity
premium puzzle. This result is partly driven by the ability of the model to generate endogenous cycles
of restricted stock market participation, achieved without imposing any a-priori trading constraint.
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1.1 Introduction
This paper studies the influence of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium asset prices and interest rates
in a continuous time two agent endowment economy with possibly incomplete markets. Ambiguity
refers to a situation in which the probabilistic description of the dynamics of key economic factors
is not known with certainty. Ambiguity aversion implies that the preference ordering representation
of the agents penalizes the impreciseness of this knowledge. Although the distinction between
ambiguity and standard risk aversion had been present in the literature at least since Knight (1921),
its behavioral and economic relevance has been acknowledged mainly after Ellsberg (1961) and the
literature inspired by this contribution.
Indeed recent academic papers have shown that ambiguity aversion may help to rationalize
stylized facts that are considered ‘puzzles’ according to the Savage expected utility paradigm. Among
these we recall Uppal and Wang (2003), Epstein and Miao (2003), for the home-bias ‘puzzle’ and
underdiversification, Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2000), Chen and Epstein (2002), Maenhout
(2001) and Sbuelz and Trojani (2002) for the equity premium ‘puzzle’. Dow and Werlang (1992) and
Trojani and Vanini (2004) generate endogenous limited stock market participation as a consequence
of agents’ optimizing behavior in the absence of market frictions, whereas Liu, Pan and Wang (2003)
are able to mimic the typical ‘smirk’ shape of options’ implied volatilities.
In an otherwise standard two-agent pure exchange general equilibrium economy, we allow for
ambiguity aversion by assuming that agents’ preference orderings are characterized by the Recursive
Multiple Prior representation (RMPU) introduced by Epstein and Wang (1994) and axiomatized in
Epstein and Schneider (2001), generalizing to a dynamical context of the max-min expected utility
representation pioneered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In this seminal contribution, the single
likelihood involved in the standard Savage expected utility model is replaced by a whole set of
probability measures that the agent regards as possible data generating processes.
The distinction between different models that incorporating ambiguity aversion within the RMPU
paradigm is essentially one about different selections of the set of likelihoods used in the represen-
tation. In accordance with the intuition that an ‘admissible’ probability measure should belong to
some ‘neighborhood’ of an approximate description - the reference belief - of the true data generating
model, we identify this set of likelihoods by means of an upper bound on the ‘distance’ between from
the reference belief, where the distance is defined according to a statistically sound metric.
Due to the presence of incomplete markets and the additional layer of heterogeneity implied
by possibly different ambiguity aversions, the methodology applied to characterize key economic
indicators in equilibrium adopts a weak notion of aggregation into a state dependent representative
agent having preferences that depend on an additional state variable. Such state variable is a
stochastic weighting process that acts as a proxy for the stochastic shifts of the cross-sectional wealth
distribution due to the different beliefs (and min-max martingale measures1) selected in equilibrium
by the agents because of ambiguity and market incompleteness. Cuoco and He (1994) where the
first to point out this line of reasoning for the case of incomplete markets. Several additional
1See He and Pearson (1991) for the notion of min-max martingale measure and the corresponding static charac-
terization of the dynamic consumption investment problem of an agent wit incomplete markets.
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contributions ( Basak and Cuoco (1998), Basak (2000), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Epstein and
Miao (2003), to quote just a few) exploit the same idea whenever some form of heterogeneity in the
representations of the state prices faced by the agents arises. In accordance with these contributions,
equilibrium quantities are driven by the aggregate endowment the state variable that affects the
coefficients of the aggregate endowment, and the stochastic weighting process we have mentioned. As
somewhat noted above, such a stochastic weighting process is really a form of disagreement process
meant to address heterogeneities in the representations of the financial investment opportunities.
In our setting such heterogeneities that in the present context are due to heterogeneous ambiguity
aversions and preference-dependent representations of the state price process, as a consequence of
market incompleteness. Contrarily to those frameworks in which different bayesian estimates of the
aggregate endowment’s conditional mean imply an essentially exogenous disagreement process, in
the present setting the individual rationality constraint of the agents directly affects the equilibrium
determination of the stochastic weighting process, giving rise to an endogenous disagreement.
The academic literature concerned with two-agent equilibrium characterizations is extensive. Fo-
cusing on contributions that embed this problem in an ambiguity averse framework, notably Trojani
and Vanini (2004) carried out a thorough investigation of the distinctive equilibrium implications of
competing frameworks of ambiguity. The present paper is more similar in spirit to Epstein and Miao
(2003) who, in a complete markets economy populated by agents with logarithmic felicities display-
ing a higher concern for ambiguity over foreign stocks, generate predictions suggesting a possible
rationalization of the home-bias puzzle. Our paper differs from the latter in that it adopts a different
set of relevant likelihoods in the preference orderings representation, it allows for incomplete mar-
kets and it also studies felicity functions different from the logarithmic one. Such a generalization
allows us to analyze also equilibrium investment policies that hedge against future changes of the
investment opportunity set caused by the endogenous shifts in the ‘disagreement’ between the two
agents.
In accordance with the literature on ambiguity aversion we find that the present modeling frame-
work generates lower interest rates and higher equity premia. But, in addition to the existing lit-
erature the availability of exact solutions in a stochastic opportunity set environment allows for a
wider set of implications. In particular, the equilibrium intertemporal hedging policy of a CRRA
agent due to the additional state variable mentioned above is illustrated in details. With the aid
of Malliavin calculus, the impact of ambiguity aversion on the equilibrium volatility of the stock is
also clarified. What is more, endogenous cycles of restricted stock market participation are obtained
without the imposition of exogenous policy restrictions or other market frictions. The agent who
refrain from investing in the risky asset selects a consumption plan characterized by a negligible
correlation with the aggregate endowment process. Since the entire variability of the latter then
falls on the agent whose risky position is not null, the equilibrium risk premium is proportional to
the risk and ambiguity aversion of this agent. Therefore, cycles of limited stock market participation
implied by a concern for ambiguity do indeed help overcome the inability of Lucas-type models to
generate realistic equity premia at reasonable values of risk aversions. This appealing feature of
ambiguity aversion, first pointed out in a static framework by Dow and Werlang (1992), mimics
the similar results achieved in the literature by means of modeling frameworks in which restricted
8
participation is imposed ex-ante by means of policy constraints (Basak and Cuoco (1998)), instead
of being derived as a consequence of agents’ optimizing behavior.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next Section describes the pure exchange economic
environment, defines ambiguity and introduces the max-min expected utility representation we have
opted for. Section 1.3 is about the individual consumption problem when the coefficients of the
opportunity set are known functions of a vector of state variables. Due to the features peculiar to an
equilibrium setting, this hypothesis is not fulfilled in general equilibrium and thus removed in Section
1.4, where a general characterization of equilibrium is given. In Section 1.5, equilibrium consumption-
investment policies, equity premia, interest rates and equity volatilities are characterized for two
different choices of risk aversions and heterogeneous ambiguity aversions. Finally two examples are
worked out, inspired by specific dynamics chosen for the aggregate endowment process. Section 1.6
concludes, whereas all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Model Set-Up
We consider an endowment economy populated by two financial agents whose action does not affect
equilibrium prices. They optimize a linear combination of the utilities arising from intertemporal
and terminal consumption of a single perishable good (the numeraire). Their consumption plans
are financed on a given time horizon [0, T ], 0 < T < ∞, by continuously trading a locally risk-
less investment opportunity with return process r(t) as well as a stock representing a claim to an
exogenously given dividend process.
1.2.1 Reference Belief
Agents are provided with an approximate probabilistic description of this dynamic economic envi-
ronment; they are characterized by an imprecise knowledge of the probability measure that governs
the realization of different economic paths. The ‘reference belief’ P should really be regarded as an
uncertain view on the future evolution of their opportunity set. Under this measure the dividend
process ε(t) is posited to follow the dynamics :
dε(t)
ε(t)
= µε(Y )dt+ σε(Y )dw(t)
dY (t) = [Λ(ω, t)dt+ Ξ(ω, t)dw(t)]
(1.1)
The riskless asset is in zero net supply, whilst the number of shares outstanding is normalized to
one. In expression (1.1) σε(x) is a [1 × (k + 1)]-vector valued function of the k-dimensional vector
of driving state variables Y . µε(x) is a deterministic scalar function of the same argument. Both
σε and µε satisfy appropriate integrability conditions, which will be detailed in the sequel. Λ(ω, t)
and Ξ(ω, t) are adapted (k × 1) and k × (k + 1) vector and matrix valued processes, respectively,
satisfying the suitable conditions for the opportunity set Ito process Y to be well defined. w(s) is a
(k + 1)−dimensional standard Wiener process on a complete probability space ( Ω,F , P ), endowed
with the augmentation by P -null sets of the natural filtration of w(s), (Ft, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ), with F = FT .
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All stochastic processes to appear in the sequel are progressively measurable with respect to this
filtration, equalities involving random variables are understood to hold P -a.s. and those involving
stochastic processes dP ⊗ dt-a.s.
Given the the dynamics (1.1) for the dividend process, the cum-dividend stock price is accordingly
posited to admit the Ito representation:
dS(t)
S(t)
= µ(ω, t)dt+ σ(ω, t)dw(t) (1.2)
This conjecture will be fulfilled in the equilibrium analysis to be pursued, where the interest rate
process r(ω, t) and the coefficients of the stock price process will be determined endogenously2.
In order to slightly simplify the analysis, and in line with our purpose of emphasizing the equilibrium
influence of ambiguity aversion, we look for equilibria in which, possibly after suitable rescaling, the
rows of the k × (k + 1)−dimensional matrix-valued process Ξ( · ) are orthonormal vectors spanning
the kernel of σ(ω, t); so that, if Σ(ω, t) denotes the volatility matrix
Σ(ω, t) =
[
σ(ω, t)
Ξ(ω, t)
]
1×(k+1)
k×(k+1)
then:
Σ(ω, t)−1 = [σ(ω, t)′(σ(ω, t)σ(ω, t)′)−1 Ξ(ω, t)′]
We will show that for the matrix Ξ(ω, t) to have the above property in equilibrium, one needs the
same matrix to span the Kernel of the dividend’s volatility σε(Y ) as well.
1.2.2 Modelling Ambiguity
We pointed out that the measure P under which the dynamics (1.1)-(1.2) have been specified plays
the role of a reference belief, supposed to describe with some approximation the data generating
process of the primitive state variables. Agents are assumed to display aversion towards the ambigu-
ous specification of this model by considering a whole set of relevant mispecifications, which take
the form of equivalent changes of probability measure. The requirement of absolute continuity of
‘contaminated’ measures with respect to the reference belief seems to yield no loss of generality: it is
somewhat natural to expect a higher level of confidence on those events regarded as impossible. Such
a requirement is then strengthened to equivalence in order to leave aside technical issues that would
come at the expense of tractability, without affecting substantially the economic analysis. Given
an Rk+1-valued adapted process κ(t) satisfying suitable integrability conditions3 the exponential
2Assumed to satisfy regularity conditions similar to those of µε and σε.
3In particular we assume that a Novikov condition is satisfied, namely that the following inequality holds
E
»
exp
„
1
2
Z T
0
`
Σ(s)−1κ(s)
´′ · `Σ(s)−1κ(s)´ ds«– <∞
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martingale
Z(κ, t) = exp
{∫ t
0
(
Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)
)′ · dw(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
|Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)|2ds
}
(1.3)
is the density process for a ‘contaminated’ probability measure
Pκ(A) = E [Z(κ, T )1A] , A ∈ FT
and wκ(t) = w(t) −
∫ t
0
Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)ds is a Pκ-Brownian motion. It will be convenient to
decompose the vector κ by expliciting its first and remaining components: κ = [κ1 κ].
Notice that under the probability measure Pκ the following representation holds for the stochastic
opportunity set of the economy4:
dS(t)
S(t)
= [µ(ω, t) + κ1(t)] dt+ σ(ω, t)dwκ(t) (1.4)
and
dε(t)
ε(t)
=
[
µε(Y ) + σε(Y )σ(ω, t)
′(σ(ω, t)σ(ω, t)′)−1κ1(t)
]
dt+ σε(Y )dwκ(t)
dY (t) = [Λ(ω, t) + κ(t)] dt+ Ξ(ω, t)dwκ(t)
(1.5)
Ambiguity has a ‘local’ nature in what follows, that is, the range of relevant mispecifications induced
is limited by requiring the corresponding density processes to satisfy instantaneously a (possibly
state dependent) upper bound constraint on the growth rate of their conditional relative entropy
with respect to the reference belief. Namely, given the relative entropy of measure Υ˜ with respect
to measure Υ ( both defined on the measurable space (Ω,F))
H(Υ˜ ‖Υ) :=
{
E
[
deΥ
dΥ log
deΥ
dΥ
]
if Υ˜ Υ
+∞ otherwise
the continuation relative entropy corresponding to the contaminated probability measure Pκ is the
stochastic process Ht (·) defined by
Ht (Pκ ‖ P ) := E
[
Z(κ, T )
Z(κ, t)
log
Z(κ, T )
Z(κ, t)
∣∣∣∣Ft] := Eκ [ log Z(κ, T )Z(κ, t)
∣∣∣∣Ft]
t ∈ [0, T ], where Eκ [ · ] denotes expectation with respect to the measure Pκ. Since
Ht (Pκ ‖ P ) + logZ(κ, t) = Eκ [ logZ(κ, T )| Ft]
4We remind that σε(Y )Ξ(ω, t)′ = 01
′
k.
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or
Ht (Pκ ‖ P ) +
∫ t
0
(
Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)
)′ · dwκ(s) + 1
2
∫ t
0
|Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)|2ds =
E
κ
[∫ T
0
(
Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)
)′ · dwκ(s) + 1
2
∫ T
0
|Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)|2ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
we have:5
Ht (Pκ ‖ P ) = 1
2
E
κ
[∫ T
t
|Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, s)|2ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
and
d
dt
Ht (Pκ ‖ P ) =
∥∥Σ(ω, s)−1κ(ω, t)∥∥2
2
=
κ1(ω, t)
2(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1 + κ(ω, t)′κ(ω, t)
2
(1.6)
A time varying bound on the time rate of change of the continuation relative entropy between an
admissible likelihood and the reference belief is a convenient way to identify the set of probability
measures appearing in the preference ordering representation of the ambiguity averse agent. It
delivers time consistency of the dynamic decision making problems. Moreover, it captures the
intuition that the more ambiguity averse agents are, the higher the tolerated maximal discrepancy
between the reference belief and other candidate models. It is convenient to assume an upper bound
on (1.6) by assuming an upper bound on the summands appearing in the last expression. Therefore,
the following restriction on the drift change identifies the set of models regarded as relevant by the
agents:
κ ∈ K K :=
{
κ(ω, t) :
(
κ1(ω, t)
2(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1
2
≤ h1(Y )
)⋂(κ(ω, t) · κ(ω, t)
2
≤ h(Y )
)}
(1.7)
for given one dimensional non negative processes h1(Y ) and h(Y ).
1.2.3 Max-Min Expected Utility
Trading takes place continuously and there are no market frictions. Let pi(t) denote the proportion
of wealth W (t) that the agent invests in the stock. Then, given a nonnegative consumption rate
process c with
∫ T
0
c(u)du <∞, a trading strategy pi that satisfies:
∫ T
0
(
|pi(s)µ(s)|+ |pi(s)σ(s)|2
)
ds <∞ P − a.s.
5Possibly after a localization argument.
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and a model ‘perturbation’ induced by some κ ∈ K, Girsanov theorem implies that W (t) evolves
under Pκ according to the dynamics6
W (t) = x+
∫ t
0
[W (s)r(s)− c(s)] ds
+
∫ t
0
W (s)pi(s)(µ(t) + κ1(s)− r(s))ds+
∫ t
0
W (s)pi(s)σ(t) · dwκ(s) (1.8)
where β(t) = exp(− ∫ t
0
r(s)ds) is the discounting process and x =W (0). Agent i is provided with
an initial endowment of ηi shares of the stock.
7 Therefore, the initial condition xi = ηiS(0) holds
throughout. A consumption process c is attainable if financed by an admissible trading strategy for
which the budget equation (1.8) holds with W (t) ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Obviously c(T ) =W (T ).
We capture agents’ concern for ambiguity by preference orderings that admit a Max-Min expected
utility representation. We restrict both agents in our model to display an isoelastic felicity function
with relative risk aversion 1 −R, R < 1, the logarithmic case being recovered for R → 0, both for
intertemporal consumption and terminal wealth. They are characterized by the same time horizon
but possibly heterogeneous degrees of risk and ambiguity aversions, captured by different parameters
h1, h and R.
The preferences orderings of the agents over admissible consumption plans {c(t),W (T )}0≤t<T , thus
admit the lower expected utility representation:
U i(c) = inf
κ∈K
E
[
A
∫ T
0
Z(κ, t)
(
c(t)R i − 1
R i
)
dt+ (1−A)Z(κ, T )W (T )
Ri − 1
Ri
]
(1.9)
= inf
κ∈K
E
κ
[
A
∫ T
0
(
c(t)R i − 1
R i
)
dt+ (1−A)W (T )
Ri − 1
Ri
]
i = 1, 2. It then follows that agent i solves the max-min program:
J i(x) = sup
pi, c
U i(c) (1.10)
Subject to (1.8) and the dynamics (1.1), (1.2).
1.3 Individual Consumption Problem
If the stock price process is supposed to be an Ito Process, with coefficients µ(ω, t) and σ(ω, t)
generic stochastic processes adapted to the filtration Ft, then it is not obvious how the consumption-
investment problem of an ambiguity averse agent should be implemented in a partial equilibrium
framework. That is, when the dynamics of the opportunity set of the economy are taken as ex-
ogenously given. In light of this indeterminacy, we depart from the specification (1.4)-(1.5) and
6We omit the functional argument ω in order to simplify notation.
7Given the normalization in place on the aggregate supply of the stock, we have
P
i
ηi = 1.
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postulate the following system for the stochastic opportunity set of economy under a probability
measure Pκ
dS(t)
S(t)
= [µ(Y ) + κ1(t)]dt+ σ(Y )dwκ(t)
dε(t)
ε(t)
= µε(Y ) + σε(Y )dwκ(t)
dY (t) = [Λ(ω, t) + κ(t)] dt+ Ξ(ω, t)dwκ(t)
(1.11)
with µ( · ) and σ( · ) deterministic functions of the state Y , so that the influence of the Girsanov kernel
κ (and the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier used to address market incompleteness8) can be clearly recognized
as an absolutely continuous change of probability measure on the space of sample paths of the state
variable that drives these coefficients. Such a specification still encompasses most of the models
investigated by the literature so far. In the next Section, it will become clear that this restriction
does not hold in equilibrium. Nevertheless we will be able to achieve a characterization of equilibrium
quantities under the general dynamics (1.2), while still assuming the exogenous dividend dynamics
(1.1). If no Markovian assumption about the process Y can be stated, dynamic programming
techniques cannot be implemented to characterize optimal individual policies, contrary to what
has been customary in the literature on uncertainty aversion as of today.9 The following analysis
therefore relies on the martingale approach developed by Pliska (1986), Cox and Huang (1989)
and Karatzas et al. (1987) for the case of complete markets, and extended by He and Pearson
(1991), Karatzas et al. (1991) and Cuoco (1997) to the case of incomplete markets. A Markovian
specification of the model suitable for computational purposes will be detailed in the sequel.
The limited analytical tractability of the optimization problem formulated in (1.10) suggests an
inversion of the sequence of sup and inf optimizations, by virtue of a suitable Min-Max theorem.10
Therefore we analyze the equivalent problem :
J i(x) = inf
κ∈K
sup
c
E
κ
[
A
∫ T
0
(
c(t)R i − 1
R i
)
dt+ (1−A)W (T )
Ri − 1
Ri
]
(1.12)
s.t. (1.2), (1.1)(1.8)
The consumption-investment problem laid out within the infimum over model mispecifications in
(1.12) is a standard one - with market incompleteness arising because of the dimensionality of the
Brownian innovation that generates the uncertainty of the economy - and it can be handled by
means of the above mentioned techniques. Being solutions qualitatively similar across agents, in
what follows we omit the index i). The selection of the optimal Girsanov kernel κ∗ that completes
the characterization of the individual consumption-investment problem under ambiguity aversion is
then addressed by means of methods borrowed from the martingale approach to stochastic control
(Davis (1979), Elliot (1982)). The following Proposition summarizes the results of both steps:
Proposition 1 Let the consumption-investment problem of the ambiguity averse agent be given by
program (1.10) subject to the opportunity set dynamics (1.2). Let the probability measure Qθ( · ) be
8See the Appendix.
9see Epstein and Miao (2001) for an exception.
10whose assumptions are easily seen to be satisfied, see for instance Ky-Fan (1953) or Sion (1958))
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defined by Qθ( · ) = Eκ
[
E
(
R
R−1
∫
θκ+λdwκ
)
1( · )
]
, where E ( · ) denotes stochastic exponentiation
and θκ+λ(s) is an adapted process that satisfies the Novikov condition and will be detailed below.
Define the random variable
f(t) = exp
{
− RR− 1
∫ t
0
(
r(s)− |θκ+λ(s)|
2
2(R− 1)
)
ds
}
Then the optimal consumption policy is given by
c∗(t) =W ∗(t)mpc(t)
for a marginal propensity to consume given by the stochastic process
mpc(t) =
1
Eθ∗
[∫ T
t
f(s)
f(t) ds+
(
A
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(t)
∣∣∣∣Ft]
where Eθ∗ [ · ] denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure Qθ∗ . The optimally invested
wealth process is given by
W ∗(t) = x
ξ(κ∗ + λ∗, t)
1
Ri−1
f(t)
Eθ∗
[∫ T
t
f(s) ds+
(
A
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Eθ∗
[∫ T
0
f(s) ds+
(
A
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
]
The shadow market price of risk and ambiguity that identifies the min-max martingale measure under
ambiguity aversion is given by
θ∗(t) := θκ∗+λ∗(t) = σ(t)′(σ(t)σ(t))−1(µ(t)− r(t) + κ∗1(t))−
(R− 1)a(t)
f˜(t, T )− ∫ t
0
f(s)ds
where f˜(t, T ) denotes the Levy-martingale
f˜(t, T ) = Eθ∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
and a(t) is the predictable integrand process in its stochastic integral representation
f˜(t, T ) = f˜(0, T ) +
∫ t
0
a(s) · dwθ∗(s)
Furthermore, the optimal Girsanov kernel κ∗ is given by
κ∗1 =
 −(µ− r) if −
√
2h1(Y ) <
(µ− r)√
σσ′
<
√
2h1(Y )
−sgn(µ− r)√2(σσ′)h1(Y ) otherwise
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κ∗(t) = −
√
2h(Y )
a(t)′√
a(t)a(t)′
The optimal investment policy in the stock is
pi∗(t) =
1
1−R (σ(t)σ(t)
′)−1[µ(t)− r(t) + κ∗1(t)] + σ(t)(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1
a(t)
f˜(t, T )− ∫ t
0
f(s)ds
Certainly, a significant difficulty of the characterization above lies in the stochastic integral repre-
sentation of the martingale f˜(t, T ), evaluated at the optimal Girsanov kernels κ∗. An attempt to a
slightly more explicit characterization, based on the solution of a Backward Stochastic differential
equations11 is given in the next Corollary.
Corollary 1 If there exists a unique pair of square integrable adapted processes (p, b), solution of
the following Backward Stochastic differential equation
dp(t) =
[
p(t)
( R
R− 1r(t) +
R
2
b(t)b(t)′ −
√
2h(Y )
√
b(t)b(t)′
)
−(
1
A
) 1
R−1
]
dt+ p(t)b(t)dwκ(t)
p(T ) =
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
(1.13)
then the value function (1.12) is given by
J(x) =
(
p(0)− E
[∫ T
0
ξ(κ∗ + λ∗, s)
R
R−1 p(s)
(√
2h(Y )
√
b(s)b(s)′ +
R
2(R− 1)2 θ˜0(κ
∗
1)
′θ˜0(κ∗1)
)
ds
])1−R
where
θ˜0(κ
∗
1) =

0 if −√2h1(Y ) < µ(t)− r(t)√
σ(t)σ(t)′
<
√
2h1(Y )
(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1
[
µ(t)− r(t)− sgn(µ(t)− r(t))
√
2σ(t)σ(t)′h1(Y )
]2
otherwise
The shadow market price of risk that identifies the min-max martingale measure under ambiguity
aversion is given by
θ∗(t) = σ(t)′(σ(t)σ(t))−1 [µ(t)− r(t) + κ∗1(t)]− (R− 1)b(t)
and the optimal Girsanov kernel is κ∗(t) = −
√
2h(Y ) b(t)
′√
b(t)b(t)′
. Furthermore, the optimal portfolio
policy is
pi∗(t) =
1
1−R (σ(t)σ(t)
′)−1[µ(t)− r(t) + κ∗1(t)] + σ(t)(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1
b(t)
p(t)
11See El Karoui, Peng and Quenez (1997)
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where
κ∗1(t) =
 −(µ(t)− r(t)) if −
√
2h1(Y ) <
µ(t)−r(t)√
σ(t)σ(t)′
<
√
2h1(Y )
−sgn(µ(t)− r(t))√2σ(t)σ(t)′h1(Y ) otherwise
Corollary 7 identifies as a sufficient condition for the existence of a solution of the consumption-
investment problem nder ambiguity aversion the solvability of the BSDE (1.13).12 It also character-
izes the optimal policies in terms of the solution (p, b) of the latter. If the stochastic opportunity set
(1.2) is postulated to be a Markovian system, that is, the processes µ( · ), σ( · ), λ( · ), r( · ) and Ξ( · )
are deterministic functions of time and the current realization of the state variable, then dynamic
programming techniques can be applied to obtain a special case of Proposition 1:
Corollary 2 Let the stochastic coefficients of the opportunity set process (1.2) be C1,2 deterministic
functions of time and Y , respectively. Then the value function J(x) of the optimization problem
(1.12) is given by J(x) = G
1
1−R , where G is solution of the Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equation
∂G
∂t
+ Λ(Y )′
∂G
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2G
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+
√
2h(Y )
√
∂G
∂Y
′ ∂G
∂Y
+G
[
R r(Y )− R
2(R− 1)(σ(Y )σ(Y )
′)−1(µ(Y )− r(Y ) + κ∗1(t))2
]
+ (R− 1)A 11−RG R1−R = 0 (1.14)
with terminal condition G(T, Y ) = 1−A. The optimal Girsanov kernel is given by
κ∗1(t) =
 −(µ(Y )− r(Y )) if −
√
2h1(Y ) < − µ(Y )−r(Y )√
σ(Y )σ(Y )′
<
√
2h1(Y )
−sgn(µ(Y )− r(Y ))
√
2h1(Y ) otherwise
κ∗(t) = −
√
2h(Y )
∂G(t)
∂Y√
∂G(t)
∂Y
′ ∂G(t)
∂Y
Optimal consumption-investment policies in the Markovian case can be inferred from their counter-
parts reported in Proposition 1 once we remind the equality a(κ, t) = ∂J(t)∂Y .
Remark 1. For expositional purposes, and with the treatment of general equilibrium in mind, we
point out that in the simpler case of an agent maximizing utility of terminal wealth alone (A = 0),
the partial differential equation to be solved in order to sort out the function G, hence the indirect
utility of the problem, becomes
∂G
∂t
+ Λ(Y )′
∂G
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2G
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+
√
2h(Y )
√
∂G
∂Y
′ ∂G
∂Y
+G
[
R r(Y )− R
2(R− 1)(σ(Y )σ(Y )
′)−1(µ(Y )− r(Y ) + κ∗1(t))2
]
= 0
wi terminal condition G(Y, T ) = 1. Feymann-Kac theorem implies that this problem coincides with
12See .... references for the important issue of the existence of adapted solutions of this nonlinear BSDE.
17
the HJB equation that would arise from the dynamic optimization problem
inf
κ∈K
E
κ
[
e
R
T
t
Rr(s)− R
2(R−1) (σ(Y )σ(Y )
′)−1(µ(Y )−r(Y )+κ1(s))2
∣∣∣Ft]
s.t. dY = [Λ(Y ) + κ(t)]dt+ Ξ(Y )dwκ(t)
We remind that Eκ [ · ] denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure Pκ, under which
wκ is a (k+1)−dimensional Brownian motion under this measure. We notice in particular that the
(innermost) value function of the program that identifies the min-max martingale measure is given
by
V(t) =
(
E
κ
[
e
R
T
t
R r(Y )− R
2(R−1) (σ(Y )σ(Y )
′)−1(µ(Y )−r(Y )+κ1)2 ds
∣∣∣Ft]) 11−R
from which one easily recovers the non ambiguity averse counterpart (h1(Y ) = 0, h(Y ) = 1k0 and
κ(t) = 0 in (1.10). 2
Remark 2. There is not much hope of achieving a complete analytical characterization of the
consumption investment problem of an ambiguity averse agent whose preferences ordering admits
a max-min expected utility representation with CRRA felicity of intertemporal consumption. Let
alone the additional layer of complication arising because of ambiguity aversion, the determination
of the min-max martingale measure by means of the optimal Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ∗ does not
seem to be an easy task. To see this, consider the non ambiguity averse counterpart of (1.14) with
A = 1 :13
∂G
∂t
+ Λ(Y )′
∂G
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2G
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+G
[
R r(Y )− R
2(R− 1)(σ(Y )σ(Y )
′)−1(µ(Y )− r(Y ))2
]
+ (R− 1)G R1−R = 0
G(T, Y ) = 0. This problem is equivalent14 to the integral equation
G(t, Y ) = (1−R)
∫
G(t, Y, x)G(t, x) RR−1 dx (1.15)
where G(t, Y, x) is the Green’s function of the linear differential operator
Lu = ∂u
∂t
+ Λ(Y )′
∂u
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2u
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+ u
[
R r(t)− R
2(R− 1)(σ(Y )σ(Y )
′)−1(µ(Y )− r(Y ))2
]
Analytical solutions of this integral equation (1.15) are confined to some very peculiar case. The
computation of the Green’s function of the operator L for interesting parameter specifications may
likely prove an ambitious challenge. 2
13The case in which felicity of terminal wealth is optimized too is treated along the same lines
14Appropriate references
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As often the case for optimal consumption-investment problems, the logarithmic felicity function
constitutes an exception to the poor analytical tractability of the intertemporal consumption cases.
With this choice, it is easily seen that the conditional version of the value function (1.10), J(t, Y ),
reduces to the following control problem :15
J(t) = inf
κ∈K
E
κ
[∫ T
t
∫ s
t
r(u) +
1
2
(σ(u)σ(u)′)−1 (µ(u)− r(u) + κ1(u))2 du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.16)
s.t. dY (t) = [Λ(Y ) + κ(t)] dt+ Ξ(Y )dwκ(t)
the optimal controls of which are easily seen to coincide with those highlighted in Corollary 2, and
the value function J is solution of
∂J
∂t
+ Λ(Y )′
∂J
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2J
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+
√
2h(Y )
√
∂J
∂Y
′ ∂J
∂Y
r(Y ) +
1
2
(σ(Y )σ(Y )′)−1(µ(Y )− r(Y ) + κ∗1)2 = 0
with terminal condition J(T, Y ) = 0. In light of this characterization, the portfolio policy of the
ambiguity averse agent with a logarithmic felicity function inherits an interesting property, basically
deriving from the myopic behavior typical of logarithmic felicities.
Corollary 3 (Endogenous stock market participation). Let the preference orderings of a
financial agent admit a max-min expected utility representation with a logarithmic felicity function,
that is
U(c) = inf
κ∈K
E
κ
[
A
∫ T
0
log c(t) dt+ (1−A) logW (T )
]
Then the optimal portfolio policy of the agent is
pi∗(t) =
 0 if −
√
2h1(Y ) <
µ(Y )−r(Y )√
σ(Y )σ(Y )′
<
√
2h1(Y )
(σ(Y )σ(Y )′)−1[µ(Y )− r(Y )− sgn(µ(Y )− r(Y ))
√
2σ(Y )σ(Y )′h1(Y )] otherwise
Limited stock market participation has been deemed as a possible explanation for the inability of
consumption based models to capture the order of magnitude of the equity premium at reasonable
levels of risk aversion. See Basak and Cuoco (1998)..... Several models appeared in the literature
have exogenously imposed constraints of the ability of agents to fully invest in the opportunity set
in order to enhance the asset pricing performance of equilibrium consumption-based models. It is
therefore a desirable side-effect of ambiguity aversion that unconstrained agents find it optimal to
avoid locally risky investments when the excess return on the stock falls within a given set determined
by the the instantaneous entropy bound. We emphasize that the equilibrium analysis pursued in the
next section will highlight how these endogenous cycles of stock market participation are determined
by the interplay of the agents. References to Dow and Werlang (...), Trojani and Vanini (....), Wang
et al. (...), explain why we improve.
15See the Appendix for details.
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Example. Consider the individual consumption investment problem of an agent with a CRRA
felicity function that maximizes utility of terminal wealth, subject to a constant entropy bound
(h1, h) and the simple Markovian (affine) specification:
µ(Y ) = µY r(Y ) = rY σ(Y ) = σ
dY = [α(m− Y ) + κ ] dt+ dz(t)
where all coefficients involved are positive constants, with m > r, and the stock is driven by a
standard Brownian motion w(t) independent of z(t). After the provisions of Corollary 2, our task
amounts to solving the boundary value problem
∂G
∂t
+ α(m− Y )∂G
∂Y
+
1
2
∂2G
∂Y ∂Y ′
+
√
2h
∂G
∂Y
+G
[
R rY − R
2(R− 1) θ˜0(κ
∗
1)
2
]
= 0
G(Y, T ) = 1 where
θ˜0(κ
∗
1) =
 0 if −
√
2h1 < − (µ−r)Yσ2 <
√
2h1
σ−1((µ− r)Y − σ sgn((µ− r)Y )√2h1) otherwise
Notice that the value function admits the following probabilistic representation:
G(t, Y ) = Eκ
[
e
R
T
t (− R2(R−1)σ−2((µ−r)Y−σ sgn((µ−r)Y )
√
2h1)
2
1B)dse
R
T
t
R rY ds
∣∣∣Ft]
where B is the set involved in the definition of θ˜0(κ
∗
1) and the expectation is taken with respect to
the density implied by the dynamics
dY = [
√
2h+ α(m− Y )]dt+ dz(t)
Therefore the optimal Girsanov kernel is (κ1, κ) = (σ sgn((µ − r)Y )
√
2h1,
√
2h) and the optimal
portfolio policy is pi∗ = (µ−r)Y+σsgn((µ−r)Y )
√
2h1
(1−R)σ2 +
1
σG(t,Y )
∂G(t,Y )
∂Y
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1.4 Equilibrium
Our aim is to characterize equilibrium asset prices and consumption-investment policies in the con-
text of the pure exchange economy we analyze. As a consequence of market incompleteness and
ambiguity aversion, the conjecture µ(ω, t) = µ(Y ), σ(ω, t) = σ(Y ) - with µ( · ) and σ( · ) determinis-
tic functions of the state variable Y - is not fulfilled in equilibrium, therefore we revert to the general
equity dynamics (1.2). For the sake of analytical simplicity, we assume that agents’ preference or-
derings representations include a felicity function over either intertemporal consumption or terminal
wealth, rather than the convex combination of the two used in the partial equilibrium setting. When
utility over terminal wealth is considered, the stock is a claim to a final dividend payment. Clearing
of the good market then mandates that the stock price coincides with the aggregate wealth of the
economy. In light of the fact that c(T ) =W (T ), the following analysis applies to either case.
We find it convenient to introduce the process
k1 = σ
′(σσ′)−1κ1
and consider it as control variable in place of κ1, without loss of generality. The (scalar) drift
perturbation affecting the dynamics of the stock is then recovered from the above (vector) process
by means of the immediate equality κ1 = σk1. With this notation, the set K of Girsanov kernels that
identifies the admissible likelihoods in the max-min expected utility representation may be rewritten
as
K :=
{
κ(ω, t) :
(
k′1(ω, t) · k1(ω, t)
2
≤ h1(Y )
)⋂(κ(ω, t)′ · κ(ω, t)
2
≤ h(Y )
)}
(1.17)
An equilibrium is a pair of interest rate-stock price processes (S, r) (or, equivalently, a price system
(µ, σ, r)) and a set of admissible policies (ci, pii, κ
i), i = 1, 2, such that:
(i) Individual rationality of agents holds: beliefs Qκ
i
are optimally selected; the consumption plan
(ci(t))t≤T , is optimal for U
i - given the dynamics (S, r) with respect to the measure Qκ
i
- and
is attained by means of pii.
(ii) All markets clear:
c1 + c2 = ε pi1W
c1, pi1
1 + pi2W
c2, pi2
2 = S (1− pi1)W c1, pi11 + (1− pi2)W c2, pi22 = 0
where W c, pi denotes the optimally invested wealth process corresponding to the policy (c, pi).
Let us consider first a model setting in which agents’ preference orderings are characterized by generic
felicity functions ui(c) in the CRRA family and by heterogeneous ambiguity aversion, indexed by
parameters (h
(1)
1 , h
(1)) and (h
(2)
1 , h
(2)). κ(i) = (κ
(i)
1 , κ
i), i = 1, 2, denote the optimal Girsanov kernels
chosen by the agents. In a second step we will detail the relevant equilibrium quantities by restricting
ourselves to specific risk aversion coefficients and dynamics of the driving state process Y .
υi(y), t ≤ T , will henceforth denote the inverse marginal felicity function of agent i. If ψi is the
Lagrange multiplier for the static budget constraint of agent i, then it follows from the individual opti-
mal consumption policies of the agents that after the normalization γ(t) =
[
ξ(t, κ(2) + λ2)
]
/
[
ξ(t, κ(1) + λ1)
]
21
the clearing condition for the good market
υ1(ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, t)) + υ2(ψ2ξ(κ
(2) + λ2, t)) = ε(t)
can be stated in the equivalent form:
υ2(ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1)ψγ(t)) + υ1(ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, t)) = ε(t)
where ψ = ψ2/ψ1 is the ratio of the static lagrange multipliers of the agents. The stochastic weighting
process γ(t) accounts for the heterogeneity in the perceived opportunity sets by directly modeling
the intra-agents marginal rate of substitution and regarding it as a state variable the equilibrium
state price density has to depend on, in excess of aggregate output.
If we define U ′(t, ε, γ) to be the strictly decreasing inverse of the aggregate demand function:
x −→ υ1(x) + υ2(xψ γ(t))
then we have, by construction
υ1(U ′(t, ε, γ)) + υ2 (ψ γ(t)U ′(t, ε, γ)) = ε(t) (1.18)
It is easily seen that the function U ′(t, · , γ) is the marginal utility of an aggregate, state-dependent
welfare function describing a ‘representative agent’ who optimally consumes the endowment process,
by suitably assigning a stochastic weight to the individual agents:
U(t, ε, γ) ≡ max
c1+c2=ε
u1(c1(t)) + ψγ u
2(c2(t))
It should be noticed that the stochastic weight placed by the representative agent on the investors
is meant to address two layers of heterogeneity, namely differing ‘worst case’ beliefs and differing
(min-max) state price densities (He and Pearson (1991)) selected as a consequence of the market
incompleteness implied by the opportunity set (1.4). Since the the choice of the min-max state price
density is part of the equilibrium determination, we denote by λ(t) the k−dimensional dynamic
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier meant to characterize the possible state-price densities of the model. 16
The ‘market prices of risk and ambiguity’ that identify all possible martingale measures are
then17
θκ(i)+λi(t) = θ0(κ
(i)
1 ) + Ξ(ω, t)
′
(
λi(t)− 1kr(t) + κ(i)
)
i = 1, 2
16See, for instance, He and Pearson (1991) and the Appendix for more details.
17The first component of the expression, θ0(κ
(i)
1 ), is given in terms of the new control variable k1 by
θ0(κ
(i)
1 ) = σ
′(σσ′)−1(µ− r) + k(i)1
See the Appendix for more details.
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Therefore, in light of the dynamics
dξκ(i)+λi(t)
ξκ(i)+λi(t)
= −r(t)dt− θκ(i)+λi(t)dwκ(i)(t)
We have, by Ito’s lemma, the following evolution of the stochastic weighting process γ(t):
dγ(t)
γ(t)
=
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
]
dt+
[(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
+
Ξ(t)′
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)]′
dwκ(2)(t) (1.19)
The inversion procedure just outlined provides a direct method to handle the consumption good
market clearing conditions by means of equilibrium state-price processes, as functions of the dividend
ε(t) supplied by the stock and of the stochastic weighting process γ(t). Clearly, in equilibrium the
agents’ state-price densities have the form:
ξ(κ(1) + λ1, t) =
U ′(t, ε, γ)
U ′(0, ε, γ) ξ(κ
(2) + λ2, t) =
U ′(t, ε, γ)
U ′(0, ε, γ)γ(t) (1.20)
and ψ1 = U ′(0, ε, ψγ). We can now state the following proposition where, as customary in the
two agents-equilibrium literature18, equilibrium quantities are characterized in terms of the inverse
function U ′(t, ε, ψγ).
Proposition 2 If the SDE (1.19) has a strong solution, then an equilibrium exists. Let ψ∗ be the
positive value of the parameter ψ = (ψ2/ψ1) for which the budget constraint
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(t, ε, ψγ)
U ′(0, ε, ψγ) υ1(U
′(t, ε, ψγ), t)dt+
(1−A)U
′(T, ε, ψγ)
U ′(0, ε, ψγ) υ1(U
′(T, ε, ψγ), T )
]
= η1S(0) (1.21)
is satisfied; the agents’ state-price densities as in (1.20) and their consumption policies given by
c∗1(t) = υ1(U ′(t, ε, ψγ), t) c∗2(t) = υ2 (ψγ(t)U ′(t, ε, ψγ), t) (1.22)
The equilibrium stock price process is defined by the expression:
S(t) =
1
U ′(t, ε, ψγ) E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
t
U ′(s, ε, ψγ) ε(s)ds+ (1−A)U ′(T, ε, ψγ)ε(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.23)
18see Karatzas, Lehocsky, Shreve and Xu (1991), Cuoco and He (1994), Cuoco and Basak (1998), Basak (2000) to
mention just a few.
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The equilibrium interest rate is given by:
r = −U
′
ε
U ′ ε
(
µε + σεk
(1)
1
)
− U
′
γ
U ′ γ
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)+
(λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1) + (k(1)1 − k(2)1 )′θ0(κ(1)1 )
]
− 1
2
U ′εε
U ′ ε
2σεσ
′
ε−
1
2
U ′γγ
U ′ γ
2
[
(k
(2)
1 − k(1)1 )′(k(2)1 − k(1)1 ) + (λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)′(λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)
]
−
U ′γε
U ′ γ ε σε
(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
(1.24)
where µ− r+ σ · k(1)1 and λ1− r1k +κ1 are as reported below. The equilibrium excess return relative
to the first agents selected measure Qκ
(1)
µ− r + σ · k(1)1 = −
U ′ε
U ′ ε σ σ
′
ε −
U ′γ
U ′ γ σ(k
(2)
1 − k(1)1 ) (1.25)
and the following relation holds between the equilibrium Kuhn-Tucker multiplier and Girsanov kernels
of the agents.
λ1 − r1k + κ1 = −
U ′γ
U ′ γ
(
λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1
)
(1.26)
Furthermore the volatility process of the stock is given in equilibrium by the following expression
σ(t)′ = −
Eκ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′γ(s)ε(s)γ(s) ds
∣∣∣Ft]
S(t)U ′(t) +
U ′γ(t)
U ′(t) γ(t)
 (k(2)1 (t)− k(1)1 (t))+
σε(t)
′ − U
′
ε(t)
U ′(t) σε(t)
′ε(t) +
σε(t)
′
S(t)U ′(t) E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′ε(s)ε(s)2 ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.27)
with S(t) as in (1.23). The equilibrium investment policy of the first agent is
pi∗1 = (σσ
′)−1(t)
(
µ∗(t)− r∗(t) + σ(t) · k(1)∗1 (t)
)
+ (σ(t)σ(t)′)−1σ(t) · δ(t)
where δ(t) is the predictable integrand process in the stochastic integral representation of the Levy
martingale
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(s)
R1
R1−1
U ′(0) ds+ (1−A)
U ′(T )
R1
R1−1
U ′(0)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
This Proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium: determines the state price densities, the con-
sumption allocations, excess return on equity and the interest rate. In light of the fact that the
security S is in positive net supply and pays an exogenously given dividend, the analysis is able to
sort out the equilibrium equity volatility process19.
Let us briefly turn our attention to the process γ(t) to gain further insight into the stochastic weight-
ing that arises as a consequence of the agents’ facing different state price densities. Contrarily to
19This is in contrast to the indeterminacy that would arise in a pure exchange economy with an opportunity set in
zero net supply that pays no dividends, as in He and Leland (1993), Karatzas et al. (1990)
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several studies dealing with heterogeneous beliefs equilibria20, whereby this ‘disagreement’ process
is fully determined in terms of exogenously specified primitives due to consistency requirements, in
the current framework expression (1.19) reveals that its dynamics will be endogenously determined
by agents’ individual rationality constraint. In particular, as briefly pointed out above, the process
γ(t) addresses two layers of ‘disagreement’ between the agents, the first arising from market incom-
pleteness and the different martingale measures selected individually (He and Pearson (1991), Cuoco
(1997)), the second being due to heterogeneous ambiguity aversions and different beliefs implied by
the Max-Min expected utility representation. Full insight on the dynamics of this additional state
variable will be gained in the sequel, once the equilibrium controls of the agents are illustrated in the
context of specific examples; for the time being we notice that, according to (1.19), the volatility of
the ‘disagreement’ intuitively increases with the differences in beliefs (Girsanov kernels) between the
agents, thus, at least in those states for which the instantaneous entropy constraint binds, increases
with the dispersion of ambiguity aversion across agents, as parameterized by the entropy bound
(h
(i)
1 , h
i). The solution of (1.19) may be expressed under the reference belief21 P as
γ(t) = exp
(
1
2
∫ t
0
[(
k
(2)′
1 · k(2)1 + κ2
′ · κ2
)
−
(
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + κ1
′ · κ1
)]
−[(
λ2 − r1k
)′ (
λ2 − r1k
)
−
(
λ1 − r1k
)′ (
λ1 − r1k
)]
ds−∫ t
0
[(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
+ Ξ(t)′
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)]′
dw(s)
)
The last expression allows for a sharp disentangling of the two distinguished sources of disagreement
mentioned above. In particular, assuming h
(1)
1 < h
(2)
1 and h
1 < h2 (we will keep this assumption
in the examples to be discussed), γ(t) tends to be higher the higher the heterogeneity in ambiguity
aversions over the past; nevertheless, this effect might be possibly mitigated by the past occurrence
of negative shocks whenever that circumstance was verified.
Before turning our attention to the equilibrium determination of the optimal Girsanov kernels κi and
dynamic multipliers λi, we provide in the next Corollary the analog of the equilibrium interest rate
and risk premium for the case of agents’ heterogeneous felicity functions being of the CRRA type;
in this case the function U ′(ε(t), ψγ(t)) is not explicitly computed in general, and the expressions
appearing in Proposition 2 are not useful for computational purposes.
Corollary 4 Let the agents’ felicity function be of the CRRA type with coefficients of relative risk
aversion Ri, i = 1, 2, then the equilibrium excess return on the stock is given by the following
expressions
µ− r + σ · k(1)1 =
R1aR
2
a
R1a +R
2
a
ε σσ′ε −
R1a
R1a +R
2
a
σγ
(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
(1.28)
The following relation holds in equilibrium between optimal Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λ and Girsanov
20see, for instance, Basak (2000)
21The stochastic differential equation (1.19) has been specified under any admissible likelihood of the second agent,
Qκ
(2)
mainly with the equilibrium treatment in mind, as Proposition 3 will clarify.
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kernels κ selected by the agents.
λ1 − r1k + κ1 = γ R
1
a
R1a +R
2
a
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)
(1.29)
Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate is given by the following expression
r = Raε
(
µε + σεk
(1)
1
)
− 1
2
RaP a
∣∣∣θ0(κ(1)1 ) + Ξ′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)∣∣∣2−
Ra
R2a
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 +
(
λ2 − λ1
)′ (
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)
+ (k
(1)′
1 − k(2)
′
1 )θ0(κ
(1)
1 ) + (κ
1 − κ2)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
]
+
Ra
R2a
R2
2(R2 − 1)
∣∣∣(k(2)1 − k(1)1 ) + Ξ′(λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1)∣∣∣2+
Ra
R2a
1
R2 − 1
[
θ0(κ
(1)
1 ) + Ξ
′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
]′ [
(k
(2)
1 − k(1)1 ) + Ξ′(λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1)
]
(1.30)
where Ria = −(Ri − 1)/ci is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of agent i, (µ − r + σ · k(1)1 ),
(λ1 − r1k + κ1) are as in (1.28) and (1.29), respectively, Ra = R
2
aR
1
a
R1a+R
2
a
and P a =
c1R1
(R1−1)2 +
c2R2
(R2−1)2
A similar characterization holds regardless of the isoelastic form assumed for the felicity functions
of the agents, with the definition Ria = −(uicc(c∗)/uic(c∗)), i = 1, 2. Expressions (1.28) and (1.29)
characterize the risk premium on the stock, impose restrictions on the equilibrium form of the
optimal Girsanov kernels and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers adopted by the two agents. They are the
analog of the expression derived for the case of market incompleteness but no ambiguity by Cuoco
and He (1994). The equilibrium risk premium as represented by agent 2 can be expressed as
µ− r + σ · k(2)1 =
R1aR
2
a
R1a +R
2
a
ε σσ′ε +
R2a
R1a +R
2
a
σγ
(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
therefore, in analogy with the literature on heterogeneous belief equilibria (see, for instance, Basak
(2000)), one may write equivalently
µ− r + σ · k(1)1 =
R1aR
2
a
R1a +R
2
a
Covκ
(1)
[
dS
S
, dε
]
− R
1
a
R1a +R
2
a
Covκ
(1)
[
dS
S
, dγ
]
µ− r + σ · k(2)1 =
R1aR
2
a
R1a +R
2
a
Covκ
(2)
[
dS
S
, dε
]
+
R2a
R1a +R
2
a
Covκ
(2)
[
dS
S
, dγ
]
where each agents takes the relevant expectations under his optimal belief, although due to absolute
continuity of the probability measures the instantaneous covariances above are really invariant to this
measure change. As in the standard consumption CAPM, a risky’s security premium is positively
related to the covariance of its return with aggregate consumption. In the present context, however,
an additional component is driven by the covariance of the asset’s return with the evolution of the
stochastic weighting process, and risk premia are increasing in this covariance only for the agent to
whom positive innovations of the additional state variable are valuable, as they represent favorable
shifts of the cross-sectional wealth distribution (agent 2). To the purpose of disentangling the
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influence of the two components that drive the risk premia, additional insight may be gained by
virtue of the following expression, counterpart of a representation that holds in the heterogeneous
belief case22:
µ− r + σ ·
(
R1a
R1a +R
2
a
k
(1)
1 +
R2a
R1a +R
2
a
k
(2)
1
)
=
R1aR
2
a
R1a +R
2
a
Covκ
(1)
[
dS
S
, dε
]
Therefore the aggregate endowment’s variability entirely drives the risk premium as represented with
respect to a fictitious belief, which corresponds to a Girsanov kernel that is a risk-aversion weighted
average of the individual selections, functions of the respective ambiguity aversions. Once again we
emphasize the additional layer of endogenety that arises in the present context, whereby beliefs are
optimally selected in equilibrium.
As in the economy with no concern for ambiguity, the equilibrium interest rate is positively related to
the expected endowment growth rate and negatively related to the endowment risk, if the aggregate
prudence is positive. Nevertheless, the influence of market incompleteness and especially ambiguity
aversion on this classical component is yet apparent, as long as this growth rate and the equilibrium
market price of risk are influenced by ‘belief selection’ problem of the first agent. On discussing
equilibrium risk premia, we have seen that the variability of the market price of risk is increased by
the dispersion of ambiguity aversions across agents, and that aggregate consumption is no more its
only driving component; to the extent that aggregate prudence is positive, ambiguity enhances the
impact of this negative term to compensate for agents’ additional precautionary savings due to future
risky shifts of the cross-sectional wealth distribution. As a result of model uncertainty, the interest
rate is driven by three extra terms. The first is related to the discrepancy in agents’ representations
of the expected growths of the relevant state variables: if the expected consumption growth relative
to the second agent’s belief is higher than the same quantity represented with respect to agent’s
one belief23, then the interest rate increases in order to provide adequate incentive to reduce the
excessive saving demand. An opposite tendency arises in the other case. The fourth term in (1.30)
decreases (for R2 > 0) the interest rate to compensate for the extra precautionary saving demand
induced by the dispersion in beliefs due to ambiguity aversion. The last term implies that the higher
the instantaneous covariance between the equilibrium state price density and the weighting process
the higher the equilibrium interest rate.
Since the signs of the additional terms need to be identified on a case by case basis, the net effect of
ambiguity on the equilibrium short rate is, in general, undetermined. If agents are highly prudent
though, and ambiguity aversions are sufficiently heterogeneous, we may expect the present framework
to generate lower term structure of interest rates than a model were ambiguity is of no concern.
As already pointed out, Proposition 2 highlights important restrictions about key economic quan-
tities that have to hold in equilibrium, but leaves otherwise untouched the fundamental issue of
determination of equilibrium levels of optimal Girsanov kernels κ∗ and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λ∗.
Quite clearly the control problems that delivered these quantities in a partial equilibrium framework
are now handled at equilibrium prices, that is, imposing the equilibrium relations dictated by Propo-
22The expression is obtained by scaling the individual risk premia with the weights
Ria
R1a+R
2
a
and summing them up.
23we remind that agent’s one state price density is assumed to be the equilibrium state price density
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sition 2. Notice that (1.24), (1.25) and (1.26) are path-wise restrictions that hold for each ω ∈ Ω
and cannot be modified by the action of each agent; furthermore, the competitive behavior of the
agents suggests that each agent takes as exogenously given the policies of the other; in particular,
agent 2 considers the equilibrium state price density ξ1 = U ′ exogenous.
Proposition 3 Let A = 0 or A = 1. In equilibrium, the optimal Girsanov kernels κi, i = 1, 2 and
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λi are solutions of the following control problems.
inf
λ1
inf
κ(1)∈K1
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
t
U ′ (s, ε, γ̂)
R1
R1−1 ds+ (1−A)U ′ (t, ε, γ̂)
R1
R1−1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.31)
s.t.
dε(t)
ε(t)
= (µε(Y ) + σε(Y ) · k(1)1 (t))dt+ σε(Y )dwκ(1)
dY =
[
Λ(t) + κ1(t)
]
dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(1)
and
inf
λ2
inf
κ(2)∈K2
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
AU ′ (s, ε, γ̂)
R2
R2−1 γ(s)
R2
R2−1 ds+ (1−A)U ′ (T, ε, γ̂)
R2
R2−1 γ(T )
R2
R2−1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.32)
s.t.
dε(t)
ε(t)
= (µε(Y ) + σε(Y ) · k(2)1 (t))dt+ σε(Y )dwκ(2)
dY =
[
Λ(t) + κ2
]
dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(2)
dγ(t)
γ(t)
=
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
]
dt+
[(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
+
Ξ(t)′
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)]
dwκ(2)(t)
for agent 1 and agent 2, respectively, where K1 denotes the set {((κ(1)1 )2 ≤ 2h1)
⋂
(κ1
′ · κ1 ≤ 2h1)}
and K2 is defined similarly.
The equilibrium state price density U ′(s, ε, γ) reflects the impact of ambiguity aversion and market
incompleteness on consumption choices, and depends on the interplay between the heterogeneous
preference orderings of the agents. This effect feeds back into the individual choice problem of the
agents and must be consistent with the consumption-investment policy selected, in a way that keeps
into account the price-taking assumption. The notion of rational expectations equilibrium mandates
that agents anticipate the influence of the additional state variable γ, to which the equilibrium control
problems to be solved will thus be subject. In the next section we will investigate two explicit cases,
the analytical tractability of which allows to overcome this additional difficulty.
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1.5 Two Worked out Equilibrium Examples
Suppose that agents share the same felicity function over intertemporal consumption or terminal
wealth. Their preference orderings still differ because of heterogeneity of the instantaneous entropy
bounds that determine the set of priors in their utility representation and, as will be shown by means
of the examples below, the general expressions discussed above assume can be clarified to a further
extent. In what follows we assume that h1 ≤ h2 and h1 ≤ h2, so that
sup
κ(1)∈K1
Ht
(
Qκ
(1) ‖ P
)
≤ sup
κ(2)∈K2
Ht
(
Qκ
(2) ‖ P
)
because K1 ⊆ K2, that is, the maximal continuation relative entropy between considered priors and
the reference belief is higher for agent 2 than for agent 1, who believes in a narrower discrepancy
between the reference model and the true data generating process and in this sense is less ambiguity
averse.
We first deal with logarithmic felicity of intertemporal consumption and comment the interesting
results arising yet at this level of tractability; we then pursue the more ambitious task of studying
an equilibrium in which agent derive utility from terminal wealth but have a general CRRA felicity
function. For the sake of clarity we adopt a markovian framework in the second example, that is,
we let the coefficients of the dividend process µε and σε deterministic and well behaved functions of
the current state Y . According to what we saw in the partial equilibrium framework, the relaxation
of this hypothesis is not a formidable challenge.
1.5.1 Utility of intertemporal consumption. Logarithmic felicities.
Both agents adopt a logarithmic felicity function in their preference ordering representation and
maximize utility of intertemporal consumption:
U i(c) = inf
κ(i)∈Ki
E
κ(i)
[∫ T
0
log c(t)dt
]
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium quantities prevailing in this economy.
Proposition 4 Let the economic agents be characterized by logarithmic felicity functions and am-
biguity aversion parameters (h1, h1) and (h2, h2), with h1 ≤ h2 and h1 ≤ h2. Then the optimal
equilibrium Kuhn-Tucker multipliers and Girsanov kernels selected by the agents are given by
λ1∗ = r∗1k − κ1∗ λ2∗ = 2(λ1∗ + κ1∗)− r∗1k
k
(1)∗
1 = −
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σ′εσε
κ1∗ = −
√
2h1(Y )
a˜√
a˜′a˜
(1.33)
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k
(2)∗
1 =

−√2h1(Y ) σ′ε√
σ′εσε
− σ′ε if
(−√2h1(Y ) σ′ε√
σ′εσε
− σ′ε)′(−
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σ′εσε
− σ′ε) ≤ 2h2(Y )√
2h2(Y )
k
(1)
1 −σ′εq
(k
(1)
1 −σ′ε)′(k(1)1 −σ′ε)
otherwise
κ2∗ = −
√
2h2(Y )
a√
a′a
(1.34)
where the stochastic processes a and a˜ are the predictable integrand processes in the stochastic integral
representation of the Levy martingales (1.101) and (1.102), respectively, reported in the Appendix24.
The optimal consumption allocation is
c∗1(t) =
ε(t)γ(t)
1 + γ(t)
c∗2(t) =
ε(t)
1 + γ(t)
(1.35)
The excess return with respect to the reference probability measure P and the equilibrium interest
rate are given by the following expressions:
r = µε − σεσ′ε −
√
2h1(Y )
√
σεσ′ε +
1
(1 + γ)
(
2h1 − d(Y )′θ0(κ(1)1 )
)
− 1
1 + γ
[σε + d(Y )
′]d(Y )
(1.36)
µ∗ − r∗ = σ
(
σ′ε +
d(Y )
1 + γ
+
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σεσ′ε
)
(1.37)
where
d(Y ) =

σε if (−
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σ′εσε
− σ′ε)′(−
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σ′εσε
− σ′ε) ≤ 2h2(Y )√
2h2(Y )
k
(1)∗
1 −σ′εq
(k
(1)∗
1 −σ′ε)′(k(1)∗1 −σ′ε)
+
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σεσ′ε
otherwise
The equilibrium weighting process is
γ(t) = exp
(∫ t
0
(
2h1(Y )− d(Y )
′d(Y )
2
)
ds−
∫ t
0
d(Y )′dwκ(2)
)
(1.38)
and the equilibrium volatility process of the equity is given by
σ(t)′ = σε(t)′ +
 Eκ(1)
[∫ T
t
γ(s)−1ds
∣∣∣Ft]
Eκ
(1)
[∫ T
t
(1 + γ(s)−1) ds
∣∣∣Ft] +
1
1 + γ(t)
 d(Y ) (1.39)
24Alternative characterizations of the stochastic process a, in particular a markovian characterization in terms of
the gradient of the value function, are easily obtained by mimicking the line of reasoning followed in the partial
equilibrium setting.
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The stock price is given by the following expression
S(t) =
ε(t)γ(t)
1 + γ(t)
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
(
1 +
1
γ(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.40)
Finally, the optimal investment policies in the stock are given by :
pi∗1(t) =
 0 if −
√
2h1(Y ) < (σσ
′)−1/2σ
(
σ′ε +
d(Y )
1+γ +
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σεσ′ε
)
<
√
2h1(Y )
(σσ′)−1σ
(
σ′ε +
d(Y )
1+γ
)
otherwise
(1.41)
pi∗2(t) =
γ(t)
T
(
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
γ(s)−1 ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− T (pi1∗(t)− 1)
)
(1.42)
Expressions (1.36) and expressions (1.37) unambiguously show that in this simple logarithmic frame-
work, for a positive difference of the equilibrium Girsanov kernels, d(Y )25, a concern for ambiguity
delivers lower interest rates and higher equity premia compared to an economy with no such concern.
The higher the stochastic weighting process, the smaller the effect induced by ambiguity, although
the component due to the equilibrium representation of expected consumption growth is independent
of the latter state variable.
As shown in the Appendix, the derivation of the equilibrium equity volatility process (1.39) is
simplified by the requirement that the volatility matrix of the state variable vector, Ξ(t), be in its
orthogonal complement. This assumption allows nevertheless for a sharp identification of the direct
effect of ambiguity26. Expression (1.39) reveals that the higher the heterogeneity of Girsanov kernels
selected by the agents, as captured by the magnitude of the process d(Y ), the higher the influence
of ambiguity aversion; notice, however, that this effect is compensated by the occurrence of positive
innovations of the process γ(t), to whose magnitude the equity volatility is inversely proportional.
Quite interestingly, a forward looking effect is captured by a concern for future realizations of the
integrated stochastic weighting process. To see this, let us make use of (1.40) and rewrite the
expression as
σ(t)′ = σε(t)′ +
(
ε(t)
S(t)
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
(
γ(s)
γ(t)
)−1
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ 1
)
d(Y )
1 + γ(t)
The equity volatility is then proportional to the dividend-price ratio scaled by the expected cumu-
lated future contingencies of the inverse stochastic weighting process. Whether the net influence
of ambiguity is positive or negative depends on the sign of the difference of the optimal Girsanov
kernels, whereas the quantitative impact needs to be addressed once a the dynamics of the aggregate
endowment and the state variable are specified.
25Notice that the particular sign of this difference that generates the effect is a consequence of having assumed the
state price density of the first agent as equilibrium state price density and entails no loss of generality.
26Indeed an additional, indirect effect, would arise in the general case as a consequence of ambiguity aversion’s
impact on the tangent process of the state variable Y .
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1.5.2 Utility of terminal wealth. General CRRA felicity functions.
Agents adopt an homogeneous felicity function of the CRRA type with relative risk aversion coeffi-
cient R. They maximize utility of terminal wealth, so that
U i(c(T )) = inf
κ(i)∈Ki
E
κ(i)
[
W (T )R − 1
R
]
The exogenous dividend process’ coefficients are deterministic functions of the state Y , and the
process Y is assumed to have the strong Markov property. The equilibrium characterization is clearly
more complicated than its analog prevailing in the logarithmic case because of the intertemporal
hedging behavior of the agents. The next Proposition illustrates the relevant equilibrium quantities.
Proposition 5 Let the economic agents maximize utility of terminal wealth, be characterized by
homogeneous CRRA felicity functions and ambiguity aversion parameters (h1, h1) and (h2, h2), with
h1 ≤ h2 and h1 ≤ h2. Then the optimal terminal consumption allocations are
W ∗1 (T ) =
ε(t)
1 + γ(t)
1
R−1
W ∗2 (T ) =
ε(t)
1 + γ(t)
1
1−R
(1.43)
and the equilibrium Girsanov kernels are
k
(1)∗
1 = −
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σ′εσε
(1.44)
κ1∗ = −
√
2h1(Y )
VY√
V ′Y VY
(1.45)
k
(2)∗
1 =

k
(1)∗
1 − (2R− 1)(R− 1)σ′ε if
(k
(1)∗
1 − (2R− 1)(R− 1)σ′ε)′(k(1)∗1 − (2R− 1)(R− 1)σ′ε) ≤ 2h2(Y )
−√2h2(Y ) k(1)∗1 −(2R−1)(R−1)σ′εq
(k
(1)∗
1 −(2R−1)(R−1)σ′ε)′(k(1)∗1 −(2R−1)(R−1)σ′ε)
otherwise
(1.46)
κ2∗ = −
√
2h2(Y )
G
α
R
R−1 (λ
1 − r1k + κ1)−GY√(
G
α
R
R−1 (λ
1 − r1k + κ1)−GY
)′ (
G
α
R
R−1 (λ
1 − r1k + κ1)−GY
) (1.47)
where G(Y ) and V (Y ) solve the HBJ equations (1.107) and (1.103), respectively, and α = (R−1)
2
R+(R−1)2 .
The equilibrium Kuhn-Tucker multipliers selected by the agent are
λ1∗ = f + r∗1k − κ1∗ (1.48)
λ2∗ = λ1∗ − (κ2∗ − κ1∗)− (R− 1)
(
λ1∗ − r∗1k + κ1∗
)
+ α
GY
G
(1.49)
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where f is the solution of the following equation27 with respect to (λ1 − r1k + κ1)[
1 +
R− 1
1 + γ
1
1−R
]
(λ1 − r1k + κ1) = 1
1 + γ
1
1−R
α
GY (λ1 − r1k + κ1)
G(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
(1.50)
The equilibrium interest rate process and excess return with respect to the reference belief are given,
respectively, by the following expressions
r = (1−R)
(
µε −
√
2h1(Y )
√
σε · σε
)
+
γ
1
R−1
1 + γ
1
R−1
[
2h1 +
(
λ2∗ − λ1∗
)′
f +
(
(1−R)f + αGY
G
)′
f − d(Y )θ0(κ(1)1 )
]
−1
2
(R− 1) (R− 2)σε·σ′ε+
1
2
[
γ
1
R−1
(
1
R− 1 − 1
)(
1 + γ
1
R−1
)−1
−R
(
1 + γ
1
R−1
)−2
γ
R
R−1
]
×[
d(Y )′d(Y ) +
(
(1−R)f + αGY
G
)′(
(1−R)f + αGY
G
)]
+ (R− 1) γ
1
R−1
1 + γ
1
R−1
σε · d(Y ) (1.51)
µ∗ − r∗ = (1−R)σ · σ′ε +
γ
1
1−R
1 + γ
1
1−R
σ · d(Y )− σ · k(1)∗1 (1.52)
where d(Y ) = k
(2)∗
1 − k(1)∗1 . The following expressions provide, respectively, the equilibrium volatility
process of the stock and the equilibrium stock price process
σ(t)′ = σε(t)′+
E
κ(1)
[
ε(T )R
(
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)−R
γ(T )
1
R−1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Eκ
(1)
[
ε(T )R
(
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)1−R∣∣∣∣Ft] +
1
1 + γ(t)
1
1−R
 (k(2)∗1 −k(1)∗1 )
(1.53)
S(t) =
1
U ′(t)E
κ(1) [U ′(T )ε(T )| Ft] = (1 + γ(t)
1
R−1 )R−1
ε(t)R−1
E
κ(1)
[
ε(T )R(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )1−R
∣∣∣Ft]
(1.54)
Finally, the equilibrium portfolio policies are
pi∗1(t) = (σσ
′)−1
(
(R− 1)σ · σ′ε +
1
1 + γ
1
1−R
σ · (k(2)∗1 − k(1)∗1 )
)
− (1.55)
(σσ′)−1σ · (k(2)∗1 − k(1)∗1 )
R
R− 1 E
κ(1)
[
γ(T )
1
R−1 ε(T )R
(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )R+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
pi∗2(t) =
(
1 + γ(t)
1
R−1
)R−1
ε(t)R
E
κ(1)
 ε(T )R(
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)R−1
(
1− pi
∗
1(t)
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 (1.56)
27G( · ) is the solution of (1.107) with the functional dependence on (λ1 − r1k + κ1) made explicit.
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where the equilibrium weighting process γ(t) is obtained by substituting the equilibrium Girsanov
kernels and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers into (1.19).
1.5.3 Explicit Dynamics
In this section we will specify in detail the opportunity set process Y and the form of the coefficients
µε(Y ) and σε(Y ) of the dividend process; in the theoretical framework of the Propositions above,
we will then work out explicitly the equilibrium quantities.
Constant opportunity set: geometric brownian motion
We will consider a simple specification in which the market is complete and the dividend process
evolves as a geometric brownian motion with respect to the reference measure P , namely:
dε(t)
ε(t)
= µε + σεdw(t)
with constants µε, σε and w(t) a scalar P -brownian motion. Agents are characterized by ambiguity
aversion parameters hi, i = 1, 2, with h1 ≤ h2, so that the first agent is considered less ambiguity
averse than the second. The available opportunity set dynamics reduce then to the following stock
price process
dS = S(t)
(
µ(t) + σ k
(i)
1
)
dt+ S(t)σ(t)dwκ(i)(t)
where wκ(i) is a standard brownian motion under the measure Q
κi , with (k
(i)
1 )
2 ≤ 2hi. It is straight-
forward to see that the form of the respective state-price densities implies the following dynamics
for the weighting process under any admissible likelihood of the second agent, Qκ
(2)
:
dγ(t)
γ(t)
= k
(1)
1 · k(1)1 dt+
(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
dwκ(2)(t) (1.57)
An easy adaptation of the arguments that inspired Proposition 4 leads us to the equilibrium quan-
tities described in the next Corollary, the proof of which is immediate, after we represent the equi-
librium stochastic weighting process (1.57) with respect and to the measure Qκ
(1)
and notice that
its transition density reduces to a lognormal.
Corollary 5 Let agents maximize utility of intertemporal consumption and have a logarithmic fe-
licity function. Then, with the following choices of lagrange multipliers for the budget constraints
ψ∗1 =
1
ε(0)
(
1 +
1
ψ∗
)
ψ∗2 = ψ
∗ψ∗1
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ψ∗ =
exp((−2h1+d2+d)(T−t))
T (−2h1+d2+d)
“
1
η1
−1
” , the equilibrium Girsanov kernels selected by the agents are
k
(1)∗
1 =
√
2h1 sgn(σε) (1.58)
k
(2)∗
1 =
{
k
(1)∗
1 − σε if −
√
2h2 < k
(1)∗
1 − σε <
√
2h2
sgn(k
(1)∗
1 − σε)
√
2h2
(1.59)
and d = k
(2)∗
1 − k(1)∗1 . The equilibrium consumption allocations are as in (1.35), with the stochastic
weighting process (1.57) evaluated at the equilibrium Girsanov kernels. The equilibrium excess return
on the stock and interest rate are given by
µ∗ − r∗ = σ
(
σε +
d
1 + ψ∗γ
+
√
2h1 sgn(σε)
)
r =
1 + ψ∗γ
(1 + ψ∗γ) + d
(
µε +
√
2h1 σε sgn(σε)
)
+
1
(1 + ψ∗γ) + d
(
(σσ′)−1µ+
√
2h1 σε sgn(σε) d
)
− 1 + ψ
∗γ
(1 + ψ∗γ) + d
σ2ε −
1
(1 + ψ∗γ) + d
[σε + d] d
The equilibrium stock price process is
S(t) =
ψ∗ε(t)γ(t)
1 + ψ∗γ(t)
(
(T − t) + e
(T−t)(−2h1+d2+d)
−2h1 + d2 + d
)
and its volatility process is
σ = σε + d− d
1 + ψ∗γ
Finally, the equilibrium fractions of wealth held in the stock by the agents are
pi∗1(t) =
 0 if −
√
2h1(Y ) <
(
σε +
d
1+ψ∗γ − sgn(σε)
√
2h1(Y )
)
<
√
2h1(Y )
σ−1
(
σε +
d(Y )
1+ψ∗γ
)
otherwise
(1.60)
pi∗2(t) =
γ(t)
T
(
e(T−t)(−2h1+d
2+d)
−2h1 + d2 + d − T (pi
1∗(t)− 1)
)
(1.61)
If we replace the logarithmic form of the felicity function with a general CRRA type and assume that
agents maximize utility of terminal wealth, the investment policy of the agents, though not in line
with endogenous cycles of absence of stock market participation, is characterized by an interesting
hedging demand against future fluctuations of the opportunity set due to changes of the stochastic
weighting process. But for the property we have just mentioned, this case is not more difficult
to handle than the logarithmic one, due to the state independence of the coefficients of aggregate
consumptions, and the relevant equilibrium quantities are not very dissimilar from those outlined
in the last Corollary, modulo some scaling for the risk aversion parameter, as one may easily figure
out from an adaptation of Proposition 5. The following Corollary illustrates the point by reporting
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the equilibrium Girsanov kernels and portfolio policy that arise in the present framework.
Corollary 6 Let agents maximize utility of terminal wealth and have a CRRA felicity function with
risk aversion parameter R, then the equilibrium Girsanov kernels selected by the agents are given by
k
(1)
1 =
√
2h1 sgn(σε) (1.62)
k
(2)
1 =
 k
(1)∗
1 − (2R− 1)(R− 1)σε if −
√
2h2 < k
(1)∗
1 − (2R− 1)(R− 1)σε <
√
2h2
−√2h2 sgn(k(1)∗1 − (2R− 1)(R− 1)σε) otherwise
(1.63)
and the optimal portfolio policy of the agents is
pi∗1(t) =
1
σ2
(
(R− 1)σσε + 1
1 + γ
1
1−R
σ(k
(2)∗
1 − k(1)∗1 )
)
− (1.64)
1
σ
(k
(2)∗
1 − k(1)∗1 )
R
R− 1 E
κ(1)
[
γ(T )
1
R−1 ε(T )R
(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )R+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
pi∗2(t) =
(
1 + γ(t)
1
R−1
)R−1
ε(t)R
E
κ(1)
 ε(T )R(
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)R−1
(
1− pi
∗
1(t)
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 (1.65)
where log ε(t) ∼ N (µεt− 12σεt, σ2εt) and log γ(t) ∼ N ((k(2)1 )2t− 32d2t, d2t)
1.6 Conclusions
A concern for an ‘ambiguous’ probabilistic description of the environment on which agent base their
decision making process has been largely shown to be both economically and behaviorally relevant
in terms of predictions on key economic indicators; we contribute to this strand of the literature
by studying the influence of such a modelling framework on the classical the two-agent equilibrium
problem. This set up allows us to clarify the impact of heterogeneous levels of ambiguity aversion
on key economic indicators; in particular, we have emphasized that for significantly wide differences
of ambiguity aversion between agents the model generates equity premia which are quantitatively in
accordance with empirical evidence. Furthermore, both the precautionary saving and the speculative
components of the equilibrium interest rate dynamics are significantly affected. An interesting
feature that arises in a simple specification we discussed is the property of the model to generate
endogenous stock market participation as a consequence of the optimizing behavior of the agents
rather than exogenous policy restrictions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
In the sequel we omit the index i for notational simplicity. Let λ(t) = [0 λ(t)]′ be an Rk+1-valued
processes (λ(t) ∈ Rk), satisfying the integrability condition
E
[∫ T
0
|λ(t)|2dt
]
<∞
and consider a complete-market economy characterized by identical preferences, unconstrained port-
folio policies and the following modified opportunity set:
dS(t)
S(t)
= [µ(Y ) + κ1(t)]dt+ σ(Y )dwκ(t)
dS˜(t)
S˜(t)
=
[
λ(t) + κ(t)
]
dt+ ϑ(Y )dwκ(t)
dY (t) = [Λ(ω, t) + κ(t)]dt+ Ξ(ω, t)dwκ(t)
(1.66)
Following He and Pearson (1991) and Karatzas, Lehocsky, Shreve and Xu (1991) the program at
hand can be equivalently stated as a consumption-investment problem where the market is fictitiously
completed by means of a k-dimensional vector of stocks, with price vector S˜(t) at time t, in which
the agent is constrained not to invest. In this context the portfolio fraction pi is interpreted as a
k+1-dimensional vector that takes values in the set
{
pi : pi ∈ R× {0}k}. The optimal consumption-
investment policy in the original market is then recovered as the infimum of the fictitious value
function over the shadow martingale measures, indexed by dynamic Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ(t).
Therefore, solving program (1.12) amounts to solving
J(x) = inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
sup
c
E
κ
[
A
∫ T
0
(
c(t)R − 1
R
)
dt+ (1−A)W (T )
R − 1
R
]
(1.67)
subject to the dynamics for invested wealth (to be outlined below) and the opportunity set process
Y . Since the characterization achieved will be independent of the particular market completion,
without loss of generality we assume once again that the rows of the k × (k + 1)−dimensional
matrix-valued process ϑ( · ) are orthonormal vectors spanning the kernel of σ(Y ): σ(Y )ϑ(Y )′ = 01k
and ϑ(Y )ϑ(Y )′ = Ik. Notice that in light of the same property shared by the volatility matrix of
the state variable Y , Ξ(ω, t), we have ϑ(Y )Ξ(ω, t) = Ik. If Σ(Y ) denotes the volatility matrix
Σ(Y ) =
[
σ(Y )
ϑ(Y )
]
1×(k+1)
k×(k+1)
then:
Σ(Y )−1 = [ σ(Y )′ ‖σ(Y )‖−2 ϑ(Y )′]
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It can be easily verified that the following dynamic budget constraint holds:
β(t)Z0(κ+ λ, t)W (t) +
∫ t
0
Z0(κ+ λ, s)β(s)c(s)ds = x
+
∫ t
0
W (s)β(s)Z0(κ+ λ, s) [Σ′pi(s)− θκ+λ(s)]′ · dwκ(s) (1.68)
where is the discount factor β(s) = exp(− ∫ t
0
r(s)ds), pi is now an Rk+1-valued vector the components
of which are portfolio proportions invested in the actual and the fictitious risky assets. The vector
θκ+λ in (2.60) is defined by
θκ+λ = Σ
−1
(
µ− r + κ1
λ− r1k + κ
)
= θ0(κ1) + ϑ
′(λ− r1k + κ)
where θ0(κ1) = σ
′‖σ‖−2(µ− r + κ1) and Z0(κ+ λ, t) is the stochastic exponential
Z0(κ+ λ, t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θκ+λ(s) · dwκ(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
‖θκ+λ(s)‖2ds
)
The l.h.s. of (2.60) is clearly a positive Pκ- local martingale28, hence a Pκ-supermartingale. There-
fore for every consumption plan c(t) satisfying (2.60) (for some pi(t)) in the fictitious economy the
state prices of which are evaluated according to β(t)Z0(κ+ λ, t) , we have:
E
κ
[∫ T
0
Z0(κ+ λ, s)β(s)c(s)ds
]
≤
E
κ
[
β(T )Z0(κ+ λ, T )W (T ) +
∫ T
0
Z0(κ+ λ, s)β(s)c(s)ds
]
≤ x (1.69)
Conversely, it can be shown that if
sup
λ
E
κ
[∫ T
0
Z0(κ+ λ, s)β(s)c(s)ds
]
= x
then there exists a (super)strategy pi(t) such that c(t) satisfies (2.60). Therefore the dynamic budget
constraint (2.60) admits the static formulation (2.61). The innermost optimization in (1.67) subject
to (2.61) is an unconstrained consumption-portfolio optimization in a complete market framework.
Lagrangian theory then dictates that the utility gradient at the optimal policies be proportional to
the unique (fictitious) state-price density. Let
ξ(κ+ λ, t) = Z0(κ+ λ, t)β(t)
denote such a state-price density. The optimal consumption and invested wealth process as well as
the value function Vκ(x, λ) of the innermost sup optimization program in (1.67) are then easily seen
28Remember that for pi to be admissible, the nonnegativity of the wealth process has to hold.
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to be given by the following expressions, where we omit the functional arguments κ + λ in ξ for
brevity:
c∗(t) = [(ψ/A)ξ(t)]
1
R−1 W ∗(T ) = [(ψ/(1−A))ξ(T )] 1R−1 (1.70)
W (t) = ψ
1
R−1 ξ(t)−1 Eκ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
t
ξ(s)
R
R−1 ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
ξ(T )
R
R−1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.71)
Vκ(x, λ) =
ψ
R
R−1
R E
κ
[
A
1
1−R
∫ T
0
ξ(s)
R
R−1 ds+ (1−A) 11−R ξ(T ) RR−1
]
− A(T − 1) + 1R (1.72)
where
ψ =
E
κ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1
∫ T
0
ξ(s)
R
R−1 ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
ξ(T )
R
R−1
]
x

1−R
is the unique Lagrange multiplier for which budget constraint (2.61) is satisfied as an equality. Since
ξ(t)
R
R−1 := ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1 = f(t)g(t) (1.73)
where
f(t) = exp
{
− RR− 1
∫ t
0
(
r(s)− |θκ+λ(s)|
2
2(R− 1)
)
ds
}
g(t) = exp
{
−1
2
( R
R− 1
)2 ∫ t
0
|θκ+λ(s)|2 ds− RR− 1
∫ t
0
θκ+λ(s)
′ · dwκ(s)
}
we find it useful to assume that θκ+λ satisfies a Novikov condition, implying that that g(t) is a
Pκ-martingale. We may thus define the probability measure Qθ(A) = E
[
g(T )1[A]
]
, A ∈ F , under
which the process
wθ(t) = wκ(t) +
∫ t
0
R
R− 1θκ+λ(s) dt
is a standard Brownian motion. Let Eθ[·] denote expectation with respect to this measure. Then
according to conditional Bayes-rule and the optimal consumption and terminal wealth level (1.70):
W (t) = (ψ/A)
1
R−1 ξ(κ+ λ, t)
1
R−1 Eκ
[∫ T
t
f(s)g(s)
f(t)g(t)
+
(
A
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )g(T )
f(t)g(t)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= (ψ/A)
1
R−1 ξ(κ+ λ, t)
1
R−1 Eθ
[∫ T
t
f(s)
f(t)
ds+
(
A
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(t)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
The latter formulation allows us to derive an expression for the stochastic marginal propensity to
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consume and therefore to achieve a convenient factorization for the optimal consumption process:
c∗(t) =
W (t)
Eθ
[∫ T
t
f(s)
f(t) ds+
(
A
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(t)
∣∣∣∣Ft] =W (t)mpc(t)
Let us now introduce the Levy-martingale
f˜(t, T ) = Eθ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.74)
Then, using the optimally invested wealth process (1.71), we have:
ψ =
(
f˜(0, T )
x
)1−R
To write down a representation for the optimal portfolio policies, we apply Ito’s lemma to the
Pκ-supermartingale (see (2.60))
W (t)ξ(κ+ λ, t) = ψ
1
R−1 g(t)
(
f˜(t, T )−
∫ t
0
f(s) ds
)
to obtain:
ξ(κ+ λ, t)W (t) =
x
f˜(0, T )
∫ t
0
(
f˜(s, T )−
∫ s
0
f(u)du
) R
1−Rg(s)θκ+λ(s)
′dwκ(s)
− x
f˜(0, T )
∫ t
0
f(s)g(s)ds+
x
f˜(0, T )
∫ t
0
g(s)φ(ω, s)′dwθ(s)
+
x
f˜(0, T )
∫ t
0
R
1−R g(s) θκ+λ(s)
′φ(ω, s) ds =
=
∫ t
0
W (s) ξ(κ+ λ, s)
R
1−Rθκ+λ(u)
′dwκ(s)
+
∫ t
0
W (s) ξ(κ+ λ, s)
φ(ω, s)′(
f˜(s, T )− ∫ s
0
f(u)du
) · [dwκ(s) + RR− 1 θκ+λ(s)ds
]
+
∫ t
0
R
1−R W (s) ξ(κ+ λ, s) θκ+λ(s)
′ φ(ω, s)(
f˜(s, T )− ∫ s
0
f(u)du
) ds
− x∫ T
0
f˜(0, s)ds
∫ t
0
f(s)g(s)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
− R t
0
ξ(κ+λ,s)c∗(s)ds
=
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= −
∫ t
0
ξ(κ+ λ, s)c∗(s)ds +
x
f˜(0, T )
∫ t
0
W (s) ξ(κ+ λ, s)
R
1−Rθκ+λ(s)
′ · dwκ(s)
+
x
f˜(0, T )
∫ t
0
W (s) ξ(κ+ λ, s)
φ(ω, s)′(
f˜(s, T )− ∫ s
0
f(u)du
) · dwκ(s)
In the last chain of equalities we have used the predictable integrand process φ(ω, t) appearing in
the stochastic integral representation of the Levy martingale f˜(t, T ):29
f˜(t, T ) = f˜(0, T ) +
∫ t
0
φ(ω, s) · dwθ(s) (1.75)
= Eθ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
]
+
∫ t
0
Eθ
[
Ds
((
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
)∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
· dwθ(s) (1.76)
= Eθ
[∫ T
0
f(s)ds
]
+
∫ t
0
E
θ
[∫ T
s
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
Dsf(u)du+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
Dsf(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
· dwθ(s) (1.77)
where D· denotes the Malliavian derivative operator and the last equality follows from the Clark-
Ocone formula.30 We have thus obtained an alternative representation for the Pκ- local martingale
(2.60):
E
κ
[∫ T
0
ξ(κ+ λ, s)c(s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= ξ(κ+ λ, t)W (t) +
∫ t
0
ξ(κ+ λ, s)c(s)ds
= x+
∫ t
0
W (s)ξ(κ+ λ, s)
 R
1−R θκ+λ(s)
′ +
φ(ω, s)(
f˜(s, T )− ∫ s
0
f(u)du
)
 dwκ(u)
The latter expression leads us to the optimal portfolio proportions by direct comparison with the
RHS of (2.60):
pi∗(t) =
1
1−R
[
‖σ(t)‖−2[µ(t)− r(t) + κ1(t)](
λ(t)− r(t)1k + κ(t)
) ] + [σ(t)‖σ(t)‖−2
ϑ(t)
]
φ(ω, t)(
f˜(t, T )− ∫ t
0
f(s)ds
) (1.78)
29If the coefficient b(t, x) and δ(t, x) are deterministic functions on [0, T ] × R, then we conclude from the Markov
property of the underlying state variable X(t) that the expectation
“ ef(t, T )− R t0 f(s)ds” is a deterministic function
of time and X(t). Moreover,
ef(t, T ) = ef(0, T ) + Z t
0
d(s,X(s)) δ(s,X(s)) dwκ+λ(s)
for some deterministic function d(t, x), from results on the representation of additive functional of diffusion processes
due to Cinlar, Jacod, Protter and Sharpe (1980)
30See Nualart(1995), Section , for details.
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Summarizing, we can thus conclude that the program (1.67) reduces to:
J(x) = inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
Vκ(x, λ)
= inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
(
ψ
R
R−1
R Eθ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
]
− A(T − 1) + 1R
)
= inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
xR
R
(
Eθ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
])1−R
− A(T − 1) + 1R
(1.79)
This is equivalent to solving the following program:31
V (t) = inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
Eθ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
t
f(s)
f(t)
ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(t)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.80)
s.t. dY (t) =
[
Λ(ω, t) +
κ(t)
1−R −
R
R− 1
(
λ(t)− r1k
)]
dt+ Ξ(ω, t)dwκ+λ(t)
Conditions to solve the incomplete market problem without relying on Markovian assumptions for
the opportunity set of the economy are best understood in the context of the martingale approach
to stochastic control as reviewed - for instance - in Davis (1979) or Elliot (1982). It is easily verified
that our regularity assumptions on the model primitives meet the requirements of the last reference
for the problem to be well posed. In particular, the conditional expected utility to be minimized
over shadow state-price processes and admissible model selections belongs to L1(Ω,Ft, P ),32 which
is a complete lattice. Therefore, the infimum exists and is Ft-measurable. What is more, since
the domain K is compact and locally convex, and the function f(t) is convex, bounded and lower-
semicontinuous, this infimum is actually attained.
The following propositions characterize the solution of sequential dynamic optimization problem
(1.80). They apply ideas from the above mentioned approach to identify the min-max martingale
measure (He and Pearson (1991)) and the optimal Girsanov kernel, respectively.
Proposition 6 Let
χK(κ) =
{
0 if κ ∈ K
∞ if κ /∈ K
denote the indicator function (in the sense of convex analysis) of the set K and define the strictly
31Notice that expression in (1.79) suggests that program (1.80) characterizes the equilibrium if 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. ForR < 0
the equivalent control problem would involve a (strictly concave) maximization problem, rather than minimization.
Since the optimality conditions of the latter case coincide with those prevailing in the case 0 < R ≤ 1, we retain for
brevity the inf notation for the rest of this Appendix.
32as noted in Elliott (1982), being the measures Pκ equivalent, the null sets up to which Eκ[·] is defined are
independent of the control κ.
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convex function let g(Y, λ, κ, t) = ∂∂t log f(t) as well as the Hamiltonian H(κ, , t)
H(κ, , t) = − sup
λ∈R
[
−
( R
R− 1 θκ+λ(t)
)′
· (t)− V (t) g(Y, λ, κ, t)
]
= inf
λ∈R
[
V (t) g(Y, λ, κ, t) +
( R
R− 1 θκ+λ(t)
′
)′
· (t)
]
= inf
λ∈R
H(λ, κ, , t) (1.81)
then, for any admissible Girsanov kernel κ ∈ K
i) The process (
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ t
0
f(s)ds+ f(t)V (t)
is a Qκ+λ-submartingale. It is Qκ+λ -martingale if and only if λ achieves the infimum in
(1.80)
ii) With ˜ = RR−1 , let λ
∗(Y, κ, ˜, t) denote the unique measurable function achieving the minimum
in H(κ, , t), then the min-max measure for the incomplete-market consumption-investment
problem is identified by the dynamic Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ∗(Y, κ, a˜f , t), where
af (κ, t) =
a(κ, t)
f(t)
and a(κ, t) is the predictable integrand process in the stochastic integral representation:
f˜(t, T ) = f˜(0, T ) +
∫ t
0
a(Y, s) · dwκ+λ∗(s)
Furthermore, the process a(Y, t) is of the form
a(Y, t)′ = Ξ(ω, t)′ a˜(Y, t) (1.82)
for a k−dimensional stochastic process a˜(Y, t).
Let the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ be given as λ∗(κ), the optimal control identified in the innermost
optimization, and define the Hamiltonian
H˜(, t) = inf
κ∈R
[
V (t) g(Y, λ∗, κ, t) +
( R
R− 1 θκ+λ∗(t)
′ − Σ(t)−1κ(t)
)′
· (t) + χK(κ)
]
= inf
κ∈K
[
V (t) g(Y, λ∗, κ, t) +
( R
R− 1 θκ+λ∗(t)
′ − Σ(t)−1κ(t)
)′
· (t)
]
= inf
κ∈K
H˜(λ∗, κ, , t)
then
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iii) The process (
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ t
0
f(s)ds+ f(t)V (t)
is a Qκ+λ
∗
-submartingale. It is Qκ+λ
∗
-martingale if and only if κ achieves the infimum in
(1.80)
iv) With ˜ = RR−1 , let κ
∗(Y, ˜, t) denote the unique measurable function achieving the minimum in
H˜(Y, t), then the optimal Girsanov kernel that identifies the preference ordering representation
of the agent is κ∗(Y, a˜f , t), where
af (Y, t) =
a(Y, t)
f(t)
and a(Y, t) , the predictable integrand process in the stochastic integral representation:
f˜(t, T ) = f˜(0, T ) +
∫ t
0
a(Y, s) · dwκ∗+λ∗(s)
= f˜(0, T ) +
∫ t
0
a˜(Y, s)′ Ξ(ω, s) dwκ∗+λ∗(s)
is the same process identified in ii).
Proof. i) We denote by V(t) the value function of the innermost optimization in (1.80) The pro-
cess
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1
∫ t
0
f(s)ds+ f(t)V(t)
]
can be shown to admit a Right-Continuous-Left-Limits version
following arguments of El Karoui and Quenez (1995). For any κ ∈ K, t ≤ s ≤ T and a given
process ν satisfying the regularity conditions mentioned at the beginning of this Appendix, consider
the set D(t,s) of controls λ which coincide with ν on [t, s]. Since D(t,s) is a subset of the admissible
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers, we have
V(t) ≤ inf
λ∈D(t,s)
f˜(t, T )− ( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(s)ds
f(t)
= inf
λ∈D(t,s)
E
κ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
f(s)
f(t)
E
κ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
s
f(u)
f(s)
du+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
From Elliott (1982), Lemmas 16.11, 14 we know that by virtue of the ε-lattice property of the set of
random variables
{
(f˜(t, T )− ( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(s)ds)/f(t)}λ we can commute the orders of the infimum
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and expectation in the last expression to obtain:
V(t) ≤ Eκ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
f(s)
f(t)
inf
λ∈D(t,s)
E
κ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
s
f(u)
f(s)
du+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= Eκ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
f(s)
f(t)
V(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
Then (
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ t
0
f(u)du+ f(t)V(t) ≤ Eκ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
0
f(u)du+ f(s)V(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
and we have obtained the submartingale property of f(t)V(t)+( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(u)du for any admissible
λ and κ ∈ K.
Consider now an admissible Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ∗ and suppose that f(t)V(t)+( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(u)du
evaluated at λ∗ is a Qκ+λ
∗
-martingale; then the following chain of equalities holds
E
κ+λ∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(u)du+
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
f(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
E
κ+λ∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
0
f(u)du+ f(T )V(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ t
0
f(u)du+ f(t)V(t)
therefore
E
κ+λ∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
(
1
A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(t)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= V(t) =
inf
λ
E
κ+λ∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
(
1
A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(t)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
and λ∗ is optimal. To show the converse, assume that λ∗ is optimal; for any t ≤ s ≤ T we may
write:
V(t) = Eκ+λ∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
f(s)
f(t)
E
κ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ T
s
f(u)
f(s)
du+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1 f(T )
f(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= Eκ+λ
∗
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
t
f(u)
f(t)
du+
f(s)
f(t)
V(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
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Then (
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ t
0
f(u)du+ f(t)V(t) = Eκ+λ
[(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ s
0
f(u)du+ f(s)V(s)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
and the martingale property of f(t)V(t) + ( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(u)du follows.
ii) For any κ ∈ K, and any admissible process λ(t), due to the assumptions on the stochastic
coefficients of the opportunity set, the submartingale
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
∫ t
0
f(u)du + f(t)V(t) is of class D,
therefore admits a unique Doob-Meyer decomposition which can be represented in the form:
L(λ, κ, t) =
(
1
A
) 1
R−1 ∫ t
0
f(u)du+ f(t)V(t) = V(0) +
∫ t
0
B(λ, κ, s)ds+M(κ, t) (1.83)
for a nondecreasing process of bounded variation
∫ t
0
B(λ, κ, s)ds, with nonnegative density B( · ) 33
and a uniformly integrable Qκ+λ-martingaleM(κ, t). Recalling familiar results of stochastic analysis
we may represent the latter process as the stochastic integral
∫ t
0
a(κ, s) · dwκ+λ(s). For any pair of
admissible controls (λ, ν) we obviously have :
L(λ, κ, t)− ( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(u)|λdu
f(t)|λ = V(t) =
L(ν, κ, t)− ( 1A) 1R−1 ∫ t0 f(u)|νdu
f(t)|ν (1.84)
Applying Ito’s lemma and Girsanov Theorem to the last and second-to-last members, and recalling
the decomposition (1.83) we may write
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|λ
[
B(λ, κ, s) +
R
R− 1 a(κ, s) · (θκ+ν(t)− θκ+λ(t))
]
ds+
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|λ a(κ, s) · dwκ+ν(s)−∫ t
0
V(s)g(Y, λ, κ, s)ds =
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|νB(ν, κ, s)ds−
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|ν a(κ, s)· dwκ+ν(s)−
∫ t
0
V(s)g(Y, ν, κ, s)ds
Certainly, the uniqueness of the representation of the special semimartingale V( · ) mandates that
bounded variation and local martingale parts be equivalent in the two representations obtained;
therefore we conclude by direct comparison that the predictable integrand
af (κ, t) =
a(κ, t)
f(t)
∀ κ ∈ K
is independent of the control and that, for any t ∈ (0, T ):
B(ν, κ, t)
f(t)|ν =
B(λ, κ, t)
f(t)|λ +H(ν, κ, a˜f , t)−H(λ, κ, a˜f , t)
Suppose now that the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ is optimal: the process L(λ, κ, t) is then a Qκ+λ-
martingale by virtue of the previous proposition and this implies B(λ, κ, t) = 0. For any admissible
33W.l.o.g. in the present context, we have assumed this process absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. In particular, being
R t
0 B( · s)ds nondecreasing, B( · ) ≥ 0
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ν the non negative process B(ν,κ,t)f(s)|ν reduces to:
B(ν, κ, t)
f(s)|λ = H(ν, κ, a˜f , t)−H(λ, κ, a˜f , t) ≥ 0
hence, if κ is optimal:
λ(Y, κ, a˜, t) = arg inf
ν
H(ν, κ, a˜, t)
The rest of the proof, in particular the standard argument ensuring that the minimizer of H( · ) can
be selected in a progressively measurable way, follows easily from Thm 16.35 in Elliott (1982).
As of the claim a(Y, t) = Ξ(ω, t)′ a˜(Y, t), notice that coefficients of the opportunity set (1.11) are
deterministic function of the (possibly non Markovian) state variable Y . Though not apparent, let
us conjecture that the optimal controls κ1 and λ inherit this property, so that f(t) is a function of
time and the state Y . This conjecture will be verified in the sequel. Applying Clark-Ocone’s formula
(more details will be found in the proof of Proposition 6 ) we realize that a(Y, t) is implicitly defined
by the following integral equation
a(Y, t) = Eκ
∗+λ∗
[∫ T
t
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
Dtf(s)ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
Dtf(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.85)
where Dt · is the Malliavin derivative operator:
Dt f(s) = ∇f(s)X(s)X(t)−1Ξ(ω, t)1(s≥t)
and X is the first variation process associated with the vector process Y (see Nualart (1995) for
details). Plugging the last expression into (1.85) we realize that
a(Y, t)′ = Ξ(ω, t)′
(
E
κ∗+λ∗
[∫ T
t
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
∇f(s)X(s)X(t)−1ds+
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
∇f(T )X(T )X(t)−1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
])′
from which the claim follows.
iii) The proof is similar to i). The expectations involved are performed with respect to the measure
Qκ+λ(κ)
∗
, where κ ∈ K and λ(κ)∗ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier selected at the previous step.
iv) The proof exploits the arguments used in ii). In particular, the sub-martingale property of
the process L(λ(κ)∗, κ, t), now defined with the value function V (t) in place of V(t). If we let
(κ, v) ∈ K ×K denote two admissible Girsanov Kernels, then applying Ito’s lemma and Girsanov
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theorem to the analog of (1.84) we may write
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|κ
[
B(λ(κ)∗, κ, s) + a(κ, s) ·
[( R
R− 1θv+λ(v)∗(t)− v(t)
)
−
( R
R− 1θκ+λ(κ)∗(t)− κ(t)
)]]
ds
+
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|κ a(κ, s) · dwv+λ(v)
∗(s)−
∫ t
0
V(s)g(Y, λ(κ)∗, κ, s)ds =∫ t
0
1
f(s)|vB(λ(v)
∗, v, s)ds−
∫ t
0
1
f(s)|v a(κ, s) · dwv+λ(v)
∗(s)−
∫ t
0
V(s)g(Y, λ(v)∗, v, s)ds
Mimicking the arguments outlined in ii) leads to the claim in iv) and completes the proof.
Notice that from this proposition it is apparent that a(κ, t) = φ(ω, t), that is, the dual process a(t)
is coincident with the progressively measurable integrand φ(ω, t) appearing in the stochastic integral
representation of the Levy martingale f˜(t, T ) evaluated at the optimal Kuhn-Tucker multiplier.
Since
1
V (t) f(t)
=
1
f˜(t, T )− ∫ t
0
f(s)ds
the first order condition for (1.81)
1
1−R
[
λ(t)− r1k + κ(t)
]
+
ϑ(Y )a(t)′
f(t)V (t)
= 01κ (1.86)
mandates directly pii = 0, i = 2, . . . k + 1. From (1.86) we obtain
34
θκ+λ∗(t) = θ0(κ1)− (R− 1) af (t)
′
V (t)
and substituting we obtain35
H˜(λ(κ)∗, κ, , t) = V (t)
(
− RR− 1r(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 θ0(κ1)
′θ0(κ1)
)
+
R
R− 1θ0(κ1) · af (t)
− R
2
af (t)
′af (t)
V (t)
− κ(t)′ϑ(Y )af (t)′ − κ1(t)(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1σ(t)af (t)′ (1.87)
in Proposition 2 we conclude that a(Y, t)′ = Ξ(ω, t)′a˜(Y, t), therefore the expression above reduces
to
H˜(λ(κ)∗, κ, , t) = V (t)
(
− RR− 1r(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 θ0(κ1)
′θ0(κ1)
)
− R
2
a˜f (t)
′a˜f (t)
V (t)
− κ(t)′a˜f (t)′
34We remind that θ0(κ1) = σ′(σσ′)−1(µ − r + κ1), which is orthogonal to the second summand in the expression
for θκ+λ∗ .
35Notice that we have substituted the dual variable (t) with its ‘optimal’ value af (t)
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The unique admissible minimizer of this expression is36
κ1(t) = κ
∗
1 =
{
−(µ− r) if −
√
2h1(Y ) < − µ−r√σσ′ <
√
2h1(Y )
−sgn(µ− r)√2(σσ′)h1(Y ) otherwise
κ(t) = −
√
2h(Y )
a˜f (t)√
a˜f (t)′a˜f (t)
which fulfills the conjecture, made in the proof of Proposition 6, that the optimal control κ1 is the
deterministic function of the state Y . The Hamiltonian H˜(af , t) is easily seen to be
H˜(af , t) = V (t)
(
− RR− 1r(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 θ˜0(κ
∗
1)
′θ˜0(κ∗1)
)
−R
2
af (t)
′af (t)
V (t)
+
√
2h(Y )
√
af (t)′af (t)
(1.88)
where
θ˜0(κ
∗
1) =
{
0 if −√2h1(Y ) < − µ−r√σσ′ <√2h1(Y )
(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1(µ− r − sgn(σσ′)
√
2(σσ′)h1(Y ))2 otherwise
This ends the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 7
We remind that wκ(t) = w(t)−
∫ t
0
Σ−1(s)κ(s)ds is a standard brownian motion under the measure
Pκ. Let an adapted, square integrable solution (p(t), b(t)) of the following backward stochastic
differential equation exists.
dp(t) =
[
p(t)
( R
R− 1r(t) +
R
2
b(t)b(t)′ + b(t)′Ξ(t)Σ(t)−1κ(t)
)
−
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
]
dt+ p(t)b(t)′Ξ(t)dwκ(t)
p(T ) =
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
36Notice that the control κ1 influences the component θ0(κ1)′θ0(κ1) alone and does not control the state vari-
ables, therefore the optimality conditions mandate point-wise minimization of the ‘running cost’ with respect to this
component.
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κ ∈ K. Then taking into account the partitioned form of Σ(t)−1 and applying Ito’s lemma we have
d
(
p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1
)
= − RR− 1 p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1 [r(t)dt+ θκ+λ(t)dwκ(t)]
+
R
2(R− 1)2 p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1 ‖θκ+λ(t)‖2dt+ p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t) RR−1 b(t)dwκ(t)
+ ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1
[
p(t)
( R
R− 1r(t)−
R
R− 1 b(t)
′(λ(t)− r(t)1k + k(t))
+
R
2
b(t)b(t)′ + b(t)′κ(t)
)
−
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
]
dt
or
d
(
p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1
)
=
R
2(R− 1)2 p(t)ξ(κ+λ, t)
R
R−1
[(
λ(t)− r(t)1k + κ(t)
)′ (
λ(t)− r(t)1k + κ(t)
)
+
(R− 1)2b(t)b(t)′ + 2(R− 1)b(t)′ (λ(t)− r(t)1k + κ(t))] dt+
ξ(κ+λ, t)
R
R−1
[
p(t)
(
b(t)′κ(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 (σ(t)σ(t)
′)−1σ(t)′(µ− r + κ1)2
)
−
(
1
A
) 1
Ri−1
]
dt+[. . . ]dwκ(t)
Integrating and taking expectations with respect to Qκ we obtain
E
κ
[(
1
A
) 1
Ri−1
∫ T
0
ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1 dt+
(
1
1−A
) 1
Ri−1
ξ(κ+ λ, T )
R
R−1
]
= p(0)+
E
κ
[∫ T
0
R
2(R− 1)2 p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1
∥∥λ(t)− (r(t)1κ − κ(t)− (R− 1)b(t))∥∥2 dt
]
+
E
κ
[∫ T
0
p(t)ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1
(
b(t)′κ(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 (σ(t)σ(t)
′)−1σ(t)′(µ− r + κ1)2
)
dt
]
therefore
inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
E
κ
[(
1
A
) 1
Ri−1
∫ T
0
ξ(κ+ λ, t)
R
R−1 dt+
(
1
1−A
) 1
Ri−1
ξ(κ+ λ, T )
R
R−1
]
=
inf
κ∈K
E
κ
[∫ T
0
p(t)ξ(κ+ λ∗, t)
R
R−1
(
b(t)′κ(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 (σ(t)σ(t)
′)−1σ(t)′(µ− r + κ1)2
)
dt
]
where λ∗(t) = [0 (r(t)1κ − κ(t)− (R− 1)b(t))]′ and substitution in θκ+λ(t) leads to the expression
reported in the corollary. It follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that the minimization of the
latter functional over admissible Girsanov kernels leads to the optimal control
κ∗1 =
{
−(µ− r) if −√2h1(Y ) < − µ−r√σσ′ <√2h1(Y )
−sgn(µ− r)
√
2(σσ′)h1(Y ) otherwise
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κ∗(t) = −
√
2h(Y )
b(t)√
b(t)b(t)′
As of the characterization of the optimal portfolio policy in terms of the solution of the BSDE (1.13)
the argument is similar to the proof of Proposition (1) and exploits the dynamic representation of
the value function given by this BSDE.
Proof of Corollary 2
In order to obtain a characterization of the problem useful for computational purposes, let us focus
our attention on the case in which (1.66) reduces to a strongly Markovian system, that is, all coef-
ficients of the equations involved in the dynamics of the opportunity set are deterministic functions
of time and the current state Y . In this case dynamic programming techniques imply that the
value function V of the program (1.80) is a classical solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation, the first order conditions of which are easily recovered from (1.87) and (1.86)
above once we remind that in the markovian case the following equality holds
af (t) =
∂V (t)
∂Y
′
Ξ(ω, t)
therefore
1
1−R
[
λ(t)− r1k + κ(t)
]− ∂V (t)
∂Y
1
V (t)
= 01κ
or
θκ+λ∗(t) = θ0(κ1) + (R− 1) ∂V (t)
∂Y
1
V (t)
and
H˜(λ(κ)∗, κ,Ξ′VY , t) =
V (t)
(
− RR− 1r(t) +
R
2(R− 1)2 θ0(κ1)
′θ0(κ1)
)
− R
2
∂V (t)
∂Y
′ ∂V (t)
∂Y
V (t)
− κ(t)′ ∂V (t)
∂Y
This expression admits as unique admissible minimizer κ(t) = −
√
2h(Y )
∂V (t)
∂Yq
∂V (t)
∂Y
′ ∂V (t)
∂Y
and κ1 as in
the proof of Proposition (6), therefore the value function of the consumption-investment problem
under ambiguity is a classical solution of the semilinear partial differential equation
∂V
∂t
+ H˜
(
∂V (t)
∂Y
, t
)
+ Λ(Y )′
∂V (t)
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2V (t)
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+
(
1
A
) 1
R−1
= 0
V (T, Y ) =
(
1
1−A
) 1
R−1
, where H˜( · ) is given in (1.88). Now let
G = V 1−R
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Then if V satisfies the latter equation one easily checks that G(t, Y ) solves the partial differential
equation
∂G
∂t
+ Λ(Y )′
∂G
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
Ξ(Y )Ξ(Y )′
∂2G
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+
√
2η(Y )
√
∂G
∂Y
′ ∂G
∂Y
G
[
R r − R
2(R− 1)(σσ
′)−1(µ− r + κ∗1)2
]
+ (R− 1)A 11−RG RR−1 = 0 (1.89)
with terminal condition G(T, Y ) = 1−A.
Logarithmic felicity function
By reasoning along the same lines of the proof of Proposition 1 one concludes that in this case the
ambiguity-averse agent solves the program
inf
κ∈K
inf
λ
E
κ
[∫ T
t
∫ s
t
r(u) +
1
2
θκ+λ(u)
′θκ+λ(u)duds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
s.t. dY =
[
Λ(Y, t) + k
]
dt+ Ξ(Y, t)dwκ(t)
Quite clearly, a given probability measure Pκ on the space of sample paths of the state variable
vector Y is invariant with respect to a particular choice of the dynamic Kuhn-Tucker multiplier
λ(t), therefore the constrained solution is recovered from the dual formulation by means of the
simple point-wise minimization:
λ∗(t) = arg min
λ
| θκ+λ(t)|2 = r(t)1k − κ
from which θκ+λ∗(t) = σ(t)
′ (σ(t)σ(t)′)−1 (µ(t) − r(t) + κ1(t)), hence program (1.16). Since the
control appearing in the running cost (κ1) does not affect the dynamics of the state variable, point-
wise minimization of the criterion implies the form reported in proposition 1 for the optimal controls,
the HBJ equation solved by the value function and the content of Corollary (3).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first assume that an equilibrium exists. We first prove the expression for the equilibrium
interest rate (1.24), the excess return (1.25), relation (1.26) and the volatility of the stock dynamics.
By construction
ξ(κ(1) + λ1, t) =
U ′(ε(t), ψγ(t))
U ′(ε(0), ψ)
therefore, according to Ito’s lemma applied to the left hand side of the expression above we have
dU ′(ε(t), ψγ(t))
U ′(ε(t), ψγ(t)) = − r(t) dt−
[
θ0(κ
(1)
1 ) + Ξ
′
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)]
· dwκ(1)
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On the other hand, one may apply Ito’s lemma to the right hand side of the equality above and
obtain the alternative representation
dU ′(ε(t), ψγ(t)) =
{
U ′εε
(
µε + σε · k(1)1
)
+ U ′γγ
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)+
(λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1) + (k(1)1 − k(2)1 )′θ0(κ(1)1 )
]
+
1
2
U ′εεε2σεσ′ε+
1
2
U ′γγγ2
[
(k
(1)
1 − k(2)1 )′(k(1)1 − k(2)1 ) + (λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)′(λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)
]
+
U ′γεγ ε σε(k(1)1 − k(2)1 )
}
dt+ U ′εσεε dwκ(1)+
U ′γγ
[
(k
(1)
1 − k(2)1 )′ + Ξ′((λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1))
]
dwκ(1)
Notice that the dynamics of the state variable need to be represented under the first agent’s proba-
bility measure Qκ
(1)
. Furthermore, as it will become clear in the sequel, for the rows of the volatility
matrix Ξ to span the kernel of the of the the stock’s volatility σ in equilibrium, the same relation
must hold for the the dividend process’ volatility σε, therefore σεΞ
′ = 01k. From the uniqueness
of the special semi-martingale representation of the process U ′(ε(t), ψγ(t)) we conclude that the
drift and diffusion components of the two Ito’s representation must be indistinguishable: from direct
comparison of the drift components we obtain the the expression for the interest rate, whereas from
direct comparison of the diffusion components we obtain the relation:
−U ′
(
θ0(κ
1
1) + Ξ
′(λ1 − r1κ + κ1)
)
= U ′εσεε+ U ′γγ
(
(k
(2)
1 − k(1)1 ) + Ξ′(λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1)
)
Projecting this equality on Span(σ) and Kernel(σ) we obtain (1.25) and the equality
−Ξ′
[
U ′(λ1 − r1κ + κ1) + U ′γγ
(
λ2 + κ2 − λ1 − κ1
)]
= U ′ε(Ik+1 − σ′(σσ′)−1σ)σ′ε
Pre-multiplying both members of this expression by Ξ and keeping in mind the properties of this
matrix we obtain (1.26).
As of the volatility process σ(Y ) appearing in the equity dynamics, Malliavin calculus provides us
with a semi explicit representation in terms of expectations with respect to the probability measure
implied by the dynamics of the state variable Y (under Qκ
(1)
, since in the solution technique the state
price density of the first agent has been taken as ’equilibrium’ state price density). This technique
has been already exploited in the literature37: one needs basically to apply Clark-Ocone formula in
order to obtain the predictable integrand process α(t) in the stochastic integral representation of
the martingale38 (remind that U ′(ε, γ, t) = ξ(κ(1) + λ1, t))
S(t)U ′(t) +
∫ t
0
U ′(s)ε(s)ds = Eκ(1)
[∫ T
0
U ′(s)ε(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= S(0) +
∫ t
0
α(s) · dwκ(1)(s) (1.90)
37see, for instance, Detemple and Serrat (2003)
38we omit functional arguments once again in order to simplify notation.
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that is
α(t) = Eκ
(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′ε(s)ε(s)Dtε(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− Eκ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′γ(s)ε(s)Dtγ(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′(s)Dtε(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.91)
where Dt denotes the Malliavin derivative operator. But
Dtε(s) = 1(s≥t) ε(s)
(
σε(t)
′ +
∫ s
t
Dt(µε(u) + σεk(1)1 ) du−
∫ s
t
σε(u)
′Dtσε(u) du+
∫ s
t
(Dtσε(u))′ dwκ(1)
)
Dtγ(s) = 1(s≥t) γ(s)
(
L(t)′ +
∫ s
t
Dt(µε(u) + k(1)
′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)+ (1.92)
L(u)Σ−1(u)(κ(1) − κ(2))) du−
∫ s
t
L(u)′DtL(u) du+
∫ s
t
(DtL(u))′ dwκ1
)
where
L(t) =
[
(k
(2)
1 − k(1)1 ) + Ξ(t)′
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)]
and we have made use of the representation of the process γ under the measure Qκ
(1)
. Now let
the process Y (t) be strongly markovian, that is, the coefficients Λ(Y, t) and Ξ(Y, t) be deterministic
functions of the current state and time. Then we may define the first variation process X associated
with the vector process Y as the solution of the following stochastic differential equation39
dX =
∂Λ(Y, t)
∂Y
X(t)dt+
k+1∑
i=1
∂Ξi(Y, t)
∂Y
X(t)dw
κ
(1)
i
(t) X(0) = Ik
and check (see Nualart (1995) for details) that for any φ ∈ C1(Rk) we have
Dt φ(Y (s)) = ∇φ(Y (s))X(s)X(t)−1Ξ(Y, t)1(s≥t) (1.93)
According to the last expressions, one may rewrite (1.91) in the following way
α(t) = σε(t)
′
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′ε(s)ε(s)2 ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− L(t)Eκ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′γ(s)ε(s)γ(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
σε(t)
′
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
U ′(s)ε(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ Ξ(Y, t)′ (. . . . . . ) (1.94)
and we easily identify the last term on the right hand side as S(t)U ′(t)σε. Expression (1.94) needs
to be compared to the volatility process of the first member of (1.90) given by Ito’s lemma. Once
39which is easily represented as the usual stochastic exponential
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we project the latter on Span(σ) we obtain:
α(t) = S(t)
[
U ′ε(t)σ′εε(t) + U ′γ(t)(k(2)1 − k(1)1 )γ(t)
]
+ S(t)U ′(t)σ(t)′ (1.95)
We may then perform a similar projection for (1.94) and compare the result with (1.95) we obtain
the system (1.27), whose solution gives the equilibrium volatility process.
Following the definition at the beginning of Section 1.4, in order to prove that the stated policies
constitute an equilibrium we must show that: (i) markets are cleared by the proposed demands
under the price system (S, r) when selected beliefs are Qκ
(i)∗
, i = 1, 2; (ii) the latter are optimally
chosen; (iii) consumption policies are optimal and financed by the given trading strategies.
Since in this general equilibrium framework we have confined ourselves either to the case of utility
from intertemporal consumption or to the case of utility from terminal wealth, in what follows we
will assume either A = 0 or A = 1.
i) The consumption policies (1.22) clear the good market as a consequence of expression (1.18),
which follows from the state-dependent representative agent’s marginal utility’s being the inverse of
the aggregate demand function (for the consumption good) with respect to the first agent’s state
price density (multiplied by ψ1). Consider now the optimally invested wealth process of agent 2;
since ξ(κ(2)∗ + λ2∗, t) = U ′(ε, γ, t)γ(t), we have:
W c2, pi22 (t) =
1
γ(t)U ′(ε, γ, t)E
κ(2)
[
A
∫ T
t
U ′(ε, γ, s)γ(s) c∗2(s) + (1−A)U ′(ε, γ, T )γ(T )W ∗2 (T ) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
1
β(t)
E
02
[
A
∫ T
t
β(s)c∗2(s) + (1−A)β(T )W ∗2 (s)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
where we have denoted by W ∗2 the optimally invested terminal wealth level and E
02 [ · ] denotes
expectation with respect to the min-max martingale measure Q02( · ), defined by the relation
E
κ(2)
[
Z0(κ
(2)∗ + λ2∗, T )1B
]
= Q02(B) B ∈ F
The min-max martingale measure is preference dependent, therefore the selection made by agent 2
will differ in general from the selection made by agent 1, whose min-max measure Q01 is similarly
defined.
Since first agent’s shadow market corresponding to the state-price density ξ(κ(1)+ λ1∗, t) (see proof
of proposition 1) is dynamically complete, agent’s 2 optimal consumption-invested wealth plan
(c∗2(t),W
∗
2 (t)) is attained by means of a self-financing, martingale generating trading strategy in
the market driven by agent’s 1 selected belief. Therefore:
x+
∫ T
0
β(s)pi∗2(s)σ(s) · dw01(s) = A
∫ T
0
β(s)c∗2(s) + (1−A)β(T )W ∗2 (T )
Taking conditional expectations with respect to Q01 on both sides and applying the conditional
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Bayes rule we obtain
x+
∫ t
0
β(s)pi∗2(s)σ · dw01(s) = E01
[
A
∫ T
0
β(s)c∗2(s) + (1−A)β(T )W ∗2 (T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
1
U ′(t)E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(s) c∗2(s) + (1−A)U ′(T )W ∗2 (T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=W c2, pi22 (t)U ′(t) +
∫ t
0
U ′(s)c∗2(s)ds
and we realize that W c2, pi22 (t) admits the alternative representation:
1
U ′(t) E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
t
U ′(s) c∗2(s) ds+ (1−A)U ′(T )W ∗2 (T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
It then follows from the good market clearing condition that:
W c1, pi11 (t)+W
c2, pi2
2 (t) =
1
U ′(t)E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
t
U ′(s) (c∗1(s) + c∗2(s)) ds+ (1−A)U ′(T ) (W ∗1 (s) +W ∗2 (s))
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
1
U ′(t) E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
t
U ′(s) ε(s) ds+ (1−A)U ′(T )ε(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= S(t) (1.96)
and
β(t) (W c1, pi11 (t) +W
c2, pi2
2 (t)) +A
∫ t
0
β(s) (c∗1(s) + c
∗
2(s)) ds =
S(0)(η1 + η2) +
∫ t
0
β(s) [pi∗1(s)W
c1, pi1
1 (t) + pi
∗
2(s)W
c2, pi1
2 (t)]σ(s)dw01(s)
By virtue of (1.96), the consumption good market clearing and by direct comparison of the last
expression with the cum-dividend stock dynamics (1.2) - namely, matching diffusion terms - we
conclude that the stock market clearing condition holds for the posited consumption-investment
policies and selected beliefs.
ii) This is the content of Proposition (3), where the equilibrium control problem that mandates
optimality of the Girsanov kernels κi, i = 1, 2 (and of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λi) is illustrated.
The equilibrium quantities reported in this proposition hold for any admissible likelihood.
iii) Let the controls κi∗ and λi∗ be optimal according to the criteria illustrated in Proposition
3. Furthermore, let the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers λi satisfy the equilibrium relation (1.26). By
construction, we have U ′(ε, γ, t) = ξ(κ(1)∗+λ1∗, t) therefore the definition of the shadow state price
density ξ( · ) implies that40:
dU ′(t) = −U ′(t) r(t) dt− U ′(t) θκ(1)∗+λ1∗(t) · dwκ(1)(t)
40As often the case in this Appendix, we drop most functional arguments in what follows when no confusion may
arise. We will also use the notation U ′(ψ, t) in order to emphasize the dependence of this inverse function on the
ratio of the lagrange multipliers for the budget constraints, ψ = ψ2/ψ1
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Let ψ∗ be the positive ratio of the static lagrange multipliers ψ2 and ψ1 such that agent’s 1 budget
constraint is satisfied:
1
U ′(ψ∗, 0)E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
(U ′(ψ∗, t))
R2
R2−1 dt+ (1−A) (U ′(ψ∗, T ))
R2
R2−1
]
=
η1
1
U ′(ψ∗, 0)E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, s) ε(s)ds+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T )ε(T )
]
A = 0, 1 (1.97)
or41
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, t)υ1(U ′(ψ∗, t), t) dt+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T )υ1(U(ψ∗, T ) ′, T )
]
=
η1 E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, s) ε(s)ds+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T ) ε(T )
]
The individual multipliers are then recovered by means of the relation U ′(ψ∗, 0) = ψ1, and it may
easily be checked that agent’ s 2 budget constraint is satisfied as a consequence of market clearing.
To see that a solution to (1.97) exists, rewrite the equation in the form
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, t)υ1(U ′(ψ∗, t), t) dt+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T )υ1(U(ψ∗, T ) ′, T )
]
Eκ
(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, s) ε(s)ds+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T ) ε(T )
] = η1 < 1
Since, by definition of the inverse function U ′( · ), limψ→∞ U ′(ψ, t) = ∂u1∂c (ε(t)), then, by continu-
ity of the functions involved we have limψ→∞ U ′(ψ, t)υ1(U(ψ∗, t) ′, t) = ∂u1∂c (ε(t))ε(t) and applying
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem twice we conclude that
lim
ψ→∞
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, t)υ1(U ′(ψ∗, t), t) dt+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T )υ1(U(ψ∗, T ) ′, T )
]
Eκ
(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, s) ε(s)ds+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T ) ε(T )
] = 1 > η1
Furthermore, in light of the fact that limψ→0 U ′(ψ, t) =∞, we have limψ→0 υ1(U ′(ψ, t), t) = 0 and
an application of De L’ Hospital rule to the above ratio allows us to write
lim
ψ→0
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, t)υ1(U ′(ψ∗, t), t) dt+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T )υ1(U(ψ∗, T ) ′, T )
]
Eκ
(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ∗, s) ε(s)ds+ (1−A)U ′(ψ∗, T ) ε(T )
] = 0 < η1
Therefore we conclude that by continuity there exists a ψ∗ in the domain (0,∞) such that the
equation (1.97) is satisfied. As of uniqueness of this solution, rewrite (1.97) as
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(ψ, t) (υ1(U ′(ψ, t), t)− η1ε(t)) dt+ (1−A)U ′(ψ, T ) (υ1(U(ψ, T ) ′, T )− η1ε(T ))
]
= 0
41Remind that υ1( · ) denotes the inverse marginal felicity function of agent 1.
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or
E
[
A
∫ T
0
(
U ′(ψ∗, t)
R1
R1−1 − U ′(ψ∗, t)ε(t)
)
dt+ (1−A)
(
U ′(ψ∗, T )
R1
R1−1 − U ′(ψ∗, T )ε(T )
)]
= 0
and notice that state dependent marginal utility of the representative agent’, U ′(ψ, t) is strictly
decreasing in the ratio ψ, therefore if we assume R1 > 0, the expression on the left hand side is
monotonically decreasing; for this case uniqueness of the solution ψ∗ can then be guaranteed.
Consider the optimal consumption-portfolio policy for agent-1 reported in the proposition, (c∗1, pi
∗
1)
and define the vector pi∗1 = (pi
∗
1 pi
∗
1)
′ where
pi∗1 = (λ1∗ − r1k + κ1∗) + Ξ(t)′δ(t)
so that
pi∗1(t) = Σ(Y )
′−1 θκ(1)∗+λ1∗(Y ) + Σ(Y )
′−1 δ(t)
W ∗1 (t)U ′(t)
In terms of the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier and the Girsanov kernel to be determined in the next
Proposition. With the above choice of the parameter ψ the following chain of equalities holds for
the Qκ
(1)
-martingale:
E
κ(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(s)
U ′(0) c
∗
1(s) ds+ (1−A)
U ′(T )
U ′(0)W
∗
1 (T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= Eκ
(1)
[
A
∫ T
0
U ′(s)
R1
R1−1
U ′(0) ds+ (1−A)
U ′(T )
R1
R1−1
U ′(0)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
U ′(t)W c1, pi11 (t) +A
∫ t
0
U ′(S)c∗1(s)ds = η1S(0) +
∫ t
0
δ(s)′ · dwκ(1)(s) =
η1S(0) +
∫ t
0
W c1, pi11 (s)U ′(s)
[
Σ′pi∗1(s)− θκ(1)∗+λ1∗(s)
]′ · dwκ(1)(s) (1.98)
where the second equality follows from the stochastic integral representation of the first member
and the third from the definition of pi∗1 . Applying once again Ito’s lemma to (1.98) - namely, to
(U ′(t)W ∗1 (t))/U ′(t), where the first term is represented as in (1.98) - we conclude that
W c1, pi11 (t) = η1S(0) +
∫ t
0
[
W c1, pi11 (s)
(
r(s) + pi∗
′
1 (s) Σ θκ(1)+λ1(s)
)
− c(s)
]
ds+∫ t
0
W c1, pi11 (s)pi
∗ ′
1 (s) Σ · dwκ(1)
or, recalling the form of θκ(1)+λ1 and expliciting products
W c1, pi11 (t) = η1S(0) +
∫ t
0
[
W c1, pi11 (s)
(
r(s) + pi∗1(s)σ(s) · k(1)1 (s)
)
− c(s)
]
ds+∫ t
0
W c1, pi11 (s)pi
∗
1(s) (µ(s)− r(s)) ds+
∫ t
0
W c1, pi11 (s)pi
∗
1(s)σ(s) · dwκ(1)
so that c∗1 is financed by pi
∗
1 and is attainable, given that we clearly have W
c1, pi1
1 (t) > 0 . The
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symmetric result holds for agent-2 as an immediate consequence of the consumption good and stock
market clearing conditions. Consider now the convex dual of the felicity function u1:
u˜1 (U ′(ε(t), ψ∗γ(t))) = sup
c1
[u1(c1(t))− U ′(ε(t), ψ∗γ(t))c1(t)] =
u1 (υ1(U ′( ε(t) , ψ∗γ(t) ), t))− U ′( ε(t) , ψ∗γ(t) )υ1(U ′( ε(t) , ψ∗γ(t) ), t)
and the budget feasible consumption plan c1; in light of the last expression we have [u1(υ1(U ′(·)))−
U ′(·)υ1(U ′(·)) ] ≥ u1(c1)− U ′(·)c1, so that:
U1(c∗1)− U1(c1) = Eκ
(1)
[∫ T
0
(u1(c
∗
1(s))− u1(c1(s))) ds
]
≥ U ′( ε(0) , ψ∗ )Eκ(1)
[∫ T
0
U ′( ε(s) , ψ∗γ(s) )
U ′( ε(0) , ψ∗ ) (c
∗
1(s)− c1(s)) ds
]
≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from (1.97). Therefore c∗1 is an optimal consumption plan for agent-
1; repeating the argument for the convex dual of u2(·) evaluated at U ′(·)γ leads to the optimality
of c∗2.
Proof of Corollary 4
Apply Ito’s lemma to both sides of the good market clearing condition:
(
ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, t)
) 1
R1−1
+
(
ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, t)γ(t)
) 1
R2−1
= ε(t)
and notice that Ria = −c∗i /(Ri − 1) = (ψiξi)
1
Ri−1 /(Ri − 1). Comparing drift and diffusion compo-
nents of the Ito representations thus obtained and applying the line of reasoning used in the proof
of Proposition (2) one obtains (1.28), (1.29) and the expression for the equilibrium interest rate
reported in the Corollary.
Proof of Proposition 3
Due to competitive behavior, the agents determine their controls in equilibrium taking as exogenously
given the state price density U ′(ε(t), ψγ) determined by the good market clearing condition. In par-
ticular this implies that they do not take advantage of the equilibrium relations (1.25), (1.24) and
(1.26), instead they consider the equilibrium weighting process as given and intermediate consump-
tion the only stochastic component in the equilibrium state price density. Since, by construction,
we have U ′(ε, γ, t)
U ′(ε, γ, 0) = ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, t) γ(t)
U ′(ε, γ, t)
U ′(ε, γ, 0) = ξ(κ
(2) + λ2, t)
following the steps that led us to the characterization of the individual consumption problem in
the partial equilibrium framework, we determine the general equilibrium values of the Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers λ and κ as solutions of the programs (1.31) and (1.32), equilibrium counterparts of (1.80).
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Notice that in this section the parameter A is either 0 or 1.
In general, due to the functional dependence of the inverse function U ′(ε, γ, t), the control problem
to be solved in equilibrium by the agent 2 is subject to the dynamics of the three state variables
γ, ε, Y , whereas competitive behavior suggests that the problem solved by agent 1 is subject to the
dynamics of ε and Y alone.
Proof of Proposition 4
If both agents have logarithmic felicity functions, inversion of the good market clearing condition is
easily seen to yield
U ′(t, ε, γ) = 1
ε(t)
(
1 +
1
γ(t)
)
The optimal equilibrium allocation (1.22), expressed in terms of the equilibrium weighting process
γ(t) is then immediately obtained from the partial equilibrium optimal demand. Competitive be-
havior of the agents suggests that in their dynamic optimization problem performed at equilibrium
prices the weighting process γ appearing above is considered exogenously given at its equilibrium
value: γ = γ̂. Then program (1.31) and program (1.32) reduce to, respectively
inf
κ(1)∈K1
inf
λ
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
− log
(
1
ε(s)
(
1 +
1
γ̂(s)
))∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
and
inf
κ(2)∈K2
inf
λ
E
κ(2)
[∫ T
t
− log
(
γ(s)
ε(s)
(
1 +
1
γ̂(s)
))∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
subject to
dY = (Λ(t) + κi)dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(i) i = 1, 2
Notice that the solutions of the stochastic differential equation for ε(t) and γ(t) under the measure
Qκ
(2)
are as follows
ε(t) = ε(0) exp
(∫ t
0
(
µε + σε · k(1)1 −
1
2
σε · σ′ε
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σε · dwκ(1)
)
(1.99)
γ(t) =
ψ1
ψ2
exp
(∫ t
0
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
]
ds− (1.100)
1
2
∣∣∣(k(2)1 − k(1)1 )+ Ξ(t)′ (λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1)∣∣∣2+[(
k
(2)
1 − k(1)1
)
+ Ξ(t)′
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)]
dwκ(2)(t)
)
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therefore the value function of agent 2, possibly after a localization argument becomes
inf
κ(2)∈K2
inf
λ
E
κ(2)
[∫ T
t
∫ s
t
[
µε(u)− 1
2
σε(u)σε(u)
′ + σε(u) · k(2)1 − C(κ, λ, u)
]
du −
log
(
1 +
1
γ̂(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]
where
C(κ, λ, t) =
[
k
(1)′
1 · k(1)1 + (λ2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)
]
−
1
2
∣∣∣(k(2)1 − k(1)1 )+ Ξ(t)′ (λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1)∣∣∣2
and we realize why the current stochastic controls problem are being solved subject to the dynamics
of the state variable Y alone. Notice that the controls λ1, κ1, κ
(1)
1 are taken as given by agent
2. Quite clearly the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier λ2 does not affect the dynamics of the state variable,
therefore a necessary condition for its optimality is λ2∗ = arg inf
λ
[drift (log ε(t))− C(κ, λ, t)], or
λ2 = 2(λ1 + κ1)− κ2 − r1k
but substitution of this expression into the equilibrium condition (1.26) yields λ1 − r1k + κ1 =
−U
′
γ
U ′
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)
, or λ1∗ = r1k − κ1. It is immediate to see that the optimal Girsanov kernel
of agent 2 is given, in terms of the still to be determined optimal Girsanov kernel of agent 1, by
k
(2)∗
1 =

k
(1)∗
1 − σ′ε if
(
k
(1)∗
1 − σ′ε
)′ (
k
(1)∗
1 − σ′ε
)
≤ 2h2(Y )√
2h2(Y )
k
(1)
1 −σ′εq
(k
(1)
1 −σ′ε)′(k(1)1 −σ′ε)
otherwise
κ2∗ = −
√
2h2(Y )
(a+ (λ1 − r1k + κ1)√
(a+ (λ1 − r1k + κ1))′(a+ (λ1 − r1k + κ1))
where a is the predictable integrand process in the stochastic integral representation of the Levy
martingale
E
κ(2)
[∫ T
0
∫ s
0
(
µε(u)− 1
2
σε(u)σε(u)
′ + σε(u)k
(2)∗
1 (s)− C(κ∗, λ∗, u)
)
du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.101)
with λ1 and κ1 still considered as given in spite of the equilibrium condition (1.26). The last
characterization follows easily from the partial equilibrium counterpart of the optimization problem.
The markovian analog of this expression is similarly obtained.
Consider now the equilibrium optimization problem of agent 1. In light of (1.99), and the fact
that his optimal dynamic Kuhn-Tucker multiplier has been determined by means of the equilibrium
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relation (1.26), his value function may be written, possibly after a localization argument
inf
κ(1)∈K1
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
t
∫ s
t
[
µε(u)− 1
2
σε(u)σε(u)
′ + σε(u)k
(1)
1 (u)
]
du − log
(
1 +
1
γ̂(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
from which one immediately obtains
k
(1)∗
1 = −
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σ′εσε
κ1∗ = −
√
2h1(Y )
a˜√
a˜′a˜
where a˜ is the predictable integrand appearing in the stochastic integral representation of the Levy
martingale
E
κ(1)
[∫ T
0
∫ s
0
µε(u)− 1
2
σε(u)σε(u)
′ −
√
2h1(Y )
√
σε(u) · σε(u)′du ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(1.102)
Notice that in light of this form of the optimal Girsanov Kernel k
(1)∗
1 , the expression (1.34) for the
optimal Girsanov kernel k
(2)∗
1 follows.
The expression (1.36) for the equilibrium interest rate and (1.37) for the equilibrium excess return
under the reference probability measure are obtained by substituting the above controls into (1.24)
and (1.25) and computing derivatives of the inverse function U ′(ε, γ, t). The expression for the
equilibrium weighting process is obtained by substituting the optimal controls into (1.19).
As of the equilibrium volatility of the stock price process, we just need to remind that U ′ε =
−(1/ε2)(1 + γ−1), U ′γ = −(1/(εγ2)) and substitute into the general formula (1.27). Notice that we
have made use twice of the equality
S(t)U ′(t) = Eκ(1)
[∫ T
t
(1 + γ(s)−1)ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
obtained by simple substitution of the inverse function U ′(t) into the general stock pricing formula.
Finally, the equilibrium portfolio fraction (1.60) invested in the stock by the first agent is obtained by
considering the investment policy of the logarithmic investor and reminding the equilibrium excess
return with respect to the measure Qκ
(1)
given in (1.37). The policy of the second agent, (1.61)
then follows from the market clearing relation pi1W1+ pi2W2 = S, where the equilibrium stock price
process and optimally invested wealth processes of the agents have been substituted.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of this proposition mimics the steps of the previous proof, but the analysis is more
involved due to the agents’ adopting a felicity function of power type. Notice that inversion of the
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good market clearing condition
(
ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, T )
) 1
R−1
+
(
ψ1ξ(κ
(1) + λ1, T )γ(T )
) 1
R−1
= ε(T )
yields
U ′(ε, γ, T ) =
(
ε(T )
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)R−1
from which the optimal equilibrium allocation of terminal consumption (1.43) (terminal wealth)
expressed in terms of the equilibrium weighting process γ(t) is then immediately obtained from the
partial equilibrium optimal demands. Since β(t)−1U ′(ε, γ, t) must be a martingale, then
β(t)−1U ′(t) = Eκ(1)
β(T )−1( ε(T )
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)R−1∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 = β(t)−1( ε(t)
1 + γ(t)
1
R−1
)R−1
so that U ′(t) =
(
ε(t)
1+γ(t)
1
R−1
)R−1
. In light of considerations similar to those made in the proof of
the logarithmic case and in light of the partial equilibrium analog of the current program, we realize
that program (1.31) and program (1.32) reduce to, respectively
inf
κ(1)∈K1
inf
λ
E
κ(1)
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
ε(T )R

and
inf
κ(2)∈K2
inf
λ
E
κ(2)
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
ε(T )Rγ(T )
R
R−1

In order to see that the two control problems are subject to the dynamics of the state variable Y
alone (under a new probability measure, as we will explain shortly), consider the problem of the
first agent and notice that in light of (1.99) and of the fact that Ξ in in the kernel of σε, we may
perform the same change of probability measure that we used in the partial equilibrium framework
and equivalently write
inf
λ
inf
κ1∈K1
E
κ(1)
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
e
R
T
0
R
“
µε+σεk
(1)
1
”
dt− 12σεσ′ε(R−R2)dt

s.t.
dY =
[
Λ(t) + κ1(t)
]
dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(1)
63
from which one immediately obtains
k
(1)∗
1 = −
√
2h1(Y )
σ′ε√
σεσ′ε
κ1∗ = −
√
2h1(Y )
VY√
V ′Y VY
where V(Y) is a classical solution of the Hamilton Bellman Jacobi equation
Vt + Λ(Y )VY −
√
2h1(Y )
√
V ′Y VY +
1
2
trace [VY Y ΞΞ
′] +
V
[
R
(
µε(Y )−
√
2h1(Y )
√
σε(Y )σε(Y )′
)
− 1
2
σε(Y )σε(Y )
′(R−R2)
]
= 0 (1.103)
V (T ) =
(
1
1+bγ 1R−1
)R
.
As of the equilibrium problem solved by agent 2, we apply once again the same line of reasoning
used in the partial equilibrium framework. Notice that the equilibrium optimal controls of agent 1
are taken as given. (1.100) and (1.99) imply that, under the measure Qκ
(2) 42
ε(t)Rγ(t)
R
R−1 = ε(0)R exp
(∫ t
0
[
R
(
µε + σε · k(2)1 −
1
2
σε · σ′ε
)
+
R
R− 1
(
k
(1)′
1 k
(1)
1 + (λ
2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)− 1
2
L′L
)
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣Rσε + RR− 1L′
∣∣∣∣2 − 12
∣∣∣∣Rσε + RR− 1L′
∣∣∣∣2
]
ds∫ t
0
(
Rσε + RR− 1L
′
)
· dwκ(2)
)
In light of this form we may perform an absolutely continuous change of probability measure and
apply Girsanov theorem to eventually rewrite the equilibrium dynamic program of agent 2 in the
equivalent form
inf
κ(2)∈K2
inf
λ
E
κ(2)
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
eF(T )
 (1.104)
subject to
dY =
[
Λ(t) + κ2(t)− Ξ(t)
(
Rσε(t)′ + RR− 1L(t)
)]
dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(2)
that is43
dY =
[
Λ(t) + κ2(t)− RR− 1
(
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
)]
dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(2)
The new probability measure and the new standard brownian motion (wκ(2)(t)) are identified as
42remind that
L(t) =
h
(k
(2)
1 − k(1)1 ) + Ξ(t)′
“
λ2 − λ1 + κ2 − κ1
”i
43remind that Ξ is in the Kernel of σε and k1 is orthogonal to Ξ by construction.
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usual and
F(T ) =
∫ T
0
[
R
(
µε + σε · k(2)1 −
1
2
σε · σ′ε
)
+
R
R− 1
(
k
(1)′
1 k
(1)
1 + (λ
2 − λ1)′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)− 1
2
L′L
)
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣Rσε + RR− 1L′
∣∣∣∣2
]
ds
If we let J(Y ) denote the value function (1.104), dynamic programming techniques and considera-
tions similar to those made in the partial equilibrium set-up suggest that
λ2∗ − λ1 + κ2 − κ1 = −(R− 1)
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)
+
JY
J
(1.105)
where J(Y ) = G(Y )α, α = (R−1)
2
R+(R−1)2 , and G(Y) is the value function of the program
inf
(k
(2)
2 ,κ
2)
E
κ(2)
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
α
e
R
T
0
K(t)dt
 (1.106)
s.t dY =
[
Λ(Y ) + κ2(t)− R−R
2
R− 1
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)]
dt+ Ξ(t)dwκ(2)
with
K(t) =
1
α
[
R
(
µε + σε · k(2)1 −
1
2
σε · σ′ε
)
+
R
R− 1
(
k
(1)′
1 k
(1)
1 + (κ
1 − κ2 − (R− 1)(λ1 − r1k + κ1))′(λ1 − r1k + κ1)− 1
2
L∗
′
L∗
)
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣Rσε + RR− 1L∗′
∣∣∣∣2
]
We have used the notation
L∗(t) = (k(2)1 − k(1)1 )− Ξ(t)′(R− 1)
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)
By virtue of techniques similar to those largely exploited in the previous proofs one easily realizes
that the optimal Girsanov kernel for agent 2, (k
(2)∗
1 , κ
2∗) optimal control of program (1.106), is given
by (1.47), where the value function G(Y ) of this program solves the nonlinear HJB equation
Gt +
(
Λ(Y ) + κ2∗ − R−R
2
R− 1
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
))′
GY +
1
2
trace[ΞΞ′GY Y ] +G K(t)|(k(2)∗1 ,κ2∗) = 0
(1.107)
G(T ) =
(
1
1+bγ 1R−1
)R
α
, where K(t)|
(k
(2)∗
1 ,κ
2∗) denotes K(t) evaluated at the optimal control (1.47).
To see why (1.48) gives the equilibrium Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the first agent, notice that λ1
appears in the HJB solved by G(Y ) in the form (λ1−r1k+κ1), a quantity considered as exogenously
65
given by agent 2. Therefore if we substitute (1.105) into (1.26) and keep in mind that G is a function
of
(
λ1 − r1k + κ1
)
, we realize that (1.26) provides an equation to be solved for this quantity, from
which (1.48) then follows.
The equilibrium interest rate, excess return, equity volatility process and stock price process are all
obtained by means of the appropriate substitutions into the general formulas provided in Proposition
(2).
Finally, consider the equilibrium portfolio policies as detailed in the Proposition and let us focus
on the determination of pi∗1 , since pi
∗
2 has been obtained from the market clearing relation pi2 =
S(t) − pi1W1 and the appropriate substitutions. We basically apply the line of reasoning used to
recover the partial equilibrium policies, suitably adapted to the current needs. The martingale
U ′(t)W1(t) admits a stochastic integral representation of the form
U ′(t)W1(t) = Eκ
(1)
[U ′(T )W ∗1 (T )| Ft] = Eκ
(1)
( ε(T )
1 + γ(T )
1
R−1
)R∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 = η1S(0)+∫ t
0
δ(s)·dwκ1(s)
which, once compared to the representation (2.60) for the same process (remind that U ′(t) =
ψ(κ(1) + λ1, t) and that c1 = 0) yields the following optimal investment process
pi1(t) = Σ(Y )
′−1 θκ(1)∗+λ1∗(Y ) + Σ(Y )
′−1 δ(t)
W ∗1 (t)U ′(t)
(1.108)
where Σ−1 is the volatility matrix of the fictitiously completed opportunity set. In light of Clark-
Ocone formula and the chain rule for Malliavin calculus one may write
δ(t) = REκ(1)
[
ε(T )R−1
(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )R
Dtε(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− RR− 1 E
κ(1)
[
γ(T )
2−R
R−1 ε(T )R
(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )R+1
Dtγ(T )
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
where the Malliavin derivative processes of γ and ε are as in (1.92). But then according to consid-
eration made in the proof of Proposition 2 we have
δ(t) = Rσε(t)′ Eκ
(1)
[
ε(T )R
(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )R
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W∗1 (t)U ′(t)
−L(t) RR− 1 E
κ(1)
[
γ(T )
1
R−1 ε(T )R
(1 + γ(T )
1
R−1 )R+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+Ξ(t)′(. . . . . . )
Recalling the properties of the matrix process Ξ, the form of the matrix Σ−1, the equilibrium shadow
market price of risk of agent 1 and the equilibrium excess return relative to Qκ
(1)
, we conclude that
the optimal stock demand (1.108) becomes (1.64).
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Proof of Corollary 6
Consider the equilibrium worst case model selection solved by agent 1 according to Proposition 3:
inf
k1∈K1
E
κ(1)
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
e
R
T
0
R
“
µε+σεk
(1)
1
”
dt−R T
0
1
2σ
2
ε(R−R2)dte
R
T
0
Rσεdwκ(1)−
R
T
0
1
2R2σ2εdt

One easily checks that the second exponential inside the expectation operator is an exponential
martingale that may serve as density process for an absolutely continuous change of probability
measure and the conditional Bayes rule implies that we may equivalently write the program above
as the following optimization problem
inf
k1∈K1
E
κ(1)∗
( 1
1 + γ̂
1
R−1
)R
e
R
T
0
h
R
“
µε+σεk
(1)
1
”
− 12σ2ε(R−R2)
i
dt

where the expectation is taken with respect to the new measure, under which the stochastic process
w∗
κ
(1)
1
(t) = w
κ
(1)
1
(t) − Rσεt is a standard brownian motion. But µε and σε, coefficients of the
endowment process, are constants, therefore the problem reduces to the point-wise minimization of
the exponential within the expectation operator, and quite clearly we have k
(1)∗
1 = sgn(σε)
√
2h1.
A similar factorization holds for the control problem of agent 2, as one realizes by exploiting the
exponential form of ε(t)R and γ(t)
R
R−1 , and we are left once again with a deterministic minimization
problem, the solution of which is reported in the Corollary. As of the optimal portfolio policy, it is
(1.64), subject to the lognormal law that governs the state variables involved, ε(t) and γ(t).
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Chapter 2
Ambiguity Aversion, Bond Pricing
and the Non-Robustness of some
Affine Term Dtructures
We develop a continuous time general equilibrium model for the term structure of interest rates
where economic agents are ambiguity averse and consider the possibility of a misspecified dynamic
model for the latent risk factors driving interest rates. Aversion to ambiguity is parameterized
through a specific form of Knightian uncertainty. We find that even a moderate level of ‘aggregate
ambiguity’ significantly affects the implied term structures in equilibrium and drives the prices
of common derivative securities toward the patterns observed in fixed income markets. Indeed,
equilibrium equity premia and interest rates are characterized by a different functional form and
random factors otherwise unpriced in the ‘standard’ paradigm do receive a premium for ambiguity
which displays a particularly rich structure in the multiple factors setting. Examples of the impact
of ambiguity aversion on popular factor models of the term structure are given in detail, both in
cases for which the ‘level of concern’ for ambiguity is time varying and in cases for which is time
invariant. Furthermore, we analyze the ‘robustness’ property of some classes with respect to model
uncertainty, that is, the functional differences between equilibrium quantities and their counterparts
arising in an economy with standard Savage-type preferences.
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2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the influence of ambiguity aversion on the term structure of interest rates in
a continuous-time general equilibrium economy. Ambiguity is the uncertainty deriving from an
unprecise knowledge of the probability law that governs future realizations of economic factors.
Ambiguity aversion refers to a situation in which investors dislike ambiguity about the distribution
of asset returns. Although its distinction from standard risk aversion had been early pointed out1,
Ellsberg (1961) paradox and the literature inspired by this contribution deemed it relevant from a
behavioral (and economical) point of view. Several recent academic papers have relied on ambiguity
aversion to successfully address stylized facts considered as ‘puzzles’ according to the standard Savage
expected utility modelling approach. Among these contributions we recall Uppal and Wang (2003),
Epstein and Miao (2003), for the home-bias ‘puzzle’ and underdiversification, Anderson, Hansen
and Sargent (2000), Chen and Epstein (2002), Maenhout (2001) and Sbuelz and Trojani (2002) for
the equity premium ‘puzzle’. Dow and Werlang (1992) and Trojani and Vanini (2004) generate
endogenous limited stock market participation as a consequence of agents’ optimizing behavior in
the absence of market frictions, whereas Liu, Pan and Wang (2003) are able to mimic the typical
‘smirk’ shape of options’ implied volatilities.
A key observation arising in some of the mentioned literature is that ambiguity aversion influences
mostly equity premia rather than assets prices. According to this intuition, the equilibrium term
structure of interest rates should inherit the richest implications from agents’ concern for ambiguity.
Quite surprisingly though, interest rate models under ambiguity have been largely unexplored so far
and the aim of this paper is precisely to tackle this issue in detail.
In order to characterize the effects of ambiguity aversion on the term structure and derivative
prices we start from the well-established general equilibrium framework of Cox Ingersoll and Ross
(1985). We depart from this classical setting by treating the underlying exogenous state dynamics
as an approximate description of the true data generating process, i.e. we model the reference belief
of our agent as in the affine multidimensional framework outlined, for instance, in Dai and Singleton
(2000). A concern for ambiguity is then induced by a max-min expected utility representation2
for the relevant preference orderings where the representative agent regards as suitable for decision
making purposes a worst case probabilistic description of the economic environment out of a set of
relevant scenarios. We follow Anderson et al. (AHS, 1998, 2000) in the way we select the worst case
scenarios by constraining their discrepancy from the approximate reference belief for asset prices.
This choice translates into yield curve levels and shapes which cannot be supported in equilibrium
by the non ambiguity averse counterpart of the model.
Implicit in the above discussion is the choice of a ‘constrained’ max-min expected utility rep-
resentation as a convenient framework for a continuous time representation of preferences under
ambiguity aversion, along the path initiated by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our representation is
of the Recursive Multiple Prior Utility type, thus admitting an axiomatic foundation and implying
a set of relevant likelihood which is ‘rectangular’, in the terminology introduced by Epstein and
1Knight (1921)
2Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Epstein and Wang (1994), Epstein and Schneider (2003), Anderson, Hansen and
Sargent (2003)
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Schneider (2003).
As an additional step, we provide insight into those forms of concern for ambiguity, or ‘pessimism’,
which preserve the functional form of the transition density of the state variable: in accordance with
our intuition about the degree of ‘pessimism’ in the economy as an indicator of confidence in the
reference model, the maximal discrepancy allowed between reference model and possible scenarios
will parameterize such different, time invariant or time varying, forms of concerns. We will show that
appropriate time varying specifications of this maximal discrepancy provide agents with selections of
worst case transition densities that are consistent with those under the reference probability. Closed
form characterizations of the impact of ambiguity aversion in these frameworks will emphasize that
such a form of ‘robustness’ delivers equilibrium interest rates and equity premia that cannot be
mimicked by the non ambiguity averse counterpart of the model.
We show that an ambiguity premium is responsible for this different behavior of key equilibrium
quantities yet at small levels of concerns for ambiguity. Otherwise unpriced factors in the standard
model receive a premium for ambiguity which is of a particularly rich structure in the multiple
factors setting. All these features induce in equilibrium term structure levels and shapes that are
very different from those arising in the ‘standard’ model. For instance, in a simple one factor model
with square root dynamics we observe that for realistic parameter choices the levels of the yields
to maturity are substantially lowered and the curvature is affected especially at shorter horizons.
Examples of interest rate derivative securities prices show that popular market indicators like Black
implied volatilities point toward a direction in accordance with empirical evidence. Such effects are
present both in the version of the model with time-invariant pessimism - non-robust, in the sense
outlined above - and in the version with time-varying pessimism; the additional layer of technical
tractability gained in the latter case allows us to discuss some key points by explicit methods.
It is nonetheless apparent in both frameworks that the specific form of these ambiguity aversion
induced term structure effects cannot be obtained by a suitable parametrization of their ‘classical’
counterparts.
After a preliminary characterization of the equilibrium equity premia and short rate in terms
of indirect utility functions, we solve for equilibrium quantities given any model in the admissible
neighborhood and then attack the worst case model selection problem. Section 2.2 presents the
reference belief for our ambiguity averse agent, the investment opportunity set represented under
this probability measure , defines the set of relevant possible mispecifications and introduces the
max-min expected utility optimization problem that implies worst case optimal consumption and
portfolio policies under model uncertainty. Section 2.3 contains preliminary computations on the
functional form of equilibrium interest rates and risk premia in terms of indirect utility function
and characterizes the equilibrium by martingale methods in a second step. Section 2.4 focuses on
explicit computations of optimal policies, equilibrium quantities and contingent claim prices in the
framework of both state-dependent and state independent maximal discrepancy with the reference
model, that is, time varying and invariant pessimism, in the terminology used above. Section
2.5 contains concluding remarks. All proofs have been relegated to the Appendix A; Appendix B
contains an additional example of term structure model along the lines of what we have described as
‘time invariant pessimism’, whereas Appendix C treats a solution approach for an economy whose
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representative agents is characterized by a more general felicity function than the logarithmic one
used to derive the main results.
2.2 Model Setting
Our reference model setting is inspired by the standard framework of Cox Ingersoll and Ross (1985).
On an infinite time horizon, uncertainty is generated by a (k + 1)−dimensional standard brownian
motion Z(t) supported by a filtered probability space (Ω,F , P ).3
2.2.1 Reference Belief
Under the probability measure P , often termed ‘reference belief’, the basic constituents of the
opportunity set available to agents are4:
• A locally risk-less bond in zero net supply, with return r(t).
• 1 linear technology producing a physical good which can be either reinvested or consumed. Its
output rate evolves as
dQ(t)
Q(t)
= α(Y )dt+ σ(Y ) dZ(t) (2.1)
• k financial assets in zero net supply, satisfying the stochastic differential equation
dS(t) = ISβ(Y )dt+ IS ϑ(Y ) dZ(t) (2.2)
where IS denotes diag[S1, S2, ..., Sk]
• k driving state variables
dY (t) = Λ(Y )dt+ Ξ(Y ) dZ(t) (2.3)
The equilibrium to be characterized is supported by a single, representative agent maximizing the
expected lifetime utility from intertemporal consumption, based on a time preference rate δ and a
logarithmic5 felicity function: U(c, t) = e−ρt log(c), c > 0.
2.2.2 Model Misspecification
The representative agent is uncertain about the belief according to which the evolution of the oppor-
tunity set is described, and considers scenarios around the reference model generated by absolutely
3We may have started with a brownian motion w(t) with instantaneous correlation matrix Ω; then, if Υ is a
(k+1)× (k+1) matrix such that Ω = ΥΥ′ and Z(t) is a (k+1)-dimensional standard brownian motion, the brownian
motion ΥZ(t) is indistinguishable from w(t). Hence, provided that all diffusion matrices to appear be the result of a
post multiplication by the matrix Υ, this setting is encompassed by our specification.
4All coefficients to appear are assumed to be continuous and uniformly bounded functions of the state variables.
Furthermore, we impose a uniform ellipticity conditions on the matrix function ΞΞ′
5In Appendix C we analyze a finite time-horizon economy populated by an ambiguity averse representative agent
who maximizes a CRRA utility of terminal wealth and we characterize the equilibrium in detail. We regard the
logarithmic case suitable to emphasize the main intuition concerning ambiguity aversion while preserving simplicity
of the main treatment.
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continuous local contaminations, as in AHS (1998, 2000). Contaminations are described by con-
taminating vectors h: in probabilistic terms, Girsanov kernels that affect the drift of the reference
diffusion process for the state variables. Aversion to model uncertainty arises by assuming that the
representative agent is concerned with the worst case scenario in a neighborhood of the reference
belief defined by:
h
′
h ≤ 2η(Y ) (2.4)
In what follows we restrict our treatment to the class of Markov Girsanov kernels h(t) = h(t, Y ),
t > 0, for some function h( ·, · ) and require that they satisfy
E
[∫ t
0
|h(s, Y )|ds
]
<∞
for every t > 0. We denote by H the class of admissible mispecifications.
As pointed out in the literature on ambiguity aversion6 this choice for the set of probabilistic models
regarded as relevant by the agents has a clear interpretation in terms of limiting the maximum ‘
distance’ allowed from the reference model: it is corresponds to assuming a bound on the instanta-
neous rate of growth of the relative entropy between the ‘contaminated’ belief and the initial one;
in particular, since this specification constrains the instantaneous evolution of the relative entropy
and not just its global continuation value, the model delivers time consistent preference orderings
or, in the terminology of Epstein and Schneider (2002), a rectangular set of priors. Furthermore, we
posit a state dependent entropy bound η(Y ) in order to allow a form of ‘pessimism’ which could be
time varying and tightened to the state of the economy7
Since the probabilistic scenarios we consider are mutually absolutely continuous, Zh(t) = Z(t) +∫ t
0
h(s)ds is a standard brownian motion under the model contamination8 Ph. In this model setting
agents posit the data generating process to have the representation (??) under an admissible belief
Ph; since the latter implies that Z(t) is a brownian motion with drift, concern for ambiguity assumes
the form of a change of drift in the dynamics specified under the reference measure.
6Appropriate references
7This specification was suggested in Trojani and Sbuelz (2003). This reference contains a thorough discussion on
the point.
8If the discontinuous part of an adapted process k is null P -a.s, as in our framework, the Dolean-Dade exponential
E( · ) is defined as
E(k) = exp
„
−k − 〈k, k〉
2
«
Then the probability measure Ph is a contamination of the reference belief in the sense that
Ph( · ) = E
»
E
„
−
Z
h dZ
«
1( · )
–
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2.2.3 Max-min Expected Utility
The representative agent trades continously at equilibrium prices in order to finance his consumption
process c(t); if we denote by Σ the (k+1)× (k+1) diffusion matrix of the available opportunity set,
Σ(Y ) =
[
σ(Y )
ϑ(Y )
]
1×(k+1)
k×(k+1)
(2.5)
then feasibility of consumption plans under the reference belief is mandated by the usual dynamic
budget constraint, coupled with the appropriate integrability conditions9:
dW (t)
W (t)
=
[
ω(t) (α(Y )− r(Y )) + v(s) (β(Y )− r(Y )) +
(
r(Y )− c(t)
W (t)
)]
dt+
pi′(t) Σ(Y ) · [dZ(t) + h(t) dt] (2.6)
W (t) > 0 for every t > 0. As a consequence of Ito’s lemma10:
ξh(t)W (t) +
∫ t
0
ξh(s)c(s)ds = x+
∫ t
0
W (s)ξh(s) [Σ(Y )
′pi(s)− θh(Y )]′ · dZ(s) (2.7)
where pi = [ω
1×k
v ]′ will hereafter denote an Rk+1-valued vector whose components are portfolio
proportion invested in the technology and the financial assets, respectively; with a slight abuse of
notation, we have set:
θh(Y ) = Σ(Y )
−1
(
α(Y )− r(Y )
β(Y )− r(Y ) 1k
)
+ h(t) (2.8)
whereas the state-price density ξh(t) is governed by the SDE
dξh(t)
ξh(t)
= −r(t)dt− θh(Y )dZ(t) (2.9)
We conclude that the the ambiguity averse representative investor solves the max-min expected
utility program
J(x, y) = sup
c , pi
inf
h∈H
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs log( c(s) )ds
]
(2.10)
s.t. (2.6)
where W (0) = x, Y (0) = y.
9In particular, for a trading strategy pi = [ω v]′ to be admissible, we require thatZ t
0
|ω(s)(α(Y )− r(Y ))|+ |v(s)(β(Y )− r(Y ))|+ |pi(s)′Σ(s)h(s)|+ |pi(s)Σ(s)|2 ds <∞
hold a.s. for every t > 0.
10This expression is particularly useful for the derivation of the equivalent static form of the budget constraint
needed in the martingale approach to consumption-investment. Since this approach is quite redundant in the context
of a representative investor with logarithmic felicity, we have decided to confine the details of this derivation to the
Appendix, where martingale methodologies are implemented in the framework of a representative agent with power
felicity.
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In a Cox, Ingersoll and Ross economy financial securities are in zero net supply, therefore their
expected returns are really to be regarded as shadow prices for the constraint to hold a null portfolio
weight on those. In light of this consideration we have the following definition of equilibrium.
Definition. An equilibrium is a collection (c∗, h∗, r∗, β∗) of a consumption policy, a model mis-
specification and returns on financial assets such that the following optimality and market clearing
conditions are satisfied:
1) The Equilibrium consumption policy and model ‘misspecification’ h∗ are optimal according to
the preference ordering representation
inf
h: (h′·h≤2η(Y ))
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δs log( c(s) )ds
]
2) Optimal consumption is financed by a trading strategy according to which wealth is totally
invested in the technology:
pi = [ω
1×k
v ]′ ≡ [1 1×k0 ]′
2.3 Equilibrium
We emphasize that J(x, y) is the equilibrium solution of (2.10), that is, the solution of the consumption-
investment problem of the ambiguity averse representative agent evaluated at the market-clearing
values of the interest rate and returns on financial assets. Quite clearly this value function stems
from a joint treatment of the model selection problem implied by the maxmin expected utility rep-
resentation and of the good optimality conditions at equilibrium prices. We argue that additional
insight may be gained if the optimal Girsanov kernel h∗ is chosen after the equilibrium interest rate
and risk premia prevailing under any admissible model have been characterized, and their functional
relation with the Girsanov kernels h has been clarified. To this end, interchanging11 the order of
maximization and minimization in (2.10) we realize that the innermost program is a standard prob-
lem whereby the equilibrium conditions are easily handled by means of constrained portfolio choice
methods12 The following Proposition takes advantage of this intuition to characterize the worst case
model selection problem involved in the determination of the optimal Girsanov kernel h∗.
Proposition 7 The value function of the ambiguity averse representative investor is given by
J(x, y) = −1
δ
+
log(δx)
δ
+ V (y) (2.11)
11See Appendix A for a formal justification of this step.
12From He and Pearson (1991) and Karatzas, Lehochsky, Shreve and Xu (1991) we know that, for any h ∈ H
sup
c,pi≡[1
1×k
0 ]′
E
»Z
∞
0
e−δs log(c(s))ds
–
= inf
(r,β)∈Rk+1
sup
c
E
»Z
∞
0
e−δs log( c(s) ) ds
–
As in Cox Ingersoll and Ross (1985a) the current analysis exploits the tractability of a logarithmic felicity function
for the representative agent, and the fact that the constraints (equilibrium conditions) always bind in this brownian
filtration setting. Nevertheless Appendix ... treats the case of a representative agent characterized by CRRA utility
of terminal wealth and exploits the representation above,
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where
V (y) = inf
h∈H
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∫ t
0
α(Y )− 1
2
σ(Y )σ(Y )′ + σ(Y ) · h(s) ds dt
]
(2.12)
subject to13
dY (t) = [Λ(Y ) + Ξ(Y )h(t)] dt+ Ξ(Y ) dZ(t)
The equilibrium Girsanov kernel which identifies the solution of the worst case model selection prob-
lem is given by
h∗(ν, Y, t) = −
√
2η(Y )
Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′√
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
′
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
(2.13)
V ′Y Λ(Y ) +
1
2
trace [Ξ(Y )′VY Y Ξ(Y )]−√
2η(Y )
√
(Ξ(Y )′VY + σ(Y )′)
′
(Ξ(Y )′VY + σ(Y )′) + α(Y )− 1
2
σ(Y )σ(Y )′ − δV (0, Y ) = 0 (2.14)
The equilibrium interest rate process, expected returns on financial assets and market price of risk
prevailing in this economy follow then as an immediate Corollary of Proposition 7.
Corollary 7 The interest rate process and the risk premia on financial assets arising in equilibrium
are given by
r(Y ) = α(Y )− σ(Y )σ(Y )′ −
√
2η(Y )σ(Y ) · Ξ(Y )
′ VY + σ(Y )′√
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
′
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
β(Y ) = r(Y ) 1k + ϑ(Y )
σ(Y )′ +√2η(Y ) Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′√
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
′
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)

where V (Y ) solves the HBJ equation (2.14). Furthermore, the following factor market price of risk
also holds
λ(Y ) = σ(Y )′ +
√
2η(Y )
Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′√
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
′
(Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′)
It is clear from (2.12) that the model selection problem involved in the maxmin expected utility
representation amounts to solving a control program where the ‘control’ h affects the state variables
by shifting the probability measure over the space of their sample paths in an absolutely continuous
fashion. The linearity of the ‘running cost’ in the Girsanov kernel highlights the first order risk
aversion effect induced by ambiguity aversion.
Differently from the results obtained in the classical Cox Ingersoll and Ross framework (η(Y ) = 0),
an intertemporal hedging component determined by a concern for ambiguity is present in the equi-
librium expression of the market price of risk. In this situation the log utility investors will indeed
exercise portfolio demand for intertemporal hedging purely due to a concern for model misspecifica-
13We remind that Zh(t) = Z(t) +
R t
0 h(s) ds is a P
h-standard brownian motion.
75
tion, and the market price of risk will reflect this feature in equilibrium. Quite clearly the additional
term implies a different functional form for the latter quantity; in particular, risk factors which are
unpriced in the standard model may receive a risk premium for ambiguity.
In order to look at a clarifying example of the last statement we are going to look at an example
which is an excerpt of the presentation given in the presentation of Gersenzee.
Contingent Claim Pricing
In light of the expression for the factor market price of risk established in Corollary 7, standard
arbitrage arguments imply the following change of drift, φY , for the dynamics of the state variables
under the risk neutral reference measure Q:
φY = Ξ
σ′ +√2η(Y )
 Ξ′ VY + σ′√
(Ξ′ VY + σ′)
′
(Ξ′ VY + σ′)
 (2.15)
where V (Y ) solves the HBJ equation (2.14). The price of a European contingent claim with maturity
T and paying off at a rate Ψ(Y, t), t ≤ T is easily characterized. This is the content of next
Proposition.
Proposition 8 The price at time t, F (Y, t) of a contingent claim with instantaneous pay-off Ψ(Y, t),
t ≤ T satisfies the partial differential equation:
1
2
trace
(
ΞΞ′
∂2F
∂Y ∂Y ′
)
+ (Λ− φY )
′ ∂F
∂Y
− r F + ∂F
∂t
= −Ψ(Y, t) (2.16)
with boundary condition:
F (Y, T ) = Ψ (Y, T )
where r is the equilibrium short rate given in Corollary 7 and φY is as in (2.15).
The fundamental pricing equation is altered only indirectly by a concern for ambiguity, via the
modified equilibrium interest rate r and the corresponding change of drift φY . Therefore, the
Feymann-Kac theorem gives the usual probabilistic representation of the price
F (Y, t) = EQ
[∫ T
t
e−
R
s
t
r(u)duΨ(Y, s)ds+Ψ(Y (T ), T ) exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rudu
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(2.17)
Unlike the standard (i.e. non ambiguity averse) case14 in order to compute the expectation involved
in the pricing representation we need to determine the functional form of the value function V (Y ),
solution of (2.14). In this respect, if a concern for ambiguity is present the equilibrium perspective
14Notice that this property that characterizes the non ambiguity averse economy is due to the myopic portfolio
behavior of the representative agent endowed with logarithmic felicity. The non ambiguity averse representative agent
with CRRA utility over terminal wealth would support an equilibrium in which the intertemporal hedging property
affects risk premia. See Appendix ...
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cannot be separated from the pricing perspective yet in the simple case of a logarithmic felicity
function.
2.4 Explicit Solutions
In the last section we have pointed out how the task of characterizing the equilibrium in an ‘ambiguity
averse’ Cox Ingersoll and Ross economy, with a logarithmic form of the felicity function, amounts
to solving a dynamic program in which the form of the ‘running cost’, affine in the contaminating
parameter, highlights the first order risk aversion effects peculiar to this framework. In this section
we explore in details those cases for which a suitable choice of the technology’s return process and
state variables’ dynamics leads to tractable quantities in the solution approaches outlined previously.
We are mainly interested in clarifying whether ambiguity aversion, as summarized by the worst-case
model selection feature of the agents, preserves the structure that the model would have had if
concern for unprecise data generating processes had not been present: by ‘structure of the model’
we really mean the family the transition density of the state variables belongs to, both under the
physical and under risk-neutral measure. We label ‘non-robust’ those specification for which such
closeness property under ambiguity aversion is not present in equilibrium.
At this stage a relevant choice to be made consists in a suitable functional form for the time varying
entropy bound η(Y ). We first analyze the simple, but not so tractable choice η = constant and
we give explicit solutions essentially for the complete market case, with the remarkable exception of
the two-factor Longstaff and Schwartz (1992) model in which the factor driving the instantaneous
variance of the technology is subject to unprecise probabilistic description: the contingent claim
pricing problems arising in this frameworks will be confined to the context of coefficient choices
pertaining the affine specification analyzed, for instance, in Duffie and Kan (1996) and Dai and
Singleton (2000), but an alternative, practically relevant specification is contained in the Appendix.
Once we relax this assumption on η(Y ), we gain additional layers of tractability through suitable
choices of ‘state dependent pessimism’: interesting conclusions about important pricing problems
are drawn in those cases as well.
We have opted for the logical distinction time-varying/invariant pessimism because in a sense it
mimics the distinction concerning the robustness of models: no ambiguity averse framework with
constant parameter η may induce ‘robustness’ of the corresponding model.
Where no confusion may arise, we will often drop functional arguments in the expressions to follow
for ease of exposition.
2.4.1 A Two-Factor Gaussian Model
We first analyze the influence of a concern for ambiguity in a simple modelling framework where the
expected return on the production technology is an affine function of the state variables and these
in turn evolve as Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic processes. In particular, we consider the following
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two factor Gaussian dynamics:
dQ(t)
Q(t)
= (g0 + g1Y1(t) + g2Y2(t) + Lh(t))dt+ LdZ(t)
dY1(t) =
[
m1(Y 1 − Y1(t)) + n1h1(t) + qh2(t)
]
dt+ n1 dZ1(t) + q dZ2(t)
dY2(t) =
[
m2(Y 2 − Y2(t)) + n2h1(t)
]
dt+ n2 dZ1(t) (2.18)
where L ≡ [L1 L2 L3] ∈ R3 and Z ≡ [Z1 Z2 Z3]′ is a three dimensional standard brownian motion.
Very different implications arise when different choices of the ‘aggregate concern’ for ambiguity
are made, that is, when the entropy bounds assumes different functional forms. In this Gaussian
setting, a time varying bound will be seen to deliver interesting effects while preserving analytical
tractability.
Constant entropy bound
The class of admissible likelihoods H is identified by the entropy bound
h21 + h
2
2 + h
2
3 ≤ 2η (2.19)
In Appendix B we briefly show that the effect of ambiguity aversion on the short rate reduces to a
constant term and the drift correction (2.15) to be applied under the risk neutral reference measure
is just a constant bivariate vector. One easily ends up with the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 Let the class of admissible likelihoods H be determined by the entropy bound (2.19),
then the price of a zero coupon bond with maturity T under the model dynamics (2.18) is given by
P (t, T ) = exp (A(t, T ) +B(t, T )y1 + C(t, T )y2) (2.20)
where Y1(t) = y1, Y (t) = y2,
B(t, T ) =
(
e−(T−t)m1 − 1) g1
m1
C(t, T ) =
(
e−(T−t)m2 − 1) g2
m2
and A(t, T ) is reported in Appendix A.
The difference between this model and its non ambiguity-averse counterpart is limited to the coef-
ficient A(t, T ): although this leads in general to nontrivial effects on the behavior of both the yield
curve and the slope of the yield curve, its state independence prevents this impact from affecting
important indicators such as, for instance, the volatility structure of instantaneous forward rates,
whose humped structure has been acknowledged as an important prerequisite for a model to fit the
observed humped structure of implied Black volatilities of derivatives’ prices. In this respect, a time
varying specification for the instantaneous entropy bound may help the ambiguity averse version of
the model to achieve more ambitious goals.
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Time-varying entropy bound
Consider a class of admissible likelihoods H identified by the following entropy bound
h21 + h
2
2 + h
2
3 ≤ 2η
(
Y1 − Y 1
)2
(2.21)
Intuitively, such a form of the function η( · ) penalizes large (in absolute value) deviations of the
conditional expected return on the technology from its parameter of mean reversion by postulating
a concern for ambiguity which increases (at increasing rates) with the magnitude of this distance.
The impact of ambiguity aversion is indeed much more pronounced in this case:
Proposition 10 The price of a zero coupon bond with maturity T is
P (t, T ) = exp (A(t, T ) +B(t, T )y1 + C(t, T )y2 +D(t, T )|y1|)
where Y1(t) = y1, Y2(t) = y2.
The absolute volatility of implied instantaneous forward rates is
σf (t, T ) =
([
n1
(
∂B(t, T )
∂T
+ sgn(Y 1 − Y1(t))∂D(t, T )
∂T
)
+ n2
∂B(t, T )
∂T
]2
+
q2
(
∂B(t, T )
∂T
+ sgn(Y 1 − Y1(t))∂D(t, T )
∂T
)2) 12
The functions A(t, T ), B(t, T ), C(t, T ) and D(t, T ), as well as their partial derivatives involved in
the last expression are reported in Appendix B.
The functional forms of the coefficients driving the yield to maturity function are indeed different
from a model in which no ambiguity aversion is considered, and, ceteris paribus, this difference may
well enhance the ability of the model to recover observed shapes of popular (derivative) markets
indicators. An humped volatility structure of instantaneous forward rates, for instance, is regarded
as a desirable property for models aimed at a good derivative pricing performance: Figure 2.2 shows
a volatility curve generated when a ‘small’ (η = 0.005) concern for ambiguity is present, to be
compared with its counterpart generated by the ‘classical’ version of this Gaussian model (Figure
2.1).
2.4.2 Constant degree of pessimism
A constant value for the instantaneous entropy bound η induces a poor level of analytical tractability
for the model selection problem (2.12), an exception being the Gaussian specification just analyzed;
in this case we have seen that both time-varying and time -invariant pessimism specifications do
generate important effects, nevertheless preserve the functional forms of equilibrium short rate and
risk premia prevailing in the non ambiguity averse case. However, this ‘robustness’ feature is rather
the exception than the rule. We thereafter discuss the equilibrium and pricing implications of two
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examples a one factor square root model and a two factor square root model, both of which imply
a concern for ambiguity that is essentially one dimensional. In the two factor example, inspired by
Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), this concern is confined to the volatility of technological returns.
A one factor affine model
In what follows we analyze a one factor complete market setting15.
α(Y ) = g0 + g1Y ; σ(Y ) = l
√
Y ; Λ(Y ) =
n2
4
+mY ; Ξ(Y ) = n
√
Y (2.22)
The solution of our ‘model selection’ problem in easily characterized in this context.
Proposition 11 The Girsanov Kernel h∗ = −√2η is optimal for the specification (2.22). The
Value function for this problem is:
V (Y ) = A +B Y + C
√
Y
with
A =
1
δ
n2
(
g1 − l22
)
4(m− δ) −
n
√
2η
m
2 − δ
−n
(
g1 − l22
)√
2η
m− δ − l
√
2η
 C
2
+ g0

B =
1
m− δ
(
g1 − l
2
2
)
C =
1
m
2 − δ
−n
(
g1 − l22
)√
2η
m− δ − l
√
2η

Let us now assume without loss of generality that g0 = 0 and l > 0; the additional assumption
(corresponding to a similar one adopted in CIR (1985b)) Y ≥ 2ηl2(g1 − l2)−2, coupled with the
nonnegativity of the state variable Y under the optimal belief Ph
∗
will ensure that the short rate
process
r(t) =
(
g1 − l2
)
Y − l
√
2η
√
Y (2.23)
stays positive Ph
∗ − a.s.. The inversion of equation (2.23) leads to a second order equation in√
Y , one of whose solutions is negative due to our previous assumptions on coefficients. If we
define a new short rate process r˜ ≡ 2ηl2 + 4 (g1 − l2) r then the equilibrium market price of risk
λ(t) = σ(Y )′ − h∗ reduces to
λ(t) = l
√
Y +
√
2η =
l2
√
2η + l
√
r˜
2(g1 − l2) +
√
2η
15It is without loss of generality that we have assumed u0 = 0, u = 1 and r0 = 0, r = 1. The result would be
substantially unaffected by the general case, but for a few additional terms in the expressions to follow.
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and it is easy to deduce the following risk neutral dynamics for r˜(t):
dr˜(t) =
(
a+ b r˜ − c
√
r˜
)
dt+
(
d+ n
√
r˜
)
dZ∗(t) (2.24)
where Z∗(t) = Z(t)+
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds and the coefficients are reported in Appendix A. Using the dynamics
of the state variable and standard arbitrage arguments we may write the fundamental valuation
equation for the discount bond P (r˜, τ) as(
d+ n
√
r˜
)2
2
Per er(r˜, τ) + (a+ b r˜ − c√r˜)Per(r˜, τ)− r˜ P (r˜, τ)− Pτ (r˜, τ) = 0
to be solved with the initial condition P (r˜, 0) = 1.
It should be emphasized that this formulation of the pricing problem cannot be mimicked by any
parametrization of the Cox Ingersoll and Ross economy where preferences are not ambiguity averse,
due to the specific form of the risk premium (i.e. proportional to
√
r) that insures absence of
arbitrage opportunity. We summarize a characterization of the term structure of interest rates in
the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Setting r(τ) = r, the price of a pure discount bound with time to maturity τ is
given by the function:
P (τ, r) = A(τ)e
B(τ)
η l2+(g1−l2)r+ l2
√
2η
√
2ηl2+4(g1−l2)r
(g1−l2)2
+C(τ)
l
√
2η+
√
2 η l2+4(g1−l2)r
2(g1−l2) (2.25)
where16
A(τ) = exp
(∫ τ
0
n2B(t)
4
− n
√
2η C(t) +
n2 C(t)
2
8
dt
)
B(τ) =
a (1− eατ )
2α− (α+ d) (1− eατ )
C(τ) =
√
2η
 2a
(
n− ln2d
) (
1− eα τ2 )2
α(2α− (α+ d) (1− eατ ))
+ 2l
d
(
1−
(
1
d− α+ eατ (d+ α)
) d
α(d2−a2)
×
(2d)
d
α(d2−a2) e
d
2 τ− an
2
2(d−α) τ
)
with α =
√
d2 + an2, d = m− nl and a = 2 (g1 − l2)
The phase-plane analysis17 shows that under the mild additional assumptions (indeed satisfied by
any ‘reasonable’ parametrization) d < 0 and 2(d+α)n + l > 0 we have C(τ) > 0. In light of this result
it is easy to obtain an estimate of the impact of ambiguity on the equilibrium yield curve, at least
16Notice that the integration involved in the functional form of the coefficient A can be carried out explicitly. We
do not report the (lengthy) expression.
17We do not include the phase-plane analysis. It is available upon request.
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for small values of the instantaneous entropy bound;
∂
∂
√
2η
(
− logP (t, t+ τ)
τ
)∣∣∣∣
η=0
= −C(τ) < 0
which leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium yield curves obtained when a concern for ambiguity
is present are dominated by their classical counterparts in this simple one factor specification.
Our ability to solve both the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the pricing equation depends
on the restriction we have imposed on the instantaneous conditional mean of the state variable,
namely:
Γ(Y ) = m0 +mY =
n2
4
+mY
If we posit
d(
√
Y ) =
1
2
(
m
√
Y − nl
√
2η
)
dt+
n
2
dZ (2.26)
then Ito’s lemma yields exactly the risk neutral dynamics we have ended up with by means of
ambiguity aversion:
dY =
(
n2
4
+mY − nl
√
2η
√
Y
)
dt+ n
√
Y dZ∗ (2.27)
Therefore it is not surprising that the change of variable X =
√
Y leads us to the quadratic class of
term structure models studied in the literature so far.
In order to gain insight into the solution corresponding to a general parameter choice, we pursue a
numerical approach, whose conclusions indeed suggests that the qualitative evidence the previous
analytics were pointing to is by no means restricted to that particular specification.18 A typical
sample path of the short rate process (2.23) appears to be an almost parallel downward shift of
its counterpart corresponding to the same ω ∈ Ω and generated by a model with no concern for
ambiguity (2.3); ceteris paribus a slight nonzero ambiguity aversion parameter suffices to generate
yields to maturity which are almost a hundred basis points lower for all maturities, the effect on the
curvature being limited to the very short end of the curve and progressively fading away.
The two factor affine model
The following model setting basically consists in the ambiguity averse extension of the Longstaff
and Schwartz (1992) two factor model. We assume that agents display ambiguity aversion only
over the probabilistic description of the state variable that drives the volatility of the returns on
the technology; since the latter satisfies a stochastic differential equation which is autonomous and
driven by the single brownian motion Z3, we henceforth assume h = [0 0 h3]
′. Therefore, under
18An analytical approach, based on perturbation analysis, is the object of a Note.
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the reference measure P , the opportunity set of the economy is described by the system19:
dQ(t)
Q(t)
=
(
g1Y1 + g2Y2 + lρ
√
Y2 h3(t)
)
dt+ l
√
Y2
(√
1− ρ2 dZ1(t) + ρ dZ3(t)
)
dY1 = (a+m1Y1) dt+ n1
√
Y1 dZ2(t)
dY2 =
(
n22
4
+m2Y2 + n2
√
Y2 h3(t)
)
dt+ n2
√
Y2 dZ3(t) (2.28)
The (one-dimensional) maximization of (1.81) gives again h3(t) = −
√
2η and (??) becomes20
r(t) = g1 Y1 +
(
g2 − l2
)
Y2 − lρ
√
2η
√
Y2 (2.29)
The separability of both the equilibrium and the asset pricing problem into problems involving a
single state variable leads easily to the following characterizations.
Proposition 13 The Value function of the ‘model selection’ problem corresponding to the specifica-
tion (2.28) is given by
V (Y1, Y2) = A+B Y2 + C
√
Y2 + E Y1
where the constant coefficients involved are reported in Appendix A. Furthermore the price of a pure
discount bond with time to maturity τ = T − t is given by
P (τ, Y1, Y2) = A(τ) exp
(
D(τ)Y1 + C(τ)
√
Y2 +B(τ)Y2
)
A(τ) = e
R
τ
0
„
n22 B(s)
4 −
n2
2
√
2η C(s)+
n22 C(s)
2
8 +aD(s)
«
ds
B(τ) =
2(g2 − l2)(1− eϕτ )
2ϕ− (ϕ+ %)(1− eϕτ )
C(τ) =
√
2η
2(g2 − l2)
(
n2 − lρ n
2
2
%
) (
1− eϕ τ2 )2
ϕ(2ϕ− (ϕ+ %) (1− eϕτ ))
+
2lρ
%
(
1−
(
1
%− ϕ+ eϕτ (%+ ϕ)
) %
ϕ((%)2−4(g2−l2)2) ×
(2%)
%
ϕ((%)2−4(g2−l2)2) e
%
2 τ−
2(g2−l2)f2
2(%−ϕ) τ
)
D(τ) =
2g1(1− eφτ )
2φ− (φ+m1)(1− eφτ )
where φ =
√
2g1n21 −m21, ϕ = −
√
2m2n2ρσ −m22 + n22(2g2 − (2 + g1)l2) and % = n2ρl −m2
Similarly to the previous case, the impact of ambiguity aversion on the equilibrium yield curve is
driven by the coefficient C(τ) for ‘moderate amounts’ of concern. In this respect the phase-plane
19In L & S (1992) the brownian motions driving the return on the technology and the state variable Y2 are assumed
to be correlated. We have denoted by ρ this instantaneous correlation
20We assume α > 0, σ > 0, β − σ2 > 0 and (β − σ2)f2 > αe2.
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analysis reveals that different signs of the correlation parameter lead to opposite implications: in
particular, given the reasonable additional assumption % < 0 , a negative instantaneous correlation
between the production technology and its volatility factor gives rise to uniformly higher yields to
maturities when ambiguity is considered, whereas ρ > 0 and the mild assumption 2(%+ϕ)f + σρ > 0
insure uniformly lower yields to maturity prevailing in ambiguity averse equilibria.
Similarly to the one dimensional case, the solutions of both the HBJ equation and the bond pricing
equation depend on the particular choice b = f
2
4 . Numerical experiments performed for the general
show that this two factor model is able to generate a wider set of scenarios compared to the one
dimensional counterpart. Again, in accordance with economic intuition and previous analytical
findings, a different sign of the coefficient of correlation between innovations of the technology and
of its volatility implies an opposite impact of ambiguity aversion both on the yield curve and on its
derivatives. Figure 2.8 shows that for two opposite values of the correlation coefficient (ρ = 0.5 and
ρ = −0.5) the mutual relationship of typical sample paths of the short rate corresponding to different
ηs looks quite different; the yield to maturities generated by these two different specifications inherit
the same feature.
2.4.3 Options on zero coupon bonds
The aim of this subsection is to address the problem of pricing a (say call) option on a zero coupon
bond within the model settings outlined above. In light of the inability to handle analytically every
possible choice of coefficients, we pursue once again the strategy of solving a single specification
(m0 =
n2
4 ) and rely on numerical analysis otherwise. As of the first purpose, we restrict ourself to
the one factor affine specification, being the analysis of the two remaining cases similar in spirit.
Proposition 14 Let X =
√
Y and let C(t,X, T, s,K) denote the price of a European call option with
strike K, maturity T on a zero coupon bond with maturity s. LetM≡ {x ∈ R : (X ≤ Xl) ∪ (X ≥ Xu)},
with
Xl =
−C(s− T )−
√
C(s− T )2 + 4B(s− T ) log( KA(s−T ) )
2B(s− T )
Xu =
−C(s− T ) +
√
C(s− T )2 + 4B(s− T ) log( KA(s−T ) )
2B(s− T )
and
M(t, T ) = X(t)e−
R
T
t
m−n2B(T−u)
2 du −
∫ T
t
e−
R
s
t
m−n2B(T−u)
2 du
(
nl
√
2η
2
+
n2C(T − s)
4
)
ds
S(t, T ) =
n2
4
∫ T
t
e−2
R
s
t
m−n2B(T−u)
2 duds
M˜(t, T ) = X(t)e−
R
T
t
m−n2B(s−u)
2 du −
∫ T
t
e−
R
τ
t
m−n2B(s−u)
2 du
(
nl
√
2η
2
+
n2C(s− τ)
4
)
dτ
S˜(t, T ) =
n2
4
∫ T
t
e−2
R
τ
t
m−n2B(s−u)
2 dudτ
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Then we have
C(t,X, T, s,K) = P (t, s)
1−
Φ
Xu − M˜(t, T )√
S˜(t, T )
− Φ
Xl − M˜(t, T )√
S˜(t, T )
−
KP (t, T )
[
1−
(
Φ
(
Xu −M(t, T )√
S(t, T )
)
− Φ
(
Xl −M(t, T )√
S(t, T )
))]
where Φ( · ) is the cumulative standard Normal distribution function.
Numerical experiments allow us to overcome the restrictive assumption m0 =
n2
4 : in Figure (2.5)
prices of a typical call option on a zero coupon are plotted against a wide range of values of the
ambiguity aversion parameter: as expected prices are monotonically increasing in the amount of
‘ambiguity’ present in the economy. In order to analyze these effect on widely accepted market
indicators, we compared the shapes of Black’s implied volatility curves for a call option on a zero
coupon bond evaluated for different levels of the parameter η. We remind that Black’s implied
volatility for such a contract is defined as solution (v) of the following equation21
E
[
ξh∗(s)
ξh∗(t)
(
P (T, s)−K)+∣∣∣∣Ft] = P (t, T ) [ P (t, s)P (t, T ) Φ(d1(v))−KΦ(d2(v))
]
where T is the maturity of the option, s is the maturity of the underlying and
d1(v) =
log
(
P (t,s)
P (t,T )/K
)
+ v2(T − t)/2
v
√
T − t
d1(v) =
log
(
P (t,s)
P (t,T )/K
)
− v2(T − t)/2
v
√
T − t
Figure 2.6 shows that for the parametrization we have chosen higher degrees of model uncertainty
increase the slope of the (almost linear) implied volatility curve. Evidence seems to point towards
an inversion of this tendency for values of η above a certain point22
These results should be compared to the richer pattern of Black implied caplet volatilities generated
by the two factor model. We remind that Black’s implied caplet volatilities are defined as solutions
of the following equation:
E
[
ξh∗(s)
ξh∗(t)
τ
[
1
τ
(
1
P (T, s)
− 1
)
−K
]+∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= P (t, s)τ
[
1
τ
(
P (t, T )
P (T, s)
− 1
)
Φ(d1(v))−KΦ(d2(v))
]
21We remind that in Black’s model of bonds option pricing, bonds are assumed to follow a lognormal martingale
under the forward risk neutral measure corresponding to the bond maturing at expiry. Similarly, in Black’s model of
caplet pricing simple forward rates are lognormal martingales under this forward measure.
22we will have more to say about this in the sequel.
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where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, T is the maturity of the caplet,
τ = s− T its tenor and
d1(v) =
log
(
1
τ
(
P (t,T )
P (T,s) − 1
)
/K
)
+ v2(T − t)/2
v
√
T − t
d1(v) =
log
(
1
τ
(
P (t,T )
P (T,s) − 1
)
/K
)
− v2(T − t)/2
v
√
T − t
Figure 2.9 anticipates that a suitable parametrization (namely, a negative coefficient of correlation
between technological shocks and shocks on the volatility driving factor) leads to a negative sensitiv-
ity of (zero) call option prices with respect to model uncertainty. As a consequence, this two factor
specification is able to reproduce the typical ‘smirk’ pattern of implied caplet volatilities observed on
the market. Interestingly enough, the inability of the classical specification to generate the observed
implied volatility pattern, evidenced in Figure 2.9, is progressively corrected by higher values of the
ambiguity aversion parameter η.
As already pointed out Figure 2.5 shows that the one factor model generates prices European call
options on zeros that are increasing in the parameter η, as expected after the previous discussion on
yields to maturity; according to this consideration, the pattern highlighted in Figure 2.7 for Black
implied caplet volatilities shouldn’t be surprising; moreover, we notice that the typical ’smirk’ shape
generated by the model implies that an higher concern for model uncertainty induces an increased
leptokurticity and negative skewness on the risk neutral transition density of forward rates. A similar
property arising in a framework of time varying pessimism for the short rate will be discussed in the
sequel by analytic methods.
2.4.4 State dependent pessimism: robustness to ambiguity of some classes
So far we have been analyzing in detail the complete-markets, one factor specification of our am-
biguity averse setting nested in the affine class and indeed we have been exploiting the analytical
tractability arising in this case. In the attempt to extend our treatment to more general specifi-
cations, and in order to gain an additional layer of tractability form the involved problem arising
in the general case, we will be imposing a state dependent entropy constraint, or, in in a separate
development, we will performing an initial change of reference measure under which the solution
can be fully characterized. Time varying-pessimism is motivated by the intuition that the level of
concern for ambiguity which affects decision makers may be linked to the state of the economy.
We discuss the contingent claim pricing problem in the context of single-factor affine dynamics.
Appendix A contains details about the derivation of equilibrium model misspecifications and about
multidimensional extensions.
The models that we are about to discuss allow for a fairly easy derivation of the optimal Girsanov
kernels h∗; as pointed out previously, these equilibrium solutions constitute the starting point in the
study of the impact of ambiguity aversion on the contingent claim valuation problem. The specifica-
tions we analyze lead us to familiar pricing methodologies which allow for a direct parametric assess-
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ment of this influence. We give details for three single factor specifications, the multi-dimensional
extensions treated in Appendix A being qualitatively similar:
Affine coefficients
We consider a one factor affine specification with state dependent entropy constraint of the form
h′ · h ≤ 2η
Y
Y :
dQ = g1Y dt+ lρdZ
h
1 + l
√
1− ρ2dZh2
dY = m1(Y − Y )dt+ n
√
Y dZh1
Let m0 = m1Y , then this specifications admits as optimal Girsanov kernels the processes
h∗1 =
√
2η
Y
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
(2.30)
h∗2 =
√
2η
Y
Y
l
√
1− ρ2
k
with k solution of (2.51) in Appendix A. Therefore the equilibrium market price of risk arising in
this ambiguity averse preference setting is proportional to the square root of the state variable Y ,
whereas the equilibrium short rate is an affine function of the latter:
θh∗ = σ
′(Y ) + h∗ =
√
Y

lρ+
√
2η
Y
√
k2−(−1+ρ2) l2
k
l
√
1− ρ2
(
1 +
q
2η
Y
k
)
 (2.31)
r∗ =
(
g1 − l2 − lρ
√
2η
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
−
√
2η
Y
l2(1− ρ2)
k
)
Y
In light of the familiar functional forms of these expressions it is not surprising therefore that closed
form solution can be obtained for several contingent claim pricing problems.
Geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics for the state variables
If both drift and diffusion components of the technological returns are linear in the state variable
(g1Y and lY ) respectively, and the latter evolves as a geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
dY = (m0 +m1Y )dt+ nY dw
where w(t) has instantaneous correlation ρ with the brownian component of the technology. In
this case a similar analysis holds, provided we impose the following state dependent instantaneous
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entropy constraint:
h′ · h ≤ 2ηY 2
The optimal Girsanov kernels are entropy constraint are
h∗1 = Y
√
2η
lρ− nb(λ, k)
λb(λ, k)− k
h∗2 = Y
√
2η
l
√
1− ρ2
λb(λ, k)− k
where
b(λ, k) =
(
λ k − nρ l +√n2k2 − 2nλ k ρ l + (n2(1− ρ2) + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2)
λ2 − n2
and (λ, k) solves the system of equations (2.52) in Appendix A. It turns out that the equilibrium
market price of risk is affine in the state variable whereas the equilibrium short rate is a quadratic
function of the latter:
θh∗ = σ
′(Y ) + h∗ = Y
 lρ+
√
2η lρ−nb(λ,k)λb(λ,k)−k
l
√
1− ρ2 +√2η l
√
1−ρ2
λb(λ,k)−k

r∗ = g1Y −
(
l2
2
+ lρ
√
2η
lρ− nb(λ, k)
λb(λ, k)− k +
√
2η
l2(1− ρ2)
λ b(λ, k)− k
)
Y 2
The risk-neutral dynamics of the state variable do not belong to the Geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
case anymore, since a term appearing in the drift is proportional to the square of Y , therefore the
pricing problem can be treated along the lines involved in the analysis of (2.57)
An additional example
In the previous examples we postulated suitable forms for the state dependent entropy constraints in
order to gain analytical tractability of the dynamic belief selection problem. The aim of the current
case is to attack the problem under the hypothesis of constant instantaneous entropy constraint:
h′ · h ≤ 2η
To this end let us consider the affine specification treated in (2.4.4) and a preliminary change of
reference measure
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(
−κ · Z(t)− κ
′ · κ
2
t
)
where κ = (κ1, κ2) is a bivariate vector of constants. Girsanov theorem then easily shows that if
we solve our max-min expected utility program relative to this new reference model, we obtain as
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optimal misspecifications
h∗1 =
√
2η
lρ− nb(λ, k)
λb(λ, k)− k
h∗2 =
√
2η
l
√
1− ρ2
λb(λ, k)− k
where b(λ, k) is still
b(λ, k) =
λ k − ρ l +√k2 − 2λ k ρ l + (1− ρ2 + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2
λ2 − 1
but (λ, k) now solves the system of equations (2.54) in Appendix A. The equilibrium market price
of risk and the equilibrium short rate are given by:
θh∗ = σ
′(Y ) + h∗ =
√
Y
 lρ
l
√
1− ρ2
+

√
2η lρ−nb(λ,k)λb(λ,k)−k
√
2η
l
√
1−ρ2
λb(λ,k)−k

r∗ =
(
g1 − l2
)
Y −[
lρ
(
κ1 +
√
2η
lρ− nb(λ, k)
λb(λ, k)− k
)
+
√
2η l
√
1− ρ2
(
κ2 +
l
√
1− ρ2
λ b(λ, k)− k
)]√
Y
The equilibrium risk-neutral dynamics of the state variable are then qualitatively similar to its
dynamics under the changed reference measure Q, since a term appearing in the drift is proportional
to the square root of Y , therefore the conclusions reached for the specification (2.22) hold true.
The effects of ambiguity aversion on the term structure and options on zeros
The pricing frameworks outlined, together with a suitable generalization of the results concerning
the one factor-complete markets case, allow to investigate the effects of ambiguity aversion on yield
to maturities, first, and options on zeros next. As apparent from (2.31), model (??) with state-
dependent entropy constraint delivers closed form solutions for both quantities of interest and the
functional dependence of those from the ambiguity aversion parameter can be studied directly. As
of the extension of (??), given that the pricing framework is qualitatively not dissimilar to the
complete market example, but indeed quantitatively richer in predictions, closed-form solutions and
explicit functional dependencies are not available but in a special case and numerical methods (or
perturbation analysis) have to be called for. In what follows we concentrate on the affine framework
(??) and work out solutions for the ‘ambiguous’ versions of the one factor square-root dynamics and
the two factor Longstaff & Schwartz (1992) model when time-varying pessimism of the form (2.55)
is involved.
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CIR economy with state dependent entropy constraint
Let us remind that in this case the investment opportunity set evolves under the reference measure
according to
dQ(t)
Q(t)
= g1 Y dt+
√
Y
[
l ρ (dZ1 + h1dt) + l
√
1− ρ2 (dZ2 + h2dt)
]
dY (t) = m1
(
Y − Y )+ n√Y (dZ1 + h1dt)
From the optimal Girsanov kernel selected (namely (2.30)) and the form assumed by the market
price of risk (2.31) we deduce the risk neutral dynamics of the state variables once the optimal belief
has been selected, hence the pricing equation
Vt +
[
m1(Y − Y )− nY
(
lρ+
√
2η
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
)]
VY +
n2Y
2
VY Y−
V
(
g1 − l2 − lρ
√
2η
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
−
√
2η
Y
l2(1− ρ2)
k
)
Y = 0
where k solves (2.51), the boundary conditions being V (T, Y ) = 1 and V (T, Y ) = (P (T, s) −K)+
for the zero coupon bond and the call on a zero maturing in s, respectively.
Standard separation of variables allows us to obtain the following expression for the yield to maturity
of a zero maturing in T :
y(t, T ) = − logP (t, T )
T − t =
B(T − t)Y −A(T − t)
T − t
with
B(T − t) = 2 b(k)
n θ(k) +m1 − coth
[
(T−t)
q
2n2 b(k)+(n θ(k)+m1)
2
2
] √
2n2 b(k) +
(
n θ(k) +m1
)2
A(T − t) =
∫ T−t
0
m1 Y B(u)du
where
b(k) = g1 − l2 − lρ
√
2η
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
−
√
2η
Y
l2(1− ρ2)
k
θ(k) = lρ+
√
2η
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
and the hyperbolic cotangent may be substituted with the more familiar expression:
cothx =
e2x + 1
e2x − 1
We remark that the expression for A(T−t) is explicitly integrable and the (lengthy) result is reported
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in the Appendix. If we consider the positive root of the quadratic equation (2.51) and make the
assumption (1 − 2n) > 023, then the short rate is always lower in the ambiguity averse economy.
Furthermore, in order to insure that the latter stays non negative , we need to impose b(k) > 0.
We are now able to describe the effect of ambiguity aversion on the term structure by computing
the sensitivity of the yield to maturity to the ambiguity aversion parameter η. Let us first compare
the result to the yield prevailing in an economy without model uncertainty (η = 0). It is easy to see
that the ambiguity averse preference ordering delivers lower yields to maturity compared to those
prevailing in the classical setting for all parameter sets satisfying the conditions depicted above.
The partial derivative of the yield to maturity with respect to η and the partial derivative of the
slope of the yield curve with respect to η when the latter is null, describe the direct impact of a
small perturbation of the reference model (when concern for such a case is present) both on the
level and on the curvature of the yield curve.24.These derivatives, though available in closed form,
are involved enough not to allow an analytical investigation of their sign; this is due essentially to
the nonlinear dependence of b(k) and θ(k) on k and on the latter’s (in turn) nonlinear dependence
on η. Nevertheless the evidence reported in Figure (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), Figures (2.15) and (2.16)
especially, and several exercises that have not been reported, show that for all parameter sets of
interest the sensitivity of the yield on the ambiguity aversion parameter has proven negative, and
decreasing up to an intermediate time to maturity, after which the the partial derivative reverts
its tendency while still keeping its negative sign; whereas the sensitivity of the slope of the yield
curve on the same parameter is negative for the short end of the yield curve and negative but fading
away at increasing maturities. It should be noted that the correlation coefficient ρ determines a
substantially different impact of model uncertainty: the closer ρ to −1 the less severe the shift of
the yield curve.
In this respect, it may be instructive to notice that for reasonable parameter sets the sensitivity of
the mean reversion parameter b(k)Y m1 with respect to the instantaneous correlation is null in the
non ambiguity averse model and negative, decreasing with ρ otherwise (see Figure 2.14).
The global evidence seems to points toward the presence of nontrivial effects of model uncertainty
on the term structure even when the reference model chosen displays the ‘robustness’ property with
respect to ambiguity. Furthermore, as emphasized below, an alternative parametrization of the
reference model may not reproduce identical effects.
In light of this evidence it is tempting to conjecture that y(t, T ) is indeed decreasing in η whenever
the restrictions outlined above are satisfied.
The valuation of options on zero coupon bonds is similarly simplified in the current framework by
the fact that the risk-neutral dynamics of the state variable retain their transition density prevailing
under the objective measure. The formulation of the problem in terms of short rate dynamics is
most convenient to our present purposes. Since under the optimal risk-neutral belief we observe:
dr(t) = [m1r − (m1 + nθ(k))r(t)]dt+ n
√
b(k)
√
r(t)dZ∗(t)
23since n is an instantaneous volatility, the assumption seems mild to us
24Since the entropy bound appears in the form
√
2η in all relevant expressions, we compute derivatives with respect
to this quantity in order to avoid singularities at η = 0
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with r = b(k)Y
a(t, T ) =
[
4(m1 + nθ(k))
n2b(k)(1− exp((m1 + nθ(k))(T − t)))
]
v =
4m1r
n2b(k)
=
4m1Y
n2
d(t, T ) = a(T − t)r(t) exp((m1 + nθ(k))(T − t))
c =
√
(m1 + nθ(k))2 + 2n2b(k)
then the risk neutral transition density of the short rate is
p∗( r(T )|r(t) ) = a(t, T ) pχ2 (a(t, T ) r(T ); v, d(t, T ) |r(t))
with p2χ the non-central chi square pdf with v degrees of freedom and non centrality parameter
d(t, T ). The effect of model uncertainty on the likelihood of the key state variable is apparent both
through the the scale parameter a(t, T ) and the non centrality parameter d(t, T ): direct study of
the behavior of the distribution is again possible and it suffices to observe Figure (2.17) to observe
that for reasonable parameter sets increasing concern for model uncertainty induces densities which
are more leptokurtic and negatively skewed.
It should be noted that for different admissible probability measures on our filtered probability
space, the implied risk neutral density functions of the short rate are mutually singular (this can
be deduced from the (nonlinear) dependence of the diffusion component on η); therefore the most
natural formulation of the problem from an economic perspective, highlights how this ambiguity
averse framework cannot be mimicked by any choice of the market price of risk within a (classic)
partial equilibrium model that specifies square-root dynamics. Direct computation of the relevant
risk-neutral expectation leads to the price of a call option expiring in T on a zero coupon bond
maturing in s > T :
C(t,X, T, s,K) = P (t, s)χ2
(
2r∗[γ + ψ +B(s− T )]; v, 2γ
2r(t) exp(c(T − t))
γ + ψ +B(s− T )
)
−
KP (t, T )χ2
(
2r∗[γ + ψ]; v,
2γ2r(t) exp(c(T − t))
γ + ψ
)
with γ = 2c/[n2b(k)(exp(c(T − t))− 1)], ψ = ((m1 + nθ(k)) + c)/n2b(k),
r∗ = log(A(s − T )/K)/B(s − T ) and A(s − T ), B(s − T ) are the coefficient appearing in the zero
coupon bond price after the change of variable Y → r has been performed in the pricing problem.
An increasing ambiguity aversion parameter η displays a double effect:
• an increasing effect on the degree of moneyness of the option, as it can be argued by the
previous discussion about yields to maturity, therefore a higher ‘moneyness’ rate r∗ and a
wider range of integration [0, r∗]; call options are always more expensive as a consequence of
this effect;
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• an effect on the likelihood of the option to expire in the money which is a priori indeterminate:
the increased negative skew we have observed above may be counterbalanced by the pronounced
leptokurticity of the distribution of the short rate at maturity. Figure (2.18) shows a situation
in which the initial tendency towards higher option prices is contrasted by the fattening of the
right tail of the distribution (of the short rate) once ambiguity aversion is further increased.
The conclusions raised in the latter point and suggested by the behavior depicted in Figure (2.18)
are confirmed by an inspection of Black’s implied volatilities25 corresponding to those option prices
(Figure 2.19). For moderate levels of ambiguity in the economy the model enhances the typical
‘smirk’ shape that we observe on market data by increasing the steepness of the curve for out of the
money profiles; this effect is more and more pronounced for ambiguity aversion parameters increasing
up to a certain threshold, after which additional layers of ambiguity do flatten out the profile of the
curve.
We achieve more clarity about this point by writing down a decomposition of the sensitivity of the
option price with respect to the ambiguity aversion parameter η. We exploit the smoothness of
Regularized Hypergeometric functions to perform the following differentiations:
∂C(t,X, T, s,K)
∂η
= C˜1 + C˜2 (2.32)
where
C˜1 =
∂P (t, s)
∂η
χ21+P (t, s)pχ21
∂
(
2r∗[γ + ψ +B(s− T )])
∂η
−K∂P (t, T )
∂η
χ22+P (t, T )pχ22
∂ (2r∗[γ + ψ])
∂η
C˜2 =
1
2
P (t, s)
(
χ21 − χ˜21
) ∂
∂η
(
2γ2r(t) exp(c(T − t))
γ + ψ +B(s− T )
)
−
1
2
KP (t, T )
(
χ22 − χ˜22
) ∂
∂η
(
2γ2r(t) exp(c(T − t))
γ + ψ
)
χ21 = χ
2
(
2r∗[γ + ψ +B(s− T )]; v, 2γ
2r(t) exp(c(T − t))
γ + ψ +B(s− T )
)
χ22 = χ
2
(
2r∗[γ + ψ]; v,
2γ2r(t) exp(c(T − t))
γ + ψ
)
pχ21 , pχ22 are the corresponding densities at 2r
∗[γ+ψ+B(s−T )] and 2r∗[γ+ψ], respectively, whereas
χ˜21 and χ˜
2
2 are identical to χ
2
1 and χ
2
2 but for one more degree of freedom.
The term C˜1 characterizes the effect on the moneyness of the option that we have discussed previously
and it can easily be seen to be positive, as a consequence of the positive derivative of zeros’ prices
with respect to η and of its being increasing with time to maturity. The second term, C˜2, quantifies
the effect due to the distortion of the risk- neutral transition density of the state variable arising when
25See the the corresponding exercise concerning time invariant pessimism for a reminder on Black’s implied volatility.
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higher concern for ambiguity is present, and it has been expressively characterized as a modification
of the option price where the initial prices have been weighted by the sensitivities to η of non
centrality parameters and the quantiles have been replaced by the difference with their analogous
displaying one more degree of freedom. If we interpret the parameter η as a proxy of the degree
of ambiguity concern present in the economy, and if we advocate a pragmatic point of view similar
to those admitting the Greeks in the Black-Scholes economy, then we may argue that η, though
constant, could be subject to an unprecise description and may therefore influence our pricing
methodology: reasoning along these lines, (2.32) may be thought to provide a (first order) hedging
methodology, whose portfolio weights in zero coupon bonds with maturity s and T , P (t, s), P (t, T ),
and a locally risk-less asset, are explicitly provided by the expression.
Two factor Longstaff and Schwartz (1992) model with time-varying pessimism
Our aim is to extend the analysis of this model to a framework in which the whole dynamics of
the technological return, in excess of the factor driving its instantaneous volatility, are subject
to an unprecise probabilistic description. In other words, we seek a Girsanov kernel of the form
h = [h1 0 h3]
′ and represent the opportunity set under the reference belief P by the system of
SDEs:
dQ(t)
Q(t)
=
[
αY1 + bY2 + σ
√
Y2
(
ρ h3(t) +
√
1− ρ2 h1(t)
)]
dt+ σ
√
Y2
(√
1− ρ2 dZ1(t) + ρ dZ3(t)
)
dY1 = a
(
Y1 − Y1
)
dt+ e
√
Y1 dZ2(t)
dY2 =
(
c(Y2 − Y2) + f
√
Y2 h3(t)
)
dt+ f
√
Y2 dZ3(t)
In accordance with (2.55) we posit an instantaneous entropy constraint of the form:
h21 + h
2
3 ≤ 2
η
Y2
Y2
The HBJ equation arising in the infinite time horizon likelihood selection process is then a special
case of (2.56). In particular, the value function V (Y1, Y2) satisfies
a(Y1 − Y1)VY1 +
e2Y1
2
VY1Y1 − Y2
√
2η
Y2
√
(σρ− f VY2)2 + σ2(1− ρ2) + c(Y2 − Y2)VY2+
f2Y2
2
VY2Y2 − Y2
(
b− σ
2
2
)
− αY1 − βV = 0
After (2.56) we realize that the solution of this problem is additively separable: V (Y1, Y2) = V
1(Y1)+
V 2(Y2), where V
1(Y1) and V
2(Y2) satisfy the autonomous ODEs:
a(Y1 − Y1)V 1Y1 + e
2Y1
2 V
1
Y1Y1
− αY1 − βV 1 = 0
Y2
√
2η
Y2
√
(σρ− f V 2Y2)2 + σ2(1− ρ2) + c(Y2 − Y2)V 2Y2 + f
2Y2
2 V
2
Y2Y2
− Y2
(
b− σ22
)
− βV 2(Y2) = 0
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The solution of the first equation admits the familiar representation in terms of hypergeometric
functions; what concerns us more in light of the form of the Girsanov kernels is the fact that
the solution of the second equation may easily be recovered along lines borrowed from the one-
dimensional case, obtaining
V 2(Y2) = Y2
(
ρ σ −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
)
f
+ C
with c0 = cY ,
C =
(
ρ σ −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
)
c0
fβ
and k solution of the quadratic equation
σ2
2
−
√
2η
Y
k − β
f
(
ρ σ −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
)
− b−
(
ρ σ −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
) c
f
= 0
Not dissimilarly from the one-dimensional case
h∗1 =
√
2ηY2
Y2
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
h∗2 =
√
2ηY2
Y2
l
√
1− ρ2
k
Since the risk premia are suitable adaptations of (2.31), we deduce the pricing equation
Vt +
[
c(Y2 − Y2)− fY2
(
σρ+
√
2η
Y2
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
k
)]
VY2 + a(Y1 − Y1)V 1Y1 +
f2Y2
2
VY2Y2+
e2Y1
2
V 1Y1Y1 − V
[(
b− σ2 − σρ
√
2η
Y2
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
k
−
√
2η
Y2
σ2(1− ρ2)
k
)
Y2 + αY1
]
= 0
If we carry on the inversion procedure outlined in Longstaff and Schwartz (1992) to restate the
opportunity set in terms of dynamics of the short rate and of instantaneous variance of the short
rate, then the the influence of ambiguity aversion is clearly summarized by the fact that the system
we obtain cannot be mimicked by any alternative form of the risk premium selected in a partial
equilibrium framework, due to the direct impact of the instantaneous entropy constraint on diffusion
components. To see this, let
µ(η) = b− σ2 − σρ
√
2η
Y2
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) σ2
k
−
√
2η
Y2
σ2(1− ρ2)
k
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then the short rate and the instantaneous variance of its changes are, respectively
r = αY1 + µ(η)Y2
v = α2e2Y1 + µ(η)
2f2Y2 (2.33)
Following Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), we may solve this system of equation for (Y1, Y2), apply
Ito’s lemma to (r, v) and substitute to obtain the risk neutral dynamics of the newly defined state
variables.
dr =
(
f
(
v − e2 r α) θ(η)
e2 α− f2 µ(η) + c µ(η)
(
Y2 +
v − e2 r α
µ (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
)
+ aα
(
Y1 +
−v + f2 r µ
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
))
dt
+e α
√
−
( −v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
)
dZ∗2h + f µ(η)
√
−
(
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
)
dZ∗3h
dv =
(
f3
(
v − e2 r α) θ(η)µ(η)
e2 α− f2 µ(η) + c f
2 µ(η)
2
(
Y2 +
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
))
dt+
a e2 α2
(
Y1 +
−v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
)
dt+ e3 α2
√
−
( −v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
)
dZ∗2h +
f3 µ(η)
2
√
−
(
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
)
dZ∗3h
where θ(η) = σρ+
√
2η
Y2
√
k2−(−1+ρ2)σ2
k
The effect of model uncertainty is captured by the (nonlinear) dependence on the parameter η of the
diffusion components of both the short rate and the instantaneous variance of short rate increments:
the set of absolutely continuous probability measures considered as relevant by the agents, Ph
∗
(and their risk-neutral counterparts), implies a set of mutually singular densities for the equilibrium
economically relevant state variables.
Although for what concerns the present application we are mainly interested in zero-coupon bond
option prices, we notice that, not surprisingly 26, zero-coupon bond prices assume the following
form:
P (r, v, τ) = A1(τ)
2
aY1
e2 A2(τ)
2
cY2
f2 eκτ+B1(τ) r+B2(τ) v
26see Longstaff and Schwartz (1992)
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where
A1(τ) =
2φ
(a+ φ)(exp(φτ)− 1) + 2φ
A2(τ) =
2ψ
(c+ fθ(η) + ψ)(exp(ψτ)− 1) + 2ψ
B1(τ) =
αφ(exp(ψτ)− 1)A2(τ)− µ(η)ψ(exp(ψτ)− 1)A1(τ)
φψ(µ(η)− α)
B2(τ) =
ψ(exp(φτ)− 1)A1(τ)− φ(exp(ψτ)− 1)A2(τ)
φψ(µ(η)− α)
φ =
√
2α+ a2 ψ =
√
2µ(η) + (c+ fθ(η))2 κ = aY1e2 (a+ φ) +
cY2
f2 (ψ + c+ fθ(η))
2)
Let us now analyze the influence of model uncertainty on the pricing of option on zero coupon bonds
in the current framework. We briefly remind that if relevant expectations are taken with respect to
the T -forward martingale measure27 then we may compute the price of a call option expiring in T
on zero coupon bond with maturity s as
C(t, Y1, Y2, T, s,K) = P (r, v, T − t)×
ET
[
(A1(s− T )2
aY1
e2 A2(s− T )2
cY2
f2 eκ(s−T )+B1(s−T ) r(T )+B2(s−T ) v(T ) −K)+
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= P (r, v, T − t)×
ET
[
(A1(s− T )2
aY1
e2 A2(s− T )2
cY2
f2 eκ(s−T )+ eB1(s−T )Y1(T )+ eB2(s−T )Y2(T ) −K)+
∣∣∣∣Ft]
with B˜1( · ) = αB1( · )+α2e2B2( · ) and B˜2( · ) = µ(η)B1( · )+µ(η)2f2B2( · ) The transition densities
of the state variables under the T -forward measure are independent noncentral chi-squares; condi-
tional on a sample path of the process Y1, the ‘moneyness region’ is one dimensional and determined
27We recall that the restriction to Ft of the Radon-Nikody´m derivative of the forward martingale measure with
respect to the risk-neutral measure (where the numeraire is the locally risk-less bond) is given by
dPT
h
dP ∗
h
˛˛˛˛
˛
Ft
=
P (r, v, T − t)
exp(
R t
0 r(u)du)P (r, v, T )
= exp
 
−
Z t
0
 
B1(T − s)e α
s
−
„ −v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«
+B2(T − s)e3 α2
s
−
„ −v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«!
dZ∗2h(s)
−
Z t
0
 
B1(T − s)f µ(η)
s
−
„
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«
+B2(T − s)f3 µ(η)2
s
−
„
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«!
dZ∗3h(s)
−1
2
Z t
0
 
B1(T − s)e α
s
−
„ −v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«
+B2(T − s)e3 α2
s
−
„ −v + f2 r µ(η)
α (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«!2
ds
−1
2
Z t
0
 
B1(T − s)f µ(η)
s
−
„
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«
+B2(T − s)f3 µ(η)2
s
−
„
v − e2 r α
µ(η) (e2 α− f2 µ(η))
«!2
ds
1A
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by the inequation
B˜2(s− T )Y2 ≤ log
A1(s− T )2 aY1e2 A2(s− T )2 cY2f2
K
− B˜1(s− T )y1 − κ(s− T )
where y1 is a realization of Y1 at expiry. Since conditionally on this realization the valuation problem
is not dissimilar to the one dimensional problem considered in the previous section, the following
chain of equalities holds, where FY1(T )t denotes the sub-sigma field generated by the random variable
Y1(T ):
C(t, r, v, T, s,K) = P (r, v, T − t)×
ET
[
ET
[
(A1(s− T )2
aY1
e2 A2(s− T )2
cY2
f2 eκ(s−T )+ eB1(s−T )Y1(T )+ eB2(s−T )Y2(T ) −K)+
∣∣∣∣FY1(T )t ]∣∣∣∣Ft] =
P (r, v, s− t)ET
[
χ2
(
2 y∗2(y1) [γ + ψ + B˜2(s− T )]; ϕ,
2γ2Y2(t) exp(h(T − t))
γ + ψ + B˜2(s− T )
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
−
KP (r, v, T − t)ET
[
χ2
(
2 y∗2(y1) [γ + ψ]; ϕ,
2γ2Y2(t) exp(h(T − t))
γ + ψ
)∣∣∣∣Ft] =
P (r, v, s− t) Ω1(r, v, t, T, s)−KP (r, v, T − t) Ω2(r, v, t, T )
with
Ω1(r, v, t, T, s) =
∫ y∗1
0
χ2
(
2 y∗2(Y1) [γ + ψ + B˜2(s− T )]; ϕ,
2γ2Y2(t) exp(h(T − t))
γ + ψ + B˜2(s− T )
)
p∗T (Y1(T )|Y1(t) )dY1
Ω2(r, v, t, T ) =
∫ y∗1
0
χ2
(
2 y∗2(Y1) [γ + ψ]; ϕ,
2γ2Y2(t) exp(h(T − t))
γ + ψ
)
p∗T (Y1(T )|Y1(t) )dY1
and (r, v) substituted in the last expression by means of (2.33). Furthermore
y∗2(y1) =
log
(
A1(s−T )2
aY1
e2 A2(s−T )
2
cY2
f2
K
)
− B˜1(s− T )y1 − κ(s− T )
B˜2(s− T )
y∗1 is such that y2(y
∗
1) = 0, that is
y∗1 =
log
(
A1(s−T )2
aY1
e2 A2(s−T )
2
cY2
f2
K
)
− κ(s− T )
B˜1(s− T )
ϕ = 4cY2f2 h =
√
(c+ fθ(η))2 + 2f2 γ = 2h/[f2(exp(h(T − t))− 1)] ψ = ((c+ fθ(η)) + h)/f2
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η 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.1
C 0.0028548 0.00847366 0.0401189 0.0809638 0.093576 0.099781 0.10869
Table 2.1: Two factor model with time varying pessimism. An example of prices of call options
(expiring in 3 years) on a zero coupon bond ( with time to maturity 4 years) for different values
of the parameter η. The parameter set is {X = 0.07, Y = 0.05, σ = 0.134, ρ = 0.2, e = 0.186, f =
0.186, β = 0.03, α = 0.2, b = 0.1, c = 0.3, a = 0.4, Y1(t) = 0.08, Y2(t) = 0.09, strike = .9}
and the forward neutral transition density of the state variable Y1 is
p∗T (Y1(T )|Y1(t) ) = q(t, T ) pχ2 (q(t, T )Y1(T ); υ, δ(t, T ) |Y1(t))
with p2χ the non-central chi square pdf with υ degrees of freedom and non centrality parameter
δ(t, T ); υ = 4aY1/e
2, q(t, T ) = 2[γY1 + ψY1 + B˜1(T − t)], δ(t, T ) =
4γ2Y1Y1(t) exp(hY1 (T−t))
q(t,T ) and γY1 ,
ψY1 , hY1 are identical to their previously defined counterparts with the parameters of the process Y1
substituted.
An inspection of the expression for the option price process reveals that the influence of model
uncertainty is indeed harder to grasp analytically that in the one dimensional case due to the
additional layer of dependence on the parameter η induced by the integration of the chi square
cumulative density function. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that this integration is easy to perform
numerically, we may rely on explicit computations in order to gain some intuition. As was the case
for the complete-market case, the flexible parametric structure of this two factor model is able to
give rise to a variety of qualitative predictions. In Table 2.1 we have reported series of call options
prices which seems to be monotonically increasing with the ambiguity aversion parameter η ceteris
paribus, however a different parameter set (in particular, a different sign of the correlation parameter
ρ) may well have generated an opposite behavior.
2.5 Conclusions
We develop a continuous time general equilibrium model for the term structure of interest rates
where economic agents are averse to model uncertainty. A concern for an ‘ambiguous’ probabilistic
description of the environment on which agent base their decision making process has been largely
shown to be both economically and behaviorally relevant in terms of predictions on key economic
indicators; we contribute to this strand of the literature by studying clarifying the equilibrium
influence of ambiguity aversion on a widely investigated topic like factor models of the term structure
and address the consequences for simple, but relevant pricing problems. We have emphasized that a
small concern for model uncertainty significantly affects the implied term structures in equilibrium,
implying risk premia and interest rates with a different functional form than in standard models.
Moreover, otherwise unpriced factors in the standard model receive a premium for model uncertainty
which is of a particularly rich structure in the multiple factor setting. All of these features induce in
equilibrium term structure levels and shapes that are very different from those generated by a set-up
characterized by standard Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Work in progress includes the
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analysis of the impact of model uncertainty in a multi factor term structure model and the estimation
of yield curve models where a concern for model uncertainty is explicitly taken into account.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 7
Notice that the regularity conditions required for an application of the Saddle Point Theorem for
infinite dimensional spaces are met in our framework. See Sion (1958) and Ky-Fan (1953). Therefore
the value function J(x, y) may be alternatively characterized as
J(x, y) = inf
h∈H
sup
c,pi
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt log(c(t))dt
]
(2.34)
Let us first assume that the time horizon T is finite. According to the martingale formulation of the
consumption-investment problem to solve in the first step, it is well known that optimality of c implies
c∗(t) = exp(−δt)/ξh(t)ψ, where the lagrange multiplier ψ is solution of E
[∫ T
0
ξ(s)c∗(s)ds
]
= x, i.e
ψ = (1− exp(−δT ))/δx. This leads to
c∗(t) = δ
(
xe−δt
ξh(t)(1− e−δT )
)
(2.35)
Let
JTh (x, y) = E
[∫ T
0
e−δt log (c∗(t)) dt
]
By virtue of (2.9) and (2.35) one obtains
Jh(x, y) =
e−T δ (1− eT δ + T δ)
δ
+ log
(
δ x
1− e−δT
)(
1− e−δT
δ
)
+
E
[∫ T
0
e−δt
∫ t
0
r(s) +
θh(s)
′θh(s)
2
ds dt
]
In the infinite time horizon case it follows that
Jh(x, y) = lim
T→∞
JTh (x, y) = −
1
δ
+
log(δx)
δ
+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∫ t
0
r(s) +
θh(s)
′θh(s)
2
ds dt
]
See Karatzas & Shreve (1998) for the differences on the technical assumptions underlying the two
frameworks.
As a consequence of our inversion of the order of optimizations leading to the value function (2.34),
we may consider a given Girsanov kernel h satisfying (2.4) and the corresponding probability measure
Ph; within this model, the equilibrium interest rate process and excess return on financial assets are
infered from Cox Ingersoll and Ross (1985a) and (2.8)
rh(Y ) = α(Y )− σ(Y )σ′(Y ) + σ(Y ) · h(t) (2.36)
βh(Y ) = α(Y )1k − σ(Y ) (σ′(Y )− h(t))1k + ϑ(Y )(σ′(Y )− h(t)) (2.37)
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Accordingly, the following equilibrium market price of risk also holds under Ph
λh(Y ) = σ
′(Y )− h(t) (2.38)
Let us notice that in Appendix ..., where the case of representative agent maximizing CRRA utility
of terminal wealth is analyzed, these equilibrium quantities will be derived by suitable dynamic
optimization methods.
We may then conclude that the value function J(x, y) is given by the following program.
J(x, y) = −1
δ
+
log(δx)
δ
+ inf
h∈H
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∫ t
0
(
r(s) +
θh(s)
′θh(s)
2
)
ds dt
]
= −1
δ
+
log(δx)
δ
+ inf
h∈H
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt
∫ t
0
(
α(Y )− σ(Y )
′σ(Y )
2
+ σ(Y ) · h(s)
)
ds dt
]
= −1
δ
+
log(δx)
δ
+ V (y)
Dynamic programming mandates the following necessary condition for optimality of h:
inf
h∈H
{
V ′Y [Λ(Y )− Ξ(Y )h(t)] +
1
2
trace [Ξ(Y )′VY Y Ξ(Y )] +
α(Y )− 1
2
σ(Y )σ(Y )′ − σ(Y ) · h(t)− δV
}
= 0 (2.39)
Due to the convexity of the functional appearing in curly brackets in the control h, the condition is
also sufficient for the optimality of h 28. The complementary slackness condition corresponding to
the minimization (2.39) implies
h∗(Y ) = − 1
ψ
[Ξ(Y )′ VY + σ(Y )′]
where
ψ =
1√
2η(Y )
√
(Ξ(Y )′ν(t) + σ(Y )′)′ (Ξ(Y )′ν(t) + σ(Y )′)
Therefore, the process
h∗(Y ) = −
√
2η(Y )
Ξ(Y )′ν(t) + σ(Y )′√
(Ξ(Y )′ν(t) + σ(Y )′)′ (Ξ(Y )′ν(t) + σ(Y )′)
(2.40)
constitutes an optimal feed-back control. We then conclude that the value function of our model
selection problem solves the nonlinear second order Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi PDE :
V ′Y Λ(Y ) +
1
2
trace [Ξ(Y )′VY Y Ξ(Y )]−√
2η(Y )
√
(Ξ(Y )′VY + σ(Y )′)
′
(Ξ(Y )′VY + σ(Y )′) + α(Y )− 1
2
σ(Y )σ(Y )′ − δV (0, Y ) = 0
28Reference to Fleming and Soner (1993)
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Proof of Corollary 7
The equilibrium interest rate, risk premia on financial assets and factor market price of risk follow
by substituting (2.40) into the corresponding quantities prevailing under a generic admissible model
Ph, i.e. (2.36), (2.37) and (2.38).
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Appendix B
A Multivariate Gaussian Model
This Appendix derives the equilibrium Girsanov kernel and the term structure of interest rates for
the two factor gaussian model analyzed in Subsection 2.4.1.
i) Constant entropy bound. Proof of Proposition 9
Let us adopt the notation
g = [g1 g2] Y = [Y1 Y2]
′ Y = [Y 1 Y 2]′ M = diag[m1,m2] N =
[
n1 q
n2 0
]
In light of the constant instantaneous entropy bound (2.19) the HBJ equation (2.14) reads
V ′YM(Y − Y ) +
1
2
trace [VY YN N
′]−
√
2η
√
(N ′VY + L′)
′
(N ′VY + L′) + g0 + g · Y − 1
2
LL′ − δV = 0
Standard separation of variables suggests that the latter has a classical solution of the form
V (Y ) = B′ · Y +A
where
B = (M ′ + δIk)−1g′
A = δ−1
(
Y
′
M ′B + g0 − LL
′
2
−
√
2η
√
(N ′B + L′)′(N ′B + L′)
)
By virtue of Proposition 7 the equilibrium Girsanov kernel is given by the following expression29:
h∗ = −
√
2η
N ′B + L′√
(N ′B + L′)′(N ′B + L′)
whereas we deduce from Corollary 7 the following equilibrium short rate:
r∗ = g0 + g · Y − LL′ −
√
2η L
N ′B + L′√
(N ′B + L′)′(N ′B + L′)
29More explicitly
h∗ = −
p
2η
2666666664
n1g1
m1+δ
+
n2g2
m2+δ
+L1r“
n1g1
m1+δ
+
n2g2
m2+δ
+L1
”2
+
“
L2+
qg1
m1+δ
”2
+L23
qg1
m1+δ
+L2r“
n1g1
m1+δ
+
n2g2
m2+δ
+L1
”2
+
“
L2+
qg1
m1+δ
”2
+L23
L3r“
n1g1
m1+δ
+
n2g2
m2+δ
+L1
”2
+
“
L2+
qg1
m1+δ
”2
+L23
3777777775
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which is affine in Y . Similarly, from (2.15), the dynamics of the state variables under the risk neutral
reference measure Q are affected by the change of drift φ with components:
φ1 = n1 φ˜1 + q φ˜2
φ2 = n2 φ˜1
where
φ˜1 = L1 +
√
2η
n1g1
m1+δ
+ n2g2m2+δ + L1√(
n1g1
m1+δ
+ n2g2m2+δ + L1
)2
+
(
L2 +
qg1
m1+δ
)2
+ L23
φ˜2 = L2 +
√
2η
qg1
m1+δ
+ L2√(
n1g1
m1+δ
+ n2g2m2+δ + L1
)2
+
(
L2 +
qg1
m1+δ
)2
+ L23
Notice that, as a consequence of the affine structure of the model’s being preserved under ambiguity
aversion, the transition density of the equilibrium short rate is Gaussian, as well as the transition
density of the integral over time of the short rate. Therefore (2.20) is obtained by performing the
standard (lognormal) integration involved in the price process representation (2.17) corresponding
to the case of a zero coupon bond. The coefficient A(t, T ) is given by the following (easy to compute)
integral:
A(t, T ) =
∫ T
t
[
g0 + LL
′ +
√
2η Lh∗ − (m1Y 1 − φ1)B(s, T )− (m2Y 2 − φ2)C(s, T )−
1
2
(n21 + q
2)B(s, T )2 − 1
2
n22C(s, T )
2 − n1n2B(s, T )C(s, T )
]
ds
ii) Time-varying entropy bound. Proof of Proposition 10
Let Y˜ = Y − Y . Taking into account the instantaneous entropy bound (2.21), the HBJ equation
(2.14) is expressed as follows in terms of Y˜
− V ′eYM Y˜ + 12 trace
[
VeY eYN N ′]−√2ηY˜ 21√(−N ′VeY + L′)′ (−N ′VeY + L′)+
g0 + g ·
(
Y − Y˜
)
− 1
2
LL′ − δV = 0
We argue that the value function arising in this case is takes the form
V (Y˜ ) = A+BY˜1 + CY˜2 +D|Y˜1|
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Separation of variables leads to the following expressions for the coefficients involved in the last
equation30:
A =
1
δ
(
g0 + g1Y 1 + g2Y 2 − LL
′
2
)
C =
g2
m2 + δ
and
B +D =
1
m12 − 2 η (q2 + n12) {2 q η L2 − g1m1 + 2 η L1 n1 + 2C η n1 n2+
1
2
(
4 (2 q η L2 − g1m1 + 2 η n1 (L1 + C n2))2−
4
(−m12 + 2 η (q2 + n12)) (−g12 + 2 η (L22 + L32 + (L1 + C n2)2))) 12}
B −D = 1
m12 − 2 η (q2 + n12) {2 q η L2 − g1m1 + 2 η L1 n1 + 2C η n1 n2−
1
2
(
4 (2 q η L2 − g1m1 + 2 η n1 (L1 + C n2))2−
4
(−m12 + 2 η (q2 + n12)) (−g12 + 2 η (L22 + L32 + (L1 + C n2)2))) 12}
so that
B =
1
m12 − 2 η (q2 + n12) (2 q η L2 − g1m1 + 2 η L1 n1 + 2C η n1 n2)
D =
1
2 [m12 − 2 η (q2 + n12)]
(
4 (2 q η L2 − g1m1 + 2 η n1 (L1 + C n2))2−
4
(−m12 + 2 η (q2 + n12)) (−g12 + 2 η (L22 + L32 + (L1 + C n2)2))) 12
Once again from (2.15) we may conclude that the dynamics of the state variables under the risk
neutral reference measure Q are the affected by the change of drift φ with components:
φ1 = n1 φ˜1 + q φ˜2
φ2 = n2 φ˜1
30Quite clearly
h∗ =
q
2ηeY 21
266666666666664
n1
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
«
+n2C+L1s„
n1
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
«
+n2C+L1
«2
+
„
L2+q
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
««2
+L23
L2+q
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
«
s„
n1
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
«
+n2C+L1
«2
+
„
L2+q
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
««2
+L23
L3s„
n1
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
«
+n2C+L1
«2
+
„
L2+q
„
B+
| eY1|eY1 D
««2
+L23
377777777777775
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where
φ˜1 = L1 +
√
2η Y˜ 21
n1
(
B + |
eY1|eY1 D
)
+ n2C + L1√(
n1
(
B + |
eY1|eY1 D
)
+ n2C + L1
)2
+
(
L2 + q
(
B + |
eY1|eY1 D
))2
+ L23
φ˜2 = L2 +
√
2η Y˜ 21
L2 + q
(
B + |
eY1|eY1 D
)
√(
n1
(
B + |
eY1|eY1 D
)
+ n2C + L1
)2
+
(
L2 + q
(
B + |
eY1|eY1 D
))2
+ L23
in light of which the pricing equation (2.16) satisfied by the price of zero coupon bond with maturity
T , P (t, T ), becomes, in terms of the state variables Y˜ = Y − Y :
Pt − P ′eY
(
M Y˜ − φ
)
+
1
2
trace
[
PeY eYN N ′] − [g0 + g (Y − Y˜ )− LL′ − Lh∗]P = 0
P (T, T ) = 1. This equation may be solved by reasoning along the lines leading to the value function
of the corresponding max-min expected utility problem. In particular, we argue that the following
holds
P (t, T ) = exp
(
A(t, T ) +B(t, T )Y˜1 + C(t, T )Y˜2 +D(t, T )|Y˜1|
)
Solving the ordinary differential equations arising from a standard separation of variables we obtain
the following expressions for the coefficients involved in the last equation:
A(t, T ) =
∫ T
t
[(
B(t, s) +
|Y˜1|
Y˜1
D(t, s)
)
(n1L1 − qL2)− C(t, s)n2L1 + (g0 + g · Y − LL′)−
1
2
(n21 + q
2)
(
B(t, s) +
|Y˜1|
Y˜1
D(t, s)
)2
+
1
2
n22C(t, s)
2+
n1n2
(
B(t, s) +
|Y˜1|
Y˜1
D(t, s)
)
C(t, s)
]
ds = 0
C(t, T ) =
(
1− e−(T−t)m2) g2
m2
Furthermore
B(t, T ) +D(t, T ) =
1
S+(S+ −m2)m2
[(
1− e−S+(T−t)
)
(S+ −m2)(Lh˜+ + g1)m22+(
m2 e
−S+(T−t) − (m+ S+(e−m(T−t) − 1))g2h˜+1 n2
)]
B(t, T )−D(t, T ) = 1
S−(S− −m2)m2
[(
1− e−S−(T−t)
)
(Lh˜− − g1)m22−(
e(T−t)m2−1
)
S−g2h˜−1 n2 +
(
1− e−S−(T−t)
)
m2(Lh˜
−S− − S−g1 − g2h˜−1 n2)
]
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where h˜+ =
[
h˜+1 h˜
+
2 h˜
+
3
]′
= h
∗√eY 21 , with Y˜1 > 0, h˜− =
[
h˜−1 h˜
−
2 h˜
−
3
]′
= h
∗√eY 21 , with Y˜1 < 0, and
S− = m1 + n1h˜−1 + n2h˜
−
2
S+ = m1 − n1h˜+1 − n2h˜+2
The coefficients B(t, T ) and D(t, T ) are then trivially obtained:
B(t, T ) =
1
2
{
1
S+(S+ −m2)m2
[(
1− e−S+(T−t)
)
(S+ −m2)(Lh˜+ + g1)m22+(
m2 e
−S+(T−t) − (m+ S+(e−m(T−t) − 1))g2h˜+1 n2
)]
+
1
S−(S− −m2)m2
[(
1− e−S−(T−t)
)
(Lh˜− − g1)m22−(
e(T−t)m2−1
)
S−g2h˜−1 n2 +
(
1− e−S−(T−t)
)
m2(Lh˜
−S− − S−g1 − g2h˜−1 n2)
]}
D(t, T ) =
1
2
{
1
S+(S+ −m2)m2
[(
1− e−S+(T−t)
)
(S+ −m2)(Lh˜+ + g1)m22+(
m2 e
−S+(T−t) − (m+ S+(e−m(T−t) − 1))g2h˜+1 n2
)]
−
1
S−(S− −m2)m2
[(
1− e−S−(T−t)
)
(Lh˜− − g1)m22−(
e(T−t)m2−1
)
S−g2h˜−1 n2 +
(
1− e−S−(T−t)
)
m2(Lh˜
−S− − S−g1 − g2h˜−1 n2)
]}
The expression for the volatility of the instantaneous forward rates implied by the model, σf (t, T ),
is obtained by applying Ito’s lemma for convex functions (Tanaka-Meyer formula, see for example
Karatzas and Shreve (1991), Theorem 7.1) to the instantaneous forward rate −∂ logP (t,T )∂T . According
to this formula, we have
|Y 1 − Y1(T )| = |Y 1 − Y1(t)|+
∫ T
t
sgn(Y 1 − Y1(s))dY1(s) +
∫ T
t
1Y1(s)=Y 1(n
2
1 + q
2)ds
The diffusion component of the instantaneous forward rate is thus given by the vector−n1 (∂B(t,T )∂T + sgn(Y 1 − Y1(t))∂D(t,T )∂T )− n2 ∂B(t,T )∂T
−q
(
∂B(t,T )
∂T + sgn(Y 1 − Y1(t))∂D(t,T )∂T
) 
Therefore
dVar
(
d
(
−∂ logP (t,T )∂T
))
dt
=
[
n1
(
∂B(t, T )
∂T
+ sgn(Y 1 − Y1(t))∂D(t, T )
∂T
)
+ n2
∂B(t, T )
∂T
]2
+
q2
(
∂B(t, T )
∂T
+ sgn(Y 1 − Y1(t))∂D(t, T )
∂T
)2
from which the expression reported in the main text for the absolute volatility follows. In particular,
the partial derivatives ∂B(t,T )∂T ,
∂C(t,T )
∂T and
∂D(t,T )
∂T are easily computed from the expressions above.
108
Proof of Proposition 11
The HBJ equation (??) becomes in this case:
1
2
n2Y VY Y +
(
n2
4
+mY − n
√
2 η
√
Y
)
VY +
(
g0 + g1Y − 1
2
l2Y − l
√
2 η
√
Y
)
−δV (Y ) = 0 (2.41)
Standard separation of variables leads to the solution reported in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 12
In light of the dynamics specified for the state variables and the technological returns (??, ??), the
equilibrium interest rate process is r(t) =
(
g1 − l2
)
Y − l√2η√Y (see Proposition ). According to
Proposition ??, the price of a zero coupon bond with time to maturity τ = T −t solves the boundary
value problem :
− Pτ (τ, Y ) + 1
2
n2Y PY Y (τ, Y ) +
(
n2
4
+ (m− nl)Y − n
√
2 η
√
Y
)
PY (τ, Y )
+
[
(g1 − l2)Y − l
√
2 η
√
Y
]
P (τ, Y ) = 0 (2.42)
with the boundary condition P (0, Y ) = 1. The ansatz P (τ, Y ) = exp
(
A(τ) +B(τ)Y + C(τ)
√
Y
)
allows to invoke a standard separation of variables argument, according to which the coefficients
A(τ), B(τ) and C(τ) are solutions of the following ordinary differential equations
dB(τ)
dτ
=
n2
2
B(τ)2 + (m− nl)B(τ)− (g1 − l2) A(0) = 0
dC(τ)
dτ
= C(τ)
(
m− nl
2
− n
2
2
B(τ)
)
−
√
2η (nB(τ)− l) B(0) = 0
dA(τ)
dτ
=
n2
8
C(τ)2 +
n2
4
B(τ)− n
2
√
2ηC(τ) C(0) = 0
Under the assumption (m− nl)2 + 2n2(g1 − l2) > 0 the solutions of these ODEs are those reported
in the Proposition.
In order to clarify the sign of the coefficient C(τ), which is responsible for the the first order effect
of the instantaneous entropy bound η, we need to implement a phase-plane analysis. Consider first
the evolutionary equation of B(τ). The stationary points of this coefficient are, for each τ
Bu =
−d+ α
n2
> 0 Bd =
−d− α
n2
< 0
where d = m − nl and α =
√
d2 + 2n2(g1 − l2). The statements about the signs of the stationary
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points hold under the reasonable assumption d > 0. Since
dB(τ)
dτ
< 0 ⇐⇒ B(τ) ∈ [Bd, Bu]
and B(0) = 0 we conclude that B(τ) < 0.
Consider now the evolutionary equation of the coefficient C(τ). Quite clearly
dC(τ)
dτ
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ C(τ) ≥
√
2η
nB(τ)− l
d
2 − n
2
2 B(τ)
:= F (τ)
Notice that C(0) = 0 > −2√2η l/d = F (0), therefore dC(τ)dτ > 0 in τ = 0. Now
dF (τ)
dτ
=
2
√
2η n (d− ln)dB(τ)dτ(
d
2 − n
2
2 B(τ)
)2 < 0
under the assumption d − ln = m − 2ln > 0, so that we may conclude by a simple limit argument
that 0 < F (τ) < C(τ) for any τ and that dC(τ)dτ > 0, so that C(τ) > 0.
Alternative argument, which actually allows to drop the assumption m− 2ln > 0
By variation of constants we know that the solution of the ordinary differential equation satisfied
by the coefficient C(τ) may be
C(τ) = e
R
τ
0
d−n2B(s)
2 ds
∫ τ
0
e
R
s
0
d−n2B(u)
2 du
√
2η (l − nB(s)) ds
This suggests that
B(s) <
l
n
=⇒ C(τ) > 0 ∀s > 0
but B(s) < 0, ∀s > 0 therefore the first condition is always verified and C(τ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 13
Taking into account that 〈Y1, Y2〉 (t) = 0, the HBJ equation (??) reads:
1
2
e2Y1VY1 Y1 +
1
2
f2Y2VY2 Y2 + (a+ cY1)VY1
+
(
f2
4
+ dY2 − f
√
Y2
√
2η
)
VY2 +
[
αY1 +
(
β − σ
2
2
)
Y2 − σρ
√
2 η
√
Y2
]
− δV = 0 (2.43)
This problem is clearly additively separable. The solution follows by a standard separation of
variables argument:
V (Y1, Y2) = A+B Y2 + C
√
Y2 + E Y1
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A =
1
δ
 aα
−c+ δ +
f2
(
β − σ22
)
4 (d− δ) +
f η
(
2 f β + 2 d σ − 2 δ σ − f σ2)
(d− 2 δ) (d− δ)

B =
1
d− δ
(
β − σ
2
2
)
C = −
√
2η
(
2 f β + 2 d σ − 2 δ σ − f σ2)
(d− 2 δ) (d− δ)
E =
α
δ − c
As of the initial value problem satisfied by the price of the zero coupon bond
Pτ +
1
2
e2Y1PY1 Y1 +
1
2
f2Y2PY2 Y2 + (a+ cY1)PY1 +
(
f2
4
+ (d− σρf)Y2 − f
√
Y2
√
2η
)
PY2+[
αY1 +
(
β − σ2)Y2 − σρ√2 η√Y2]P = 0 (2.44)
P (0) = 1, the separability of this equation exploited for the solution of the corresponding HBJ
equation, coupled with the solution of the one-dimensional case, suggests that an exponentially
affine form the state variables Y1, Y2,
√
Y2 achieves the desired separation of variables and yields a
system of ordinary differential equations for the coefficients, solutions of which are those reported
in the text.
Options on zeros in a one factor affine model with constant degree of pessimism
In order to characterize the solution of our zero-th order model, m0 =
n2
4 , it is convenient to apply
the change of variable X =
√
Y . Let C(t,X, T, s,K) denote the price in t of a call option with
strike K and expiration T on a zero coupon bond with maturity s. The standard valuation principle
dictates that:
C(t,X, T, s,K) = E
[
ξh∗(T )
ξh∗(t)
[
P (T, s,X)−K]+∣∣∣∣Ft] = P (t, T,X)ET [(P (T, s,X)−K)1M∣∣Ft]
where
M = {X ∈ R : P (T, s,X)−K ≥ 0} ≡ {X ∈ R : B(s− T )X2 + C(s− T )X ≥ log( K
A(s− T )
)}
and ET [ · ] denotes expectation with respect to the forward neutral measure31. According to the
(2.26), (2.27) and the change of numeraire toolkit, the dynamics of the sta te variable under this
31Jamshidian (1991), Geman and Rochet (1995)
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measure are32
dX(t) =
1
2
[(
m− n2B(T − t)) X − nl√2η − n2
2
C(T − t)
]
dt+
n
2
dZT (t) (2.45)
with ZT (t) = Z(t) +
∫ t
0
n
2 (2B(T − t)X + C(T − t))ds a standard brownian motion under the new
measure. It is easy to infer from33 (2.45) that the forward-neutral transition density of the state
variable is equal to a Gaussian density function with mean and variance given respectively by (T > t)
M(t, T ) = X(t)e−
R
T
t
m−n2B(T−u)
2 du −
∫ T
t
e−
R
s
t
m−n2B(T−u)
2 du
(
nl
√
2η
2
+
n2C(T − s)
4
)
ds(2.46)
S(t, T ) =
n2
4
∫ T
t
e−2
R
s
t
m−n2B(T−u)
2 duds (2.47)
Since the bond price process satisfies the following SDE
dP (t, T ) = r(t)P (t, T )dt+ P (t, T )(2B(T − t)X + C(T − t))n
2
dZ(t)
Ito’s lemma yields the following representation under the T-forward measure for the forward price
with delivery in T of the zero coupon bond that expires in s:
dPF (t, T, s) = d
(
P (t, s)
P (t, T )
)
= PF (t, T, s) [2(B(s− t)−B(T − t))X + C(T − t)− C(s− t)] dZT (t)
(2.48)
with solution (T > u > t)
PF (u, T, s) = PF (t, T, s)E
(∫ u
t
(2(B(s− τ)−B(T − τ))X + C(T − τ)− C(s− τ))dZT (τ)
)
where E is the usual stochastic exponential. The PT -martingale 34 PF ( · ) may therefore serve as
density process for the equivalent change of probability measure35
dPs
dPT
= E
(∫ T
0
(2(B(s− τ)−B(T − τ))X + C(T − τ)− C(s− τ))dZT (τ)
)
32notice that Ito’s lemma applied to P (t, T ) gives
dP (t, T ) = r(t)P (t, T )dt+ P (t, T )(2B(T − t)X + C(T − t))n
2
dZ(t)
33The solution of this SDE reads
X(t) = e
R t
0
m−n2B(T−s)
2
ds
»
X(0)−
Z t
0
e−
R s
0
m−n2B(T−u)
2
du
„
nl
√
2η
2
+
n2C(T − s)
4
«
ds+
Z t
0
e−
R s
0
m−n2B(T−u)
2
du n
2
dZT
–
34By direct computation (similar to those leading to the bond pricing formula) one easily checks that the Novikov
condition
ET
»
exp
„
1
2
Z t
0
(2(B(s− τ)−B(T − τ))X + C(T − τ)− C(s− τ)))2 dτ
«–
<∞
is indeed satisfied.
35This measure is the restriction to the sigma-field FT of the s-forward measure. See Musiela and Rutkowski (1997).
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According to Girsanov theorem, the process
Zs(t) = ZT (t)−
∫ t
0
(2(B(s− τ)−B(T − τ))X + C(T − τ)− C(s− τ))dτ
is a Ps− standard brownian motion, therefore under the new probability measure the transition
density of the state variable is still Gaussian with mean and variance given by (T > t)
M˜(t, T ) = X(t)e−
R
T
t
m−n2B(s−u)
2 du −
∫ T
t
e−
R
τ
t
m−n2B(s−u)
2 du
(
nl
√
2η
2
+
n2C(s− τ)
4
)
dτ(2.49)
S˜(t, T ) =
n2
4
∫ T
t
e−2
R
τ
t
m−n2B(s−u)
2 dudτ (2.50)
Finally
C(t,X, T, s,K) = P (t, T )ET
[(
P (T, s)−K)1M∣∣Ft]
= P (t, T )ET [PF (T, T, s)1M| Ft]− P (t, T )KPT ((X(T ) ≤ Xl) ∪ (X(T ) ≥ Xu)| Ft)
= P (t, s)ET
[
dPs
dPT
∣∣∣∣
Ft
1M
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− P (t, T )KPT ((X(T ) ≤ Xl) ∪ (X(T ) ≥ Xu)| Ft)
= P (t, s)Ps((X(T ) ≤ Xl) ∪ (X(T ) ≥ Xu)| Ft)−
P (t, T )KPT ((X(T ) ≤ Xl) ∪ (X(T ) ≥ Xu)| Ft)
= P (t, s)
1−
Φ
Xu − M˜(t, T )√
S˜(t, T )
− Φ
Xl − M˜(t, T )√
S˜(t, T )
−
KP (t, T )
[
1−
(
Φ
(
Xu −M(t, T )√
S(t, T )
)
− Φ
(
Xl −M(t, T )√
S(t, T )
))]
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The coefficient A(T-t) of the yield to maturity under one factor (??) with state depen-
dent pessimism
Here is the form of A(T − t)
A(T−t) = −
Y m1
−2n θ arctanh
 (n θ +m1)2 tanh( t
√
2n2 b(k)+(n θ+m1)
2
2 )√(
(n θ +m1)
2
(
2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)
2
))
 √2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)2+
(
n t θ − log(2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)2) + log(n2 b(k)
(
1 + cosh(t
√
2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)
2
)
)
+ (n θ +m1)
2
)
)
×√(
(n θ +m1)
2
(
2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)
2
))
+
m1
−2 arctanh
 (n θ +m1)2 tanh( t
√
2n2 b(k)+(n θ+m1)
2
2 )√(
(n θ +m1)
2
(
2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)
2
))
 √2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)2+
t
√(
(n θ +m1)
2
(
2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)
2
)))))(
n2
√(
(n θ +m1)
2
(
2n2 b(k) + (n θ +m1)
2
)))−1
Worked-out examples of time varying pessimism
One state variable
It suffices to consider the case of two Brownian motions with instantaneous correlation ρ, the general
case being qualitatively identical.
W.l.o.g. ,
√
Y
(
lρdZh1 + l
√
1− ρ2dZh2
)
and n
√
Y dZh1 are, respectively, the diffusion components of
the technology and the state variable, whereas m1(Y −Y ) is the drift of the state variable; therefore
m0 = m1Y in what follows. If the entropy constraint takes the form h
′ · h ≤ 2η
Y
Y , then optimal
Girsanov kernels are :
h∗1 =
√
2η
Y
Y
lρ− nVY√
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2)
h∗2 =
√
2η
Y
Y
l
√
1− ρ2√
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2)
and the HBJ equation we have to solve is
(m0 −m1Y )VY − Y
√
2η
Y
√
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2) + n
2Y
2
VY Y − Y
(
g1 − l
2
2
)
− δV = 0
Let us consider the solution V of the following ordinary differential equation
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2)− k2 = 0
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with k constant to be determined. This solution reads
V (Y ) = Y
(
ρ l −√k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2)
n
+ C
where C is a constant to be determined as well. Substituting into the HBJ equation we obtain
Y
(
l2
2
−
√
2η
Y
k − β
n
(
ρ l −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
)
− g1 −
(
ρ l −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
) m1
n
)
−(
β C −
(
ρ l −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
) m0
n
)
= 0
Therefore setting
C =
(
ρ l −√k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2) m0
nβ
and k solution of the quadratic equation
l2
2
−
√
2η
Y
k − β
n
(
ρ l −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
)
− g1 −
(
ρ l −
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
) m1
n
= 0 (2.51)
the function V (Y ) solves the ODE. The optimal Girsanov kernels are
h∗1 =
√
2ηY
Y
√
k2 − (−1 + ρ2) l2
k
h∗2 =
√
2ηY
Y
l
√
1− ρ2
k
Geometric Ornstein Uhlenbeck
In this case a similar analysis holds provided we impose the following state dependent instantaneous
entropy constraint:
h′ · h ≤ 2ηY 2
Optimal controls are
h∗1 = Y
√
2η
lρ− nVY√
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2)
h∗2 = Y
√
2η
l
√
1− ρ2√
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2)
and the HBJ equation is (we keep the same parameters)
(m0 +m1Y )VY − Y 2
√
2η
√
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2) + n
2Y 2
2
VY Y − g1Y − l
2
2
Y 2 − δV = 0
115
Let us consider the solution V of the following ordinary differential equation
(lρ− nVY )2 + l2(1− ρ2)− (λVY − k)2 = 0
with k and λ constants to be determined. This solution reads
V (Y ) =
(
λ k − nρ l +
√
n2k2 − 2nλ k ρ l + (n2(1− ρ2) + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2
)
λ2 − n2 Y + C
where C is a constant to be determined as well. Substituting into the HBJ equation we easily
separate variables and conclude that with
C =
m0
(
λ k − nρ l +√n2k2 − 2nλ k ρ l + (n2(1− ρ2) + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2)
(λ2 − n2)δ
and (k, λ) solution of the following system of quadratic equations
λ
√
2η
(
λ k − nρ l +√n2k2 − 2nλ k ρ l + (n2(1− ρ2) + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2)
(λ2 − n2) − k
√
2η +
l2
2
= 0
−
β
(
λ k − nρ l +√n2k2 − 2nλ k ρ l + (n2(1− ρ2) + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2)
λ2 − n2
− g1 +(
λ k − nρ l +√n2k2 − 2nλ k ρ l + (n2(1− ρ2) + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2) m1
λ2 − n2 = 0(2.52)
the function V (Y ) solves the ODE.
An additional example
The HBJ equation arising in this case is
(m0 +m1Y − nκ1
√
Y )VY −
√
2η Y
√
(σρ− VY )2 − l2(1− ρ2) + n
2Y
2
VY Y−
Y
(
g1 − l
2
2
)
+ l
√
Y (κ1ρ+ κ2
√
1− ρ2)− δV = 0 (2.53)
We can provide an explicit solution for this equation along the lines of the previous examples.
Let us consider the solution V of the following ordinary differential equation
(lρ− VY )2 − l2(1− ρ2)− (λVY − k)2 = 0
with k and λ constants to be determined. This solution reads
V (Y ) =
(
λ k − ρ l +
√
k2 − 2λ k ρ l + (1− ρ2 + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2
)
λ2 − 1 Y + C
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where C is a constant to be determined as well. Substituting into the HBJ equation we easily
separate variables and conclude that with
C =
m0
(
λ k − ρ l +
√
k2 − 2λ k ρ l + (1− ρ2 + λ2 (−1 + 2 ρ2)) l2
)
(λ2 − 1)δ
and (k, λ) solution of the following system of quadratic equations
λ
√
2η
“
λ k−ρ l+
√
k2−2λ k ρ l+(1−ρ2+λ2 (−1+2 ρ2)) l2
”
(λ2−1) − k
√
2η+
nκ1
“
λ k−ρ l+
√
k2−2λ k ρ l+(1−ρ2+λ2 (−1+2 ρ2)) l2
”
(λ2−1) − σ(κ1ρ+ κ2
√
1− ρ2) = 0
−
(
β
“
λ k−ρ l+
√
k2−2λ k ρ l+(1−ρ2+λ2 (−1+2 ρ2)) l2
”
−1+λ2
)
− g1+“
λ k−ρ l+
√
k2−2λ k ρ l+(1−ρ2+λ2 (−1+2 ρ2)) l2
”
m1
−1+λ2 = 0
(2.54)
the function V (Y ) solves the ODE.
Multidimensional Extensions
Multidimensional extension of the previous examples are promptly obtained for those specifications
where the problem displays a separable structure (similarly to Longstaff & Schwartz (1992)). We
have k state variables Yi and uncertainty is driven by a (k + 1)-dimensional standard Brownian
motion Z(t). For the model described in (??) and its extension outlined in the previous section, this
amounts to choosing the diagonal matrices U and R driving the state-dependence of volatilities in
the following way:
u0i = r0i = 0 ri = ui = u i = 1, 2 . . . k + 1
Therefore U = R = (u · Y )Ik+1 In what follows we will give details of the three cases whose one-
dimensional analog has been treated.
Extended affine dynamics
We remind that the reference probability measure under which the relevant coefficients are affine
in the state variables has been changed to Q by means of a the constant Girsanov kernel κ =
(κ1 κ2 . . . κk+1). It is easy to see that optimal controls are:
h∗(t) =
√
2η
−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′√
(−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)′ (−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)
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and the corresponding Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equation for the infinite-time horizon case reads
(in the notation introduced in (??)):
∇V (Y )′(M0 +M1 Y −
√
u · Y Nκ)−
√
2η(u · Y )
√
(−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)′ (−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′) +
(u · Y )
2
trace
[
N ′∇2V (Y )N]− βV (Y )− (g0 + g1 · Y −√u · Y L · κ− (u · Y )
2
LL′
)
= 0
The solution of the PDE above is then additively separable:
V (Y ) = C +
k∑
i=1
vi(Yi)
Let vi(Yi) solve the ordinary differential equation
(
k+1∑
j=1
n2ij)v
′
i(Yi)
2 − 2 v′i(Yi)(
k+1∑
j=1
nij lj) + l
2
i − (Kiv′i(Yi)−Hi) = 0
with Hi and Ki constants to be determined. The solution is
vi(Yi) = Ci +
Yi
(
2(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj) + Ki −
√
(2
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj +Ki)
2 − 4(∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi + l2i ))
2
∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
substituting the last solutions into the equation and separating variables we conclude that with
C =
k∑
i=1
Ci =
1
β
k∑
i=1
m0i
(
2(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj) + Ki −
√
(2
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj +Ki)
2 − 4(∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi + l2i ))
2
∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
−g0
and (H =
∑k
i=1Hi, K1, K2 . . .Kk) solving the nonlinear system of k+1 equations in k+1 unknowns
√
2η
√
lk+1 −
∑k
p=1
∑k
p 6=q=1(
∑k+1
j=1 npjnqj)bp(Kp, Hp)bq(Kq, Hq) +
∑k
i=1Kibi(Ki, Hi)−H + (N − L) · κ = 0
−LL′u′ + g′1 + βb(K,H)−M ′1b(K,H) = 0
where b(K,H) = (b1(K1, H1), b2(K2, H2), . . . bk(Kk, Hk))
′ and
bi(Ki, Hi) =
2(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj) + Ki −
√
(2
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj +Ki)
2 − 4(∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi + l2i )
2
∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
the function V (Y ) solves the partial differential equation
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Affine dynamics with state-dependent constraint
The constraint on the entropy’s instantaneous rate of growth becomes
h′ · h ≤ 2η(u · Y ) (2.55)
In light of this, the optimal Girsanov kernels are
h∗(t) =
√
(2η)(u · Y ) −N
′∇V (Y ) + L′√
(−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)′ (−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)
whereas the corresponding Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equation for the infinite-time horizon case reads
(in the notation introduced in (??)):
∇V (Y )′(M0 +M1 Y )− (u · Y )
√
2η
√
(−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)′ (−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′) +
(u · Y )
2
trace
[
N ′∇2V (Y )N]− βV (Y )− (g0 + g1 · Y − (u · Y )
2
LL′
)
= 0 (2.56)
The solution of the PDE above is in fact then additively separable:
V (Y ) = C +
k∑
i=1
vi(Yi)
Let vi(Yi) solve the ordinary differential equation
(
k+1∑
j=1
n2ij)v
′
i(Yi)
2 − 2 v′i(Yi)(
k+1∑
j=1
nij lj) + l
2
i −Hi = 0
with Hi constant to be determined. The solution is
vi(Yi) = Ci +
Yi
(
(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj)−
√
(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj)
2 − (∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi − l2i ))∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
substituting the last solutions into the equation and separating variables we conclude that with
C =
k∑
i=1
Ci =
1
β
k∑
i=1
m0i
(
(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj)−
√
(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj)
2 − (∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi − l2i ))∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
− g0
and (H1, H2 . . . Hk) solving the nonlinear system of k equations in k unknowns
u′
√
2η
√√√√lk+1 − k∑
p=1
k∑
p 6=q=1
(
k+1∑
j=1
npjnqj)bp(Kp, Hp)bq(Kq, Hq) +
k∑
i=1
Hi−LL′u′+g′1+βb(H)−M ′1b(H) = 0
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where b(H) = (b1(H1), b2(H2), . . . bk(Hk))
′ and
bi(Hi) =
(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj)−
√
(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj)
2 − (∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi − l2i )∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
the function V (Y ) solves the partial differential equation.
Geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck with state-dependent constraint
As for the previous case we have to modify the constraint on the entropy’s instantaneous rate of
growth:
h′ · h ≤ 2η(u · Y )2
Keeping in mind that in the current setting:
σ(Y ) = LU2(Y )L′ Ξ(Y ) = NR2(Y )N ′
and L = U = (u · Y )Ik+1, the optimal Girsanov kernels are
h∗(t) = (u · Y )
√
2η
−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′√
(−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)′ (−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)
whereas the corresponding Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equation for the infinite-time horizon case reads
(in the notation introduced in (??)):
∇V (Y )′(M0 +M1 Y )− (u · Y )2
√
2η
√
(−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′)′ (−N ′∇V (Y ) + L′) +
(u · Y )2
2
trace
[
N ′∇2V (Y )N]− βV (Y )− (g0 + g1 · Y − (u · Y )2
2
LL′
)
= 0
Not surprisingly the solution of the PDE above is again additively separable:
V (Y ) = C +
k∑
i=1
vi(Yi)
Let vi(Yi) solve the ordinary differential equation
(
k+1∑
j=1
n2ij)v
′
i(Yi)
2 − 2 v′i(Yi)(
k+1∑
j=1
nij lj) + l
2
i − (Kiv′i(Yi)−Hi) = 0
with Hi and Ki constants to be determined. The solution is
vi(Yi) = Ci +
Yi
(
2(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj) + Ki −
√
(2
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj +Ki)
2 − 4(∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi + l2i ))
2
∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
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substituting the last solutions into the equation and separating variables we conclude that with
C =
k∑
i=1
Ci =
1
β
k∑
i=1
m0i
(
2(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj) + Ki −
√
(2
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj +Ki)
2 − 4(∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi + l2i ))
2
∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
−g0
and (H =
∑k
i=1Hi, K1, K2 . . .Kk) solving the nonlinear system of k+1 equations in k+1 unknowns
√
2η
√
lk+1 −
∑k
p=1
∑k
p 6=q=1(
∑k+1
j=1 npjnqj)bp(Kp, Hp)bq(Kq, Hq) +
∑k
i=1Kibi(Ki, Hi)−H − LL′u′ = 0
g′1 + βb(K,H)−M ′1b(K,H) = 0
where b(K,H) = (b1(K1, H1), b2(K2, H2), . . . bk(Kk, Hk))
′ and
bi(Ki, Hi) =
2(
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj) + Ki −
√
(2
∑k+1
j=1 nij lj +Ki)
2 − 4(∑k+1j=1 n2ij) (Hi + l2i )
2
∑k+1
j=1 n
2
ij
the function V (Y ) solves the partial differential equation.
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Appendix B
Constant degree of pessimism: an additional example
In order to analyze a widely used factor specification which is not included in (??), we discuss here
a one factor model whose returns on the technology and state variable display geometric Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck dynamics:
α(Y ) = g0 + g1Y ; σ(Y ) = lY ; Λ(Y ) = m(Y −m0) ; Ξ(Y ) = nY (2.57)
Without loss of generality, we set g0 = 0. As was the case for the previous examples, we will succeed
in solving the model for a particular specification within the chosen class and afterwards rely on
perturbation theory to gain further insight. Our ’zero-th order’ specification is indeed interesting
and widely used in its turn: Y follows a geometric brownian motion, that is, m0 = 0.
The methods needed to attack the HBJ equation arising from the agents’ consumption-investment
problem are similar to those involved in the bond pricing equation, the relevant difference being the
non-homogeneity to be treated along the lines of the previous model; a similar consideration applies
to the perturbation analysis, therefore we concentrate on the latter problem and briefly mention the
solution of the former.
The equilibrium short rate is given by :
r(t) =
(
g1 − l
√
2η
)
Y − l2 Y 2
whereas the market price of risk is an affine function of Y :
θh∗(t) = l Y +
√
2 η
Although the short rate is a quadratic form in the state variable, the dynamics of the latter under
the risk neutral measure, that is
dY =
[
(m− n
√
2η)Y + l n Y 2
]
dt+ nY dZ∗(t)
prevents the model from falling into the exponential quadratic class studied, for instance, in Leippold
and Wu (2002). Let us then consider the fundamental bond pricing equation and apply the change
of variables X = (2/n2)Y and u = (n2/2)τ
− Pu(u,X) +X2PXX(u,X) +
(
2(m− n√2η)
n2
X − l nX2
)
PX(u,X)
−
[(
g1 − l
√
2η
)
X − n
2 l2
2
X2
]
P (u,X) = 0 (2.58)
with P (0, X) = 1. If we consider a solution of the form P (u,X) = F (u,X) + G(X), then direct
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substitution mandates that the summands on the r.h.s. solve
X2GXX(u,X)+
(
2(m− n√2η)
n2
X − l nX2
)
GX(u,X)−
[(
g1 − l
√
2η
)
X − n
2 l2
2
X2
]
G(u,X) = 0
and
− Fu(u,X) +X2FXX(u,X) +
(
2(m− n√2η)
n2
X − l nX2
)
FX(u,X)
−
[(
g1 − l
√
2η
)
X − n
2 l2
2
X2
]
F (u,X) = 0
F (0, X) = 1−G(X).
In order to solve the first (ordinary) differential equation, we cast it into the confluent hypergeometric
equation
zf ′′(z) + (γ − z)f ′(z) + αf(z) = 0
by means of the ansatz G(X) = eg(X)Xsf(X), for suitable g(X) and s, and the change of variable
z = nl(1− 2i)X; eventually we obtain:
G(X) = e
(1−i)nl
2 XH1
(−(g1 + l√2η)
nl(1− 2i) −
(m− 2n√2η)
n2
(1− i)
(1− 2i) ,
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
, nl(1− 2i)X
)
where H1( · ) is the confluent first order hypergeometric function.
As of the second (partial) differential equation, we may separate the variables as F (u,X) = p(u)q(X)
and without loss of generality choose as constant of separation
−1
4
(
1− 2(m− 2n
√
2η)
n2
+ φ
)2
+
1
4
(
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
− 1
)2
for a parameter φ ∈ R. We obtain
F (u,X) = e
(1−i)nl
2 X×∫
R
H1
(−(g1 + l√2η)
nl(1− 2i) −
(m− 2n√2η)
n2
(1− i)
(1− 2i) +
φ i
1− 2i ,
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
, nl(1− 2i)X
)
×
X
φ
2 e
»
− 14
“
1− 2(m−2n
√
2η)
n2
+φ
”2
+ 14
“
2(m−2n√2η)
n2
−1
”2–
u
µ∗(φ) dφ
where µ∗(φ) is determined by the initial condition F (0, X) = 1−G(X) and therefore solves
∫
R
H1
(−(g1 + l√2η)
nl(1− 2i) −
(m− 2n√2η)
n2
(1− i)
(1− 2i) +
φ i
1− 2i ,
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
, nl(1− 2i)X
)
×
X
φ
2 µ(φ) dφ = e−
(1−i)nl
2 X−
H1
(−(g1 + l√2η)
nl(1− 2i) −
(m− 2n√2η)
n2
(1− i)
(1− 2i) ,
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
, nl(1− 2i)X
)
(2.59)
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Let us summarize this solution in the following proposition.
Proposition 15 Let the return on the production opportunity evolve according to (2.57) and the
state variable Y be described by a geometric brownian motion process. Then the price of a zero-
coupon bond with time to maturity τ is given by the following function:
P (τ, Y ) = F (τ, Y ) +G(Y )
F (u,X) = e
(1−i)nl
n2
Y×∫
R
H1
(−(g1 + l√2η)
nl(1− 2i) −
(m− 2n√2η)
n2
(1− i)
(1− 2i) +
φ i
1− 2i ,
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
,
2l(1− 2i)
n
Y
)
×
(
2Y
n2
)
φ
2 e
»
− 14
“
1− 2(m−2n
√
2η)
n2
+φ
”2
+ 14
“
2(m−2n√2η)
n2
−1
”2–
n2
2 τ
µ∗(φ) dφ
G(Y ) = e
(1−i)nl
n2
Y×
H1
(−(g1 + l√2η)
nl(1− 2i) −
(m− 2n√2η)
n2
(1− i)
(1− 2i) +
φ i
1− 2i ,
2(m− 2n√2η)
n2
,
2l(1− 2i)
n
Y
)
where µ∗(φ) is given implicitly by (2.59).
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Appendix C
In this Appendix36 we relax the assumption of a logarithmic felicity function for the representative
investor, which enhanced our chances of accomplishing explicit insights into equilibrium quantities.
We assume a finite time horizon [0, T ] and neglect discounting at the rate δ. We briefly remind that
we consider a range of absolutely continuous probability measures assumed to be likely data gener-
ating processes. According to Girsanov theorem Zh(t) = Z(t) +
∫ t
0
h(s)ds is a standard brownian
motion under the model contamination Ph( · ) = E[E(− ∫ h dZ)1( · )]. Admissibility of Ph is defined
by means of the instantaneous entropy bound 12h
′h ≤ 2η(Y ) on the Girsanov kernel, and under any
such belief the opportunity set is posited to follow the dynamics (??).With
Σ(Y ) =
[
σ(Y )
ϑ(Y )
]
1×(k+1)
k×(k+1)
and
θh = Σ(Y )
−1
(
α− r
β − r 1k
)
+ h
the state-price density ξh(t) is governed by the SDE
dξh(t)
ξh(t)
= −r(t)dt− θh(Y )dZ(t)
Consider the budget constraint
ξh(t)W (t) +
∫ t
0
ξh(s)c(s)ds = x+
∫ t
0
W (s)ξh(s) [Σ(Y )
′pi(s)− θh(Y )]′ · dZ(s) (2.60)
The l.h.s. of (2.60) is clearly a positive P - local martingale37, hence a P -supermartingale, there-
fore for every consumption plan c(t) satisfying (2.60) (for some pi(t)) within an admissible model
contamination, we have:
E
[∫ T
0
ξh(s)c(s)ds
]
≤ E
[
ξh(T )W (T ) +
∫ T
0
ξh(s)c(s)ds
]
≤ x (2.61)
Conversely, it can be shown that if
E
[∫ T
0
ξh(s)c(s)ds
]
= x
then there exists a strategy pi(t) such that c(t) satisfies (2.60); therefore the latter admits the static
formulation (2.61) and the ambiguity averse representative investor solves the max-min expected
36See Cox and Huang (1988), Pliska (1986) or Karatzas, Lehoczky and Shreve (1987) for details on the martingale
approach to consumption-investment problems. The derivation of the hedging demand component of optimal portfolio
based on Malliavin calculus can be found, for instance, in Karatzas and Shreve (1998) and especially Detemple, Garcia
and Rindisbacher (2003)
37In order to rule out doubling strategies, following Dybvig and Huang (1988) we require the nonnegativity of the
corresponding wealth process for a pi to be admissible.
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utility maximization:
sup
c , pi
inf
h: (h′·h≤2η(Y ))
E
[∫ T
0
U( c(s) )ds
]
(2.62)
s.t. E
[∫ T
0
ξh(s)c(s)ds
]
≤ x
Once we interchange the order of maximization and minimization in (2.62) we realize that stan-
dard Lagrangian theory mandates the following condition for the innermost consumption-investment
problem:
c∗(t) = I (ψξh(t)) (2.63)
where I( · ) denotes inverse marginal utility and ψ is the unique positive Lagrange multiplier such
that x = E
[∫ T
0
ξh(s)I (ψξh(s)) ds
]
.
By definition of financial wealth
ξh(t)W (t) = E
[∫ T
t
ξh(s)I (ψξh(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(2.64)
therefore, if f˜(t, T ) denotes the Levy-martingale E
[∫ T
0
ξh(s)I (ψξh(s)) ds
∣∣∣Ft], then
ξh(t)W (t) +
∫ t
0
ξh(s)I (ψξh(s)) ds = f˜(t, T )
and we just need to compare the l.h.s. of (2.60) with the stochastic integral representation of f˜(t, T ),
df˜(t, T ) = φ(t)′dZh, and recall the uniqueness of the (special) semimartingale representation, to
conclude
pi(t) = Σ(Y )′−1 θh(Y ) + Σ(Y )′−1
φ(t)
W (t)ξh(t)
(2.65)
The first of the following chain of equalities is dictated by the Clark-Hansmann-Ocone formula. Dt ·
denotes the Malliavin differential operator.
φ(t) = Dt f˜(t, T )
= E
[∫ T
t
Dt [ξh(s)I (ψξh(s))] ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= E
[∫ T
t
[
ψξh(s)
∂2U(I(ψξh(s)))
∂y2
+ I (ψξh(s))
]
Dt ξh(s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
But the chain rule for Malliavin calculus mandates, for s > t
Dt ξh(s) = −θ′h(Y ) ξh(s)−H(t, s)′ ξh(s)
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with
H(t, s) =
∫ s
t
Dt
(
rh(u) +
|θh(Y )|2
2
)
du+
∫ s
t
Dtθ′h(Y ) dZh(u)
therefore For R = − Ucc Ucc denoting the (state dependent) coefficient of relative risk aversion, we have
φ(t) = θh(Y ) E
[∫ T
t
[
1
R(s) − 1
]
ξh(s) I (ψξh(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
E
[∫ T
t
[
1
R(s) − 1
]
ξh(s) I (ψξh(s)) H(t, s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= −θh(Y )W (t) ξh(t) + θh(Y ) ξh(t)E
[∫ T
t
1
R(s)ξh(s) I (ψξh(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
E
[∫ T
t
[
1
R(s) − 1
]
ξh(s) I (ψξh(s)) H(t, s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
Upon substitution in (2.65) we obtain the optimal unconstrained (i.e. non equilibrium) policy of the
representative agent
pi(t) = Σ′−1 θh(t)
E
[∫ T
t
1
R(s)ξh(s) I (ψξh(s)) ds
∣∣∣Ft]
ξh(t)W (t)
+
Σ(Y )′−1
E
[∫ T
t
[
1
R(s) − 1
]
ξh(s) I (ψξh(s)) H(t, s) ds
∣∣∣Ft]
ξh(t)W (t)
(2.66)
At this point we have to address both conditions appearing in the definition of the equilibrium by
carrying out the previous consumption-investment program once the trading strategy of our agent
has been constrained to lie in the set dictated by 2).
With b = 1− ω − 1′k v denoting investment in the bond, we have
pi = [1
1×k
0 ]′ ⇐⇒ [b 1×kv ]′ ∈ L ≡ [0 1×k0 ]′
The support function of −L
S(r, β) = sup
[b,v]∈L
− (b r + v′ · β)
is a convex, lower semi-continuous function, finite on its effective domain
L˜ ≡ {(r, β) : δ(r, β) <∞}
In our case, S(r, β) = 0 and L˜ ≡ Rk+1.
In line with the economic intuition about the interest rate process, we assume the latter, hence the
support function, to be essentially bounded. We may then regard the instantaneous expected returns
on the bond (r) and on the financial assets as dynamic Kuhn-Tucker multipliers meant to address
the inability of the agent to exploit these investment opportunities. According to this interpretation,
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the available opportunity set (the linear technology) would be fictitiously completed with securities
(a bond and k financial assets) whose expected returns processes are chosen in such a way that
the representative agent finds it optimal not to exploit them. By means of duality techniques, the
equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium risk premia of any contingent claim in zero net supply
issued in the market, are easily obtained as solutions of the convex control problem
J∗h(x, Y ) = inf
(r,β)∈eL Jh(x, Y ) = inf(r,β)∈eL E
[∫ T
0
U( I (ψξh(s)) )ds
]
(2.67)
s.t. dynamics of Q, S and state variables
whose necessary conditions for optimality, according to the martingale approach, clearly mandate
ω = 1 and v(t) = 01k, 1k being a k-dimensional vector of ones. Denoting by ξ
∗
h(t) the state price
density evaluated at the equilibrium risk premiums of the financial assets (θ∗h(t)), the solution of
J(x, Y ) = inf
h:(h′h≤2k)
J∗h(x, Y ) = inf
h:(h′h≤2k)
E
[∫ T
0
U( I (ψξ∗h(s)) ) ds
]
s.t. dynamics of the state variables
delivers the optimal belief.
Utility from terminal wealth. Felicity of power type.
Let us consider the case in which the representative agent derives utility from the terminal level of
financial wealth and displays a felicity function of power type. According to the previous section we
need to solve
inf
h:h′·h≤2η(Y )
inf
(r,β)
sup
pi∈ R
E
[
W (T )γ − 1
γ
]
subject to the static budget constraint E [ξh(T )W (T )] ≤ x and the dynamics of the state variables un-
der the reference belief. It easy to see that the optimality conditions for the consumption-investment
problem imply c∗ = 0 and
W ∗(T ) = (ψξh(T ))
1
γ−1
where the Lagrange multiplier ψ is identified as
(
x/E
[
ξh(T )
γ
γ−1
])γ−1
. The arguments involved
above may be promptly adapted to derive the analog of (2.66) for the current framework. Using
notation introduced in the previous section we may write
J∗h(x, Y ) = inf
(r,β)∈eL
xγ
γ
(
E
[
ξh(T )
γ
γ−1
] )1−γ
− 1
γ
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If we assume γ ≤ 1 then for any t ∈ [0, T ] the equilibrium interest rate and returns on financial
assets, and the optimal Girsanov kernel h∗ are optimal controls of the program
1
ξh(t)
γ
γ−1
ess inf
h :h′·h≤ 2η(Y )
ess inf
(r,β)∈eLE
[
ξh(T )
γ
γ−1
∣∣∣Ft] = ess inf
h :h′·h≤ 2η(Y )
ess inf
(r,β)∈eLEγ
[
e
R
T
t
“
− γ
γ−1 r(s)+
γ
2(γ−1)2 θ
′
h(s)θh(s)
”
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]
(2.68)
s.t. dY (t) =
[
Λ(Y ) + Ξ(Y )
(
h(t)− γ
γ − 1 θh(t)
)]
dt+ Ξ(Y ) dZγ(t)
where Eγ [·] denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure
P γ( · ) = E
[
E
(∫ T
0
γ
γ − 1θh(s)dZ(s)
)
1( · )
]
and Zγ(t) = Z(t)+
∫ t
0
γ
γ−1θh(s)ds is a standard brownian motion under this measure. Under suitable
regularity conditions on the coefficients the value function of the innermost control problem, say
Ĵh(t, Y ), is a classical solution of the HBJ equation
∂Ĵh
∂t
+ inf
(r,β)∈eL
{[
Λ + Ξ
(
h− γ
γ − 1 θh
)]′
∂Ĵh
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
ΞΞ′
∂Ĵh
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+Ĵh
[
− γ
γ − 1 r +
γ
2(γ − 1)2 θ
′
hθh
]}
= 0 (2.69)
in [0, T )× Rk, with the terminal condition Ĵh(T, Y ) = 1.
Remark. In order to emphasize the impact of model uncertainty, let us briefly consider the non
ambiguity averse case arising when η(Y ) = 0. The equation above then reduces to
∂J
∂t
+ inf
(r,β)∈eL
{[
Λ− Ξ γ
γ − 1 θ
]′
∂J
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
ΞΞ′
∂J
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+ J
[
− γ
γ − 1 r +
γ
2(γ − 1)2 θ
′θ
]}
= 0
(2.70)
where θ = θh− h. Formal minimization of the expression within curly brackets leads to (recall from
(??) in Appendix A the definitions of f and σ)
γ
γ−1 1
′
k+1Σ
−1 ′Ξ′ ∂J∂Y − J γ(γ−1)2 1
′
k+1Σ
−1 ′θ = γγ−1 J
γ
γ−1
[
σ
σ f
f
]′
Ξ′ ∂J∂Y − J γ(γ−1)2
[
σ
σ f
f
]′
θ = 01k
In light of the partitioned form of Σ−1, the first equation implies, as a consequence of the remaining
k s38
Σ−1
′
Ξ′
1
J
∂J
∂Y
− 1
γ − 1Σ
−1 ′θ =
[
1
01k
]
38In light of 2.66 this equations imply that in equilibrium the representative investor should not invest either in the
financial assets or in the money market.
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or, after simple passages
θ =
(
Ξ′
1
J
∂J
∂Y
− σ′
)
(γ − 1) (2.71)
We have obtained the following proposition
Proposition 16 In the equilibrium economy populated by a representative agent with power utility,
no ambiguity aversion, maximizing utility from terminal wealth and facing the opportunity set (??),
the equilibrium interest rate and instantaneous excess returns on financial assets are given in terms
of the value function J by
r = α+
(
σ σ′ − σ Ξ′ 1
J
∂J
∂Y
)
(γ − 1) (2.72)
β − r1k =
(
ϑσ′ − ϑΞ′ 1
J
∂J
∂Y
)
(1− γ)
Proof. Just rewrite (2.71) as [
α− r
β − r1k
]
= Σ
(
Ξ′
1
J
∂J
∂Y
− σ′
)
(γ − 1)
and recall Σ’s block form (2.5). 2
Substitution of (2.71) and (2.72) leads to the nonlinear HBJ equation satisfied by the value function
∂J
∂t
+ [Λ + γΞσ′]′
∂J
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
ΞΞ′
∂J
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
− γ
2
1
J
∂J
∂Y
′
Ξ′Ξ
∂J
∂Y
− J
[
γ
γ − 1 α+
γ
2
σσ′
]
= 0 (2.73)
with J(T, Y ) = 1. Let
G = J1−γ
Then if J satisfies (2.73) one easily checks that G(t, Y ) solves the linear partial differential equation
∂G
∂t
+ [Λ + γΞσ′]′
∂G
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
ΞΞ′
∂G
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+G
[
γ α+
γ(γ − 1)
2
σσ′
]
= 0 (2.74)
with terminal condition G(T, Y ) = 1. At this point we notice that the uniform ellipticity condition
we imposed on ΞΞ′ and the uniform boundedness and continuity of coefficients meet the standard
regularity conditions for this linear parabolic problem to possess a unique classical solution; a char-
acterization of the latter then follows from Feyman-Kac theorem. theorem.
Proposition 17 The unique solution of (2.74) is given by
G(t, y) = E−γσ
′ [
e
R
T
t (γα+
γ(γ−1)
2 σσ
′)ds
∣∣∣Y (t) = y]
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where Eγσ
′
[·] denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure
P−γσ
′
( · ) = E
[
E
(∫ T
0
−γσ′ · dZ(s)
)
1( · )
]
under which the state variables follow the dynamics
dY (t) = [Λ(Y ) + γΞ(Y )σ(t)] dt+ Ξ(Y ) dZ−γσ′(t) (2.75)
Z−γσ′(t) = Z(t) −
∫ t
0
γσ′(s)ds being a standard brownian motion under this measure. Furthermore
the value function of the optimization problem of the representative agent is given by
J(t, y) =
(
E
−γσ′
[
e
R
T
t (γα+
γ(γ−1)
2 σσ
′)ds
∣∣∣Y (t) = y]) 11−γ (2.76)
Notice that as an additional consequence of the coefficients’ boundedness the function G is bounded
from below and J inherits its smoothness. Furthermore the strictly convex minimization problem
appearing in (2.70) admits a unique solution. A standard verification theorem (for instance Fleming
and Soner (1993), Theorem 3.1) then implies optimality of (r, β) as detailed above and that the
value function of the problem is indeed J ad characterized in the Proposition.
Before considering the general ambiguity averse case, let us mention two explicit examples.
Example. Coefficients of the form (??).
One easily checks that (2.75) is a multivariate diffusion of the square root type under the measure
P−γσ
′
. Namely, according to the notation adopted in (??), let us write the dynamics of the state
variable as
dY (t) = [M(Y − Y (t)) + γNR 12U 12L′]dt+NR 12 dZ
We may hope to solve easily this specification if U = R. Notice that this is the only specification for
which the usual partial equilibrium assumption of an affine risk neutral drift is fulfilled in equilibrium.
In this case, with the additional notation
%0(γ) = γg0+
γ(γ − 1)
2
k+1∑
j=1
L2ju0j %i(γ) = γ g1i+
γ(γ − 1)
2
k+1∑
j=1
L2juji K0i = γ
k+1∑
j=1
Ljniju0j Kij = γ
k+1∑
z=1
Lznizuzj
so that
γα+
γ(γ − 1)
2
σσ′ = %0(γ) + %(γ) · Y
γΞσ′ = K0 +K Y
we may characterize explicitly the expectation involved in the value function G as an exponential
affine function of Y (see Duffie and Kan (1996)):
G(t, T, Y ) = exp(A(T − t)−B(T − t)′ · Y )
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dA(τ)
dτ
= −(Y ′M ′ +K′0)B(τ) +
1
2
k+1∑
i=1
(N ′B(τ))2iu0i − %0(γ)
dB(τ)
dτ
= −(M ′ −K′)B(τ)− 1
2
k+1∑
i=1
(N ′B(τ))2iui + %(γ)
where τ = T − t and these ODEs satisfy the initial conditions A(0) = 0 and B(0) = 0 1k. In light of
the expression for G we obtain
1
J
∂J
∂Y
=
1
1− γ
1
J
∂J
∂Y
=
B(τ)
γ − 1
so that the equilibrium short rate
r = g0 + g1 · Y + LU(Y )L′(γ − 1)− LU(Y )N ′B(τ)
is affine in the state variables vector Y.
Example. Quadratic models.
As an additional example, we consider the class of quadratic models that has recently received
attention in the literature. Let the instantaneous returns and volatility of the technology be affine
in the state variables and let these be multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes; then under P−γσ
′
they still have multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics39:
α(Y ) = g0 + g1 · Y σ = Y ′ N ′
k×(k+1)
dY (t) = [M(Y − Y (t)) + γNY ]dt+ dZ
If we define N˜ = N ′N then we may characterize explicitly the expectation involved in the value
function G as an exponential quadratic function of Y (see Leippold and Wu (2002) and references
therein):
G(t, T, Y ) = exp(−A(T − t)−B(T − t)′ · Y − Y ′ C(T − t)Y )
dC(τ)
dτ
=
γ(γ − 1)
2
N˜ − 2C(τ)(M − γN)− 2C(τ)′C(τ)
dB(τ)
dτ
= γg1 − (M − γN)B(τ)− 2C(τ)B(τ)− 2MY
dA(τ)
dτ
= γg0 + trace[C(τ)]− B(τ)
′B(τ)
2
−B(τ)′MY
where τ = T − t and these ODEs satisfy the initial conditions A(0) = 0,B(0) = 0 1k and C(0) =
0 1k1
′
k. In light of the expression for G we obtain
1
J
∂J
∂Y
=
2C(τ)Y +B(τ)
1− γ
39Z(t) has to be regarded as a new k-dimensional brownian motion obtained by suitable rescaling.
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so that the equilibrium short rate
r = g0 + g1 · Y + (γ − 1)Y ′N˜Y + Y ′N ′(2C(τ)Y +B(τ))
is quadratic in the state variables vector Y.
Let us consider again the HJB equation (2.69). The following proposition is obtained by mimicking
the line of reasoning adopted above and recalling the drift perturbation occurring under the reference
measure with aversion for ambiguity:
Proposition 18 Under suitable regularity conditions the unique solution of (2.69) is given by
J(t, y) =
(
E
−γσ′
[
e
R
T
t (γ(α+σ·h)+
γ(γ−1)
2 σσ
′)ds
∣∣∣Y (t) = y]) 11−γ (2.77)
where Eγσ
′
[·] denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure
P−γσ
′
( · ) = E
[
E
(∫ T
0
−γσ′ · dZ(s)
)
1( · )
]
under which the state variables follow the dynamics
dY (t) = [Λ(Y ) + Ξ(Y ) (γσ(t)′ + h(t))] dt+ Ξ(Y ) dZ−γσ′(t) (2.78)
Z−γσ′(t) = Z(t) −
∫ t
0
γσ′(s)ds being a standard brownian motion under this measure. Furthermore
the equilibrium interest rate and instantaneous excess returns on financial assets are given in terms
of the value function Ĵh by
r = α+
(
σ σ′ − σ Ξ′ 1
Ĵh
∂Ĵh
∂Y
)
(γ − 1) + σ · h (2.79)
β − r1k =
(
ϑσ′ − ϑΞ′ 1
Ĵh
∂Ĵh
∂Y
)
(1− γ) + ϑh
We emphasize the twofold effect of model uncertainty on equilibrium short rate and risk premia:
the direct first order impact arising through the term proportional to h and the effect on the value
function J due to the impact on the transition density with respect to which the expectation is
computed.
It is evident from what stated so far that the task of selecting an optimal Girsanov kernel h∗ amounts
to solving the program40
arg inf
h:(h′h≤2η(Y ))
Ĵh(t, Y ) = arg sup
h:(h′h≤2η(Y ))
E
[
e
R
T
t (γ(α+σ·h)+
γ(γ−1)
2 σσ
′)ds
∣∣∣Y (t) = y]
s.t dY (t) = [Λ(Y ) + Ξ(Y ) (γσ(t)′ + h(t))] dt+ Ξ(Y ) dZ(t)
40We drop the superscript γσ′ for ease of exposition.
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The HBJ equation satisfied by the value function J(t, Y ) is
∂J
∂t
+ sup
h:h′h≤2η(Y )
{
[Λ + Ξ(h+ γ σ′)]′
∂J
∂Y
+
1
2
trace
[
ΞΞ′
∂J
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+ J
[
γ (α+ σ · h) + γ(γ − 1)
2
σσ′
]}
= 0
with the terminal condition J(T, Y ) = 1. Performing the (formal) optimization within curly brackets
we obtain
h∗(ν, Y ) = − 1
ψ
(
Ξ(Y )′
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ(Y )′
)
where
ψ =
1√
2η(Y )
√(
Ξ(Y )′
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ(Y )′
)′(
Ξ(Y )′
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ(Y )′
)
Therefore, the process
h∗(Y ) = −
√
2η(Y )
Ξ(Y )′ ∂J∂Y + Jγσ(Y )
′√(
Ξ(Y )′ ∂J∂Y + Jγσ(Y )
′)′ (Ξ(Y )′ ∂J∂Y + Jγσ(Y )′) (2.80)
constitutes an optimal feed-back control, where J is a classical solution of the nonlinear partial
differential equation
∂J
∂t
+ [Λ + γ Ξσ′]′
∂J
∂Y
−
√
2η(Y )
√(
Ξ(Y )′
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ(Y )′
)′(
Ξ(Y )′
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ(Y )′
)
+
1
2
trace
[
ΞΞ′
∂J
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+ J
[
γ α+
γ(γ − 1)
2
σσ′
]
= 0 (2.81)
J(T, Y ) = 1.
Example. Time invariant pessimism
The case characterized by time invariant pessimism (η(Y ) = const.) and model coefficients of the
form (??) still constitutes a considerable technical challenge. We provide a solution for both tech-
nological returns and state variables’ returns displaying multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics.
Under P−γσ
′
the state variables are still multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic processes41:
α(Y ) = g0 + g1 · Y σ = σ̂
1×(k+1)
dY (t) = [M(Y − Y (t)) + γσ̂′]dt+ dZ
41As before we have scaled the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and expressed it in terms of a newly defined standard
k-dimensional brownian motion Z(t)
134
The HJB equation to be solved reads
∂J
∂t
+
[
M(Y − Y (t)) + γσ̂′]′ ∂J
∂Y
−
√
2η
√(
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ̂′
)′(
∂J
∂Y
+ Jγσ̂′
)
+
1
2
trace
[
∂J
∂Y ∂Y ′
]
+ J
[
γ (g0 + g1 · Y ) + γ(γ − 1)
2
σ̂σ̂′
]
= 0
whose solution is easily seen to be of the form:
J = exp(A(τ)−B(τ)′ · Y )
dB(τ)
dτ
= Y ′MB(τ) + γg′1
dA(τ)
dτ
=
√
2η
√
(−B(τ) + γσ̂′)′ (−B(τ) + γσ̂′)− (Y ′M ′ + γσ̂)B(τ)− B(τ)
′B(τ)
2
−
γg0 − γ(γ − 1)
2
σ̂σ̂′
A(0) = 0, B(0) = 0. Since
h∗(Y ) = −
√
2η
−B(τ) + γσ̂′√
(−B(τ) + γσ̂′)′ (−B(τ) + γσ̂′)
and 1J
∂J
∂Y = −B(τ), the short rate is affine in the state variable Y . Since the functional dependence
of equilibrium quantities on the state variable is not dissimilar from its counterpart arising in the non
ambiguity averse economy, time invariant pessimism in a multivariate gaussian framework implies
‘robustness’ with respect to ambiguity aversion.
As was the case for logarithmic felicity of intertemporal consumption, for coefficients of the general
form (??) we may notice that in the single factor, complete market specification, where h∗ = −√2η
the value function can be characterized analytically for the parametric restriction that makes the
model fall within the quadratic class. In this case it is easy to see that J = exp(A(τ)
√
Y +B(τ)Y +
C(τ)) for functions A,B,C solving suitable ODEs. Both effects due to model uncertainty induce
a term proportional to
√
Y in the expressions for the short rate and risk premia. The equilibrium
structure arising in the non ambiguity averse economy is not preserved in this (non robust) case.
Example. Time varying pessimism
Let us consider the case η(Y ) = η
√
Y and the single state variable model treated in 2.5. If U = R
the generalization to the multidimensional case can be carried out along the lines of (2.55). The
solution of the HJB equation
Jt + [m0 + (m1 + γnlρ)Y ]JY − Y
√
2η
Y
√
(γJlρ− nJY )2 + γ2J2l2(1− ρ2)+
n2Y
2
JY Y + Y
(
γg1 +
γ(γ − 1)
2
l2
)
J = 0
135
is of the form
J = exp(A(τ)−B(τ)Y )
dB(τ)
dτ
= −B(τ)(m1 + γnlρ) + n
2
2
B2(τ)−
√
2η
Y
√
n2B2(τ)− 2γnσρlB(τ) + l2γσ2 + γ
γ − 1g1 +
γ
2
l2
dA(τ)
dτ
= −B(τ)m0
A(0) = 0, B(0) = 0. Since
h∗1 =
√
2η
Y
Y
lρ+ nB(τ)√
n2B2(τ)− 2γnσρlB(τ) + l2γσ2
h∗2 =
√
2η
Y
Y
l
√
1− ρ2√
n2B2(τ)− 2γnσρlB(τ) + l2γσ2
and 1J
∂J
∂Y = −B(τ), the short rate is still affine in the state variable Y .
The solutions of the additional cases of time varying pessimism treated in the paper may be recovered
as follows. If we write J(t, Y ) = H(Y ) +K(t, Y ) then direct substitution suggests that K(T, Y ) =
1−H(Y ); we may then conjecture K(t, Y ) = p(t)q(Y ) and mimic the solution approach pursued in
Appendix B. Notice that if we posit q(Y ) = exp(f(Y )) and H(Y ) = exp(g(Y )) then f and g can be
shown to be linear in Y by reasoning similarly to the case of logarithmic felicity, because the term
proportional to the square of their gradient does not affect the separation of variables argument.
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Figure 2.1: Two factor Gaussian model with time-varying pessimism. Volatility of instantaneous forward rates
under no ambiguity aversion plotted against time to maturity. Parameters have been set to {g1 = 0.3, g2 =
−.7, n2 = −0.29, n1 = .01,m1 = 0.1,m2 = 0.2, q = 0.12, L1 = .0076, L2 = .05, L3 = .005}
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Figure 2.2: Two factor Gaussian model with time-varying pessimism. Volatility of instantaneous forward rates
under ambiguity aversion (η = 0.005) plotted against time to maturity. Parameters have been set to {g1 =
0.3, g2 = −.7, n2 = −0.29, n1 = .01,m1 = 0.1,m2 = 0.2, q = 0.12}
137
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Figure 2.3: A typical path of the equilibrium short rate for η = 0.01 (black curve) compared to its counterpart
implied by the model with Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Parameters have been set to {Y = 0.25, l =
0.106, n = 0.1764, β = 0.03, g1 = 0.42,m1 = 0.3, Y = 0.25}, Y (0) = 0.193194 (η = 0) and Y (0) = 0.21
(η = 0.01) which corresponds to r(0) = 0.0789709 in both cases.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of equilibrium yield curves generated by the model with the same parameter set as the
previous figure and η = 0.001 (dotted line), η = 0 .
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Figure 2.5: Price of a call option (y) expiring in one year on a zero coupon bond with time to maturity 3 years
plotted against the ambiguity aversion parameter η (x). The parameter set is as in Figure (2.4).
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Figure 2.6: Black implied volatility curves for a call option that expires in one year on a zero coupon bond with
time to maturity 3 years generated by one factor model nested in (??). The parameter set is as in Figure (2.4).
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Figure 2.7: Black implied volatility curves for a floorlet on the 3month LIBOR (simple future interest rate)
generated by the model. The floorlet expires in one year and the parameter set is as in Figure (2.4). Subplots
correspond to different choices of η.
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Figure 2.8: Two-factor Longstaff and Schwartz model with ambiguity on the factor driving the volatility of
technological returns. Sample paths of short rates and equilibrium yield curves for η = 0 (black curves) and
η = 0.001 (yellow curves). In the subplots on the first column ρ = −0.5, on the second column ρ = 0.5.
Parameters have been set to {a = 0.18, σ = 0.134, f = 0.286, δ = 0.03, α = 0.22, c = 0.54, d = 0.5, β = 0, e =
0.237, l = 0.16}. l is the parameter of mean reversion in the dynamics of Y2, no longer constrained to f
2/4.
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Figure 2.9: Ceteris Paribus, prices of call options on zero coupon bonds are decreasing in the ambiguity aversion
parameter η (at least for small values) when ρ is negative (left panel), and increasing in η when ρ is positive
(right panel). We report an example where the strike is 0.77 the maturity is one year and the underlying has time
to maturity 3 years.
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Figure 2.10: Implied Black caplet volatilities generated by the two factor model with ρ = −0.5. The parameter
set is {a = 0.18, σ = 0.134, f = 0.286, δ = 0.03, α = 0.22, c = 0.54, d = 0.5, β = 0, e = 0.237, l = 0.16}. l is
the parameter of mean reversion in the dynamics of Y2
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Figure 2.11: One factor square root specification with time-varying pessimism. Equilibrium yield curves for
η = 0.01 (dashed line) and η = 0, with parameter set {Y = 0.18, l = 0.134, ρ = 0.9, n = 0.386, δ = 0.03, g1 =
0.5,m1 = 0.7, r = 0.075}
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Figure 2.12: One factor square root specification with time-varying pessimism. Equilibrium yield curves for
η = 0.01 (dashed line) and η = 0, with parameter set {Y = 0.18, l = 0.134, ρ = 0, n = 0.386, δ = 0.03, g1 =
0.5,m1 = 0.7, r = 0.075}
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Figure 2.13: One factor square root specification with time-varying pessimism. Equilibrium yield curves for
η = 0.01 (dashed line) and η = 0, with parameter set {Y = 0.18, l = 0.134, ρ = −0.9, n = 0.386, δ = 0.03, g1 =
0.5,m1 = 0.7, r = 0.075} 141
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Figure 2.14: One factor square root specification with time-varying pessimism. Sensitivity of the mean reversion
parameter b(k)Y m1 with respect to ρ plotted against ρ and the ambiguity aversion parameter η. Parameters
have been set to {Y = 0.18, l = 0.134, n = 0.386, δ = 0.03, g1 = 0.5,m1 = 0.7}
5 10 15 20 25 30
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
Figure 2.15: One factor square root specification with time-varying pessimism. Sensitivity of the slope of the
yield curve (y) to the parameter η, for η = 0 and plotted against time to maturity (x). The parameter set is
{Y = 0.18, l = 0.134, ρ = −0.9, n = 0.386, δ = 0.03, g1 = 0.5,m1 = 0.7, r = 0.075}
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Figure 2.16: Sensitivity of yield to maturity (y) with respect to η, for η = 0 and plotted against time to maturity
(x). The parameter set is {Y = 0.18, l = 0.134, ρ = −0.9, n = 0.386, δ = 0.03, g1 = 0.5,m1 = 0.7, r = 0.075}
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Figure 2.17: Equilibrium risk- neutral transition density of the short rate for different choices of η and the
parameter set {Y = 0.05, l = 0.134, ρ = −0.4, n = 0.154, β = 0.03, g1 = 0.1,m1 = 0.3, t = 3, T = 5, r = 0.05}
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Figure 2.18: Price (y) of an out-of-the-money call option with strike K = 0.9 expiring in T = 5 on a zero
coupon bond with maturity s = 7 for different choices of η (x) and parameter set {Y = 0.05, l = 0.134, ρ =
−0.4, n = 0.154, β = 0.03, g1 = 0.1,m1 = 0.3, t = 3, T = 5, r = 0.05}
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Figure 2.19: Black implied volatility curves for a call option with time to maturity of 5 years on a
zero coupon bond with time to maturity 7 years. The current forward prices at expiry of the underline are
(0.951212, 0.951345, 0.951444, 0.953023) for each of the values assumed by η. Parameters have been set to
{Y = 0.05, l = 0.134, ρ = −0.35, n = 0.154, β = 0.03, g1 = 0.1,m1 = 0.3, t = 3, T = 5, r = 0.05}
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Chapter 3
Concluding Remarks
Allowing financial agents to posses a complete knowledge of the data generating process is a stringent
modelling requirement. While acknowledging this fact, ambiguity aversion provides a still tractable
modelling framework for addressing the lack of precision in the probabilistic description of the data
generating model. In continuous-time, the requirement of absolute continuity of the multiple beliefs
that the agent involves in his optimization problem implies that ambiguity essentially pertains
the conditional mean of the financial opportunity set’s evolution, in accordance with the intuition
that first conditional moments are notoriously more difficult to identify than, for instance, second
conditional moments.
The present thesis is an attempt to investigate whether two classical modelling framework like a Cox
Ingersoll and Ross economy and a two-agent rational expectations equilibrium environment may
benefit from a concern for ambiguity in terms of realistic predictions. Our findings support those
of the recent strand of literature that deems ambiguity aversion as a candidate for assessing several
‘puzzles’ documented by the financial community. Indeed both Chapters document the ability of
this preference ordering representation to affect equilibriums quantities in a way that point towards
empirical evidence, at least from the qualitative point of view.
One possible criticism to which this ambiguity set-up may be prone, is the observation that investors
seem to dogmatically expect the worst while ignoring the information flow, thus remaining trapped
in their invariant ambiguous probabilistic description of future contingencies. Whether model un-
certainty preserves or even enhances its appealing once learning is accounted for is an issue that
only very recently deserved the attention of the authors. The answers provided so far have em-
phasized that ambiguity may well fail to resolve asymptotically, so that ” asset pricing relations
under ambiguity aversion but no learning can be interpreted as the limit of an equilibrium learning
process under ambiguity aversion” ( Leippold, Trojani and Vanini (2004)1). As of the second point
implicit in the criticism above, that is, the dogmatic worst case optimizing behavior, the response
to this question certainly relies on whether the ubiquitous identification of aversion for ambiguity
with preference for robustness is an admissible one. The inspiration for the latter interpretation
comes from the analogy with the methods of robust control exploited by the approach pioneered by
1In this respect, see also Knox (2004) and Epstein and Schneider (2002).
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Hansen, Sargent and coauthors, and to a lesser extent, from the analogy with the robust statistics’
methodologies. While the multiplicity of beliefs considered may be interpreted as local contami-
nation of a reference model, the optimization criterion implied by an ambiguity averse preference
ordering does not deliver robust policies, i.e., policies that preserve stability of the indirect utility
across these local contaminations. By construction, if Girsanov kernels are selected according to the
criteria we have been analyzing, the indirect utility is increasing in the ‘direction of the true’ data
generating model, provided it is represented by a Girsanov kernel in the admissible set. Whether
an axiomatic theory of ‘robust’ decision making may be constructed with the priority of delivering
smoothness of the value functions involved across possible models is an open question.
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